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Cybersecurity is a growing threat not only to nations, critical infrastructure, and major 
entities, but also to smaller organizations and individuals.  The growing number of 
successful attacks on all manner of U.S. targets highlights the need for effective and 
comprehensive policy from the local to federal level, though most research focuses on 
federal policy issues, not state issues.  The purpose of this study was to examine the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process within the current cybersecurity policy 
environment in a southern state of the United States.  Sabatier’s advocacy coalition 
framework served as the theoretical framework for the study.  Data were collected 
through 5 semistructured interviews with individuals who were either elected or 
appointed officials, emergency managers, or subject matter experts.  These data were 
transcribed, then coded and analyzed with McCracken’s analytic categorization 
procedure.  Participants recognized that the federal government provides some resources 
but acknowledged that action at the state level is largely funded through the state 
resulting in a network of dissimilar policies and protocols in states across the country.  
Findings also revealed that state leadership in some locations better grasps what resources 
are needed and is more likely to earmark in order to plan for unanticipated cybersecurity 
needs of the public. Analysis of study data also highlighted areas for future study and 
identified needed resources or areas of opportunity for creating a more comprehensive 
and effective cybersecurity policy environment.  Implications for positive social change 
include recommendations for state and federal decision makers to engage in community 
partnerships in order to more effectively protect the public from cybersecurity threats.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The threat of cyberattacks and the need for effective defenses against these attacks 
are now part of everyday life around the world for major government entities as well as 
individual citizens.  Attacks may come in the form of hacks committed against companies 
or agencies at the local, state, or national level; spam e-mail or phishing attacks aimed at 
theft of personal information; or communication and coordination of terror attacks.  For 
as much as these threats are discussed as an emerging trend, it should be noted that they 
have existed in one form or another for at least 50 years.  The beginning decades of the 
Internet, threats were mitigated by barriers to entry for hackers and the limited 
connectivity of different networks and systems.  As the Internet flourished, so too did 
attacks, threats, and competency of hackers.  In recent years, and especially since the 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the ability of terrorists and state actors to utilize 
computers and other devices to coordinate and execute attacks has emerged as a primary 
focus of computer defense efforts (Kallberg & Thuraisingham, 2013).  These threats are 
not just increasing in number, but also in complexity and origin.  As threats evolve, there 
is an intensifying need to adjust techniques to address such threats. 
The global population is rapidly transitioning aspects of daily life from face-to-
face interactions onto the Internet for a variety of functions.  Leeuw and Leeuw (2012) 
stated that in 2011 over 2.1 billion users were using the Internet, a figure that increased 
500% since 2000, and has only increased in the last few years.  Such an increase in 
volume both provides a larger target audience for attacks and more space for hackers and 
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others to hide behind.  Hackers and other malicious actors and organizations benefit from 
the added volume as the sheer volume complicates the defense of networks proactive 
measures taken to identify potential hostile actions.  Those who pursue criminals and 
terrorists on the Internet, primarily intelligence agencies and law enforcement, require the 
ability to identify potential problems, conduct surveillance, and address threats.  With the 
increasing complexity and ubiquity of electronic devices and the number of technology 
savvy users, additional tools and permissions are needed to defend against cyberattacks. 
The modern phase of cybersecurity policy and procedures began in the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks.  When the details began to emerge about these 
attacks, lawmakers, members of the public, and others deliberated over the lengths to 
which the terrorists used Internet resources to coordinate their movements and plans.  The 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, commonly 
referred to as the Patriot Act, was intended to close some of the identified holes in 
security and provide resources to address future threats.  In crafting this sweeping and 
comprehensive legislation, legislators sought to address weaknesses in tracking terror 
financing, surveillance, law enforcement abilities, and coordination amongst the U.S. 
agencies charged with identifying and fighting terrorism, both online and on the ground 
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001). This legislation was passed in a matter of 
weeks following the attacks, marking a significant inflection point in U.S. policy making.  
Such a large-scale policy can typically take years to put together and pass through the 
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normal channels of policy making (see Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.), but 
the attacks compelled lawmakers to address the issue immediately.   
The Patriot Act set forth a new era of permissions and authorizations for the fight 
against terrorism and cyberattacks and was primarily focused on issues at the federal 
level.  The next major national policy was not published until 2011, in Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD) 20.  In PPD-20, the administration provided for two separate goals 
(safeguarding cyberspace and confronting those who would disrupt it) and identified 
areas where responsible agencies could conduct either defensive or offensive actions to 
counter those threats (International Strategy for Cyberspace, 2011).  This policy, along 
with most other legislation and international laws, assumes that national-level agencies 
maintain some level of primacy in the fight against cyberattacks (Glennon, 2012).  The 
federal government has several different initiatives under the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to assist state and local governments with improving cybersecurity, but 
the initiatives remain a patchwork system.  These programs range from voluntary 
membership in groups to help guide policy and educate the public to voluntary reporting 
of cyberattacks against individuals or interests (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency, n.d.).  Under this umbrella, each of the 50 states, along with local, territorial, and 
tribal governments, enact their own legislation, policies, and procedures to fight 
cyberterrorism and cyberattacks against their interests and citizens interests 
(Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, n.d.). 
The state of Tennessee has a diverse population in terms of its citizens, public and 
private entities, and infrastructure.  The state legislature, in its governance of such a 
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diverse base, is required to develop policies and procedures that can cover all 
contingencies, something that can be difficult considering the varied resources and 
populations included.  Legislators have found it a challenge to draft cybersecurity laws to 
address concerns of large cities, small towns, urban, and rural areas alike.  In conducting 
this inquiry, I sought to determine whether the current policy development process and 
decision-making framework meets the needs of the field agencies throughout the state.  
Tennessee has 95 counties, each with its own mayor and sheriff’s department, in addition 
to over 200 police departments that serve as first responders for crime, terror, and 
cyberattacks.  Across these entities, counties range from among the richest in the country 
to the poorest, with a wide array of social, educational, and cultural backgrounds (County 
Technical Assistance Service, n.d.).  In this study I focused on four counties in Middle 
Tennessee: Davidson, Giles, Maury, and Williamson.  Davidson County is home to 
Nashville, the state capitol, and is primarily an urban environment.  Williamson is a 
suburban community with several more affluent and rapidly expanding areas (County 
Technical Assistance Service, n.d.).  Giles and Maury County are primarily rural counties 
comprised mostly of small towns and agricultural lands (County Technical Assistance 
Service, n.d.). 
Making policies and procedures to account for the different resource levels, 
infrastructure, and usage differences across these counties is a demanding task.  The 
behaviors of the legislators can be described using the bounded rational choice theory.  In 
this theory of policy setting and behavior, the actions of legislators is intended to be 
rational (McLean, 1991).  However, several factors can influence the decision-making 
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process, with emotion and attention standing out as the main causal factors (McLean, 
1991) .  The emotional aspect may encompass a range of influences, from the 
individual’s personal beliefs on a subject to pressures posed by friends or colleagues on 
how to vote for a particular issue (McLean, 1991). These pressures can be the result of 
political party affiliation, activist positioning, or self-interests, to name a few.  Attention 
is an important factor to consider when examining legislative decision-making as there 
are generally more issues being deliberated than a given legislature can manage at once 
(McLean, 1991) .  This can provide an opportunity for small, vocal groups to take a 
larger role in setting the agenda than might otherwise be anticipated.  Areas of interest 
that are believed to be under control or successfully managed might take less precedence 
than those believed to need more direct intervention in the near term, no matter the 
reality. 
Background 
Cybersecurity is an emerging topic in public discourse, but it is hardly a new 
phenomenon.  The first concerns over computer security date back to the use of the first 
computers in government facilities in the 1960s.  At that time, it was understood that 
multiple users on the same mainframe could access shared data, requiring standard 
clearance to certain systems or the removal of classified data after its use (Warner, 2012).  
That realization was followed, over the next three decades, by three additional insights, 
according to Warner (2012): “Computers can be hacked and data stolen, we can build 
computer attack into military arsenals, [and] others might do that to us – and perhaps 
already are” (p.782).  These insights and realizations among U.S. leadership evolved 
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along with the use and broader acceptance of computers for a wide range of uses.  The 
ongoing threats and concerns over cybersecurity led to a series of national policies, 
culminating in the 1990s with the first national cybersecurity strategies and directives 
(Warner, 2012). 
It was in this period of flux and policy development of the 1980s and 1990s that 
the events that led to September 11, 2001, occurred.  The policies created under the USA 
PATRIOT ACT sought to close loopholes and provide intelligence and law enforcement 
with additional tools to combat the threats identified in that attack (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001).  One of the lasting lessons of 9/11 was how well suited 
the Internet is for coordination and collaboration for terrorist groups.  The lack of unified 
standards across the globe and the uneven enforcement of standards provide any number 
of loopholes for groups to create their own web pages or smaller sections in existing 
frameworks (Heidenriech & Gray, 2014).   Al-Qaeda was known at the time of the law’s 
passage to have an extensive Internet presence, a fact that was only reinforced during 
intelligence gathering efforts during the war in Afghanistan (Heidenriech & Gray, 2014). 
In the years since 9/11, the usage of the Internet has grown, but there has not been 
a unified effort to close security gaps around the world.  Certain regions and groups are 
seeking a more comprehensive stance, but there are loopholes and opportunities for terror 
groups and individuals in every country (Tripathi, 2015).  Into this landscape, the United 
States inserted the Department of Defense’s Cyber Command, several intelligence 
agencies, and the DHS, each with their own missions, rules of engagement, and virtual 
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territories.  Current legislation before Congress seeks to enhance the cooperation of DHS 
and the private sector, as private interests are believed to own and operate 95% of the 
information infrastructure in the United States (Tripathi, 2015).  Although the United 
States has devoted a significant amount of resources to cybersecurity and will for the 
foreseeable future (Department of Homeland Security, 2019), it lacks both leadership for 
its cybersecurity efforts and a comprehensive policy for directing them. 
Underneath this umbrella of federal agencies and policies, each of the individual 
states also manage cyberattacks.  Under the current framework, federal agencies, 
especially the DHS, Secret Service, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, are the 
main conduit for investigation and pursuit of cyber criminals and terrorists who mount 
attacks against U.S. interests.  Federal lawmakers have given states a certain amount of 
leeway in their prosecution of cyberattacks but have requested voluntary reporting to 
federal agencies if the activity falls within certain parameters.  Specifically, if the attack 
could impact national security or interests; corrupt networks; or is a violation of federal 
or State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial (SLTT) law, a report is recommended (Department 
of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Cyber Incident Reporting Guide, 2016).  
Law enforcement is viewed by the DHS as the first line of defense for responding 
to reports of cybercrime and conducting preliminary investigations.  Furthermore, the 
DHS relies on the SLTT governments to “maintain systems and data, hire and train 
cybersecurity professionals, determine and enforce policy, and engage in cybersecurity 
awareness to develop a cyber-savvy public” (National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Careers and Studies, 2016)  With the escalating pace and rigor of cyberattacks at all 
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levels of the government and against private citizens, there is a dearth of research on 
whether the current policy environment is sufficient for state agencies to combat this 
emerging threat.  Existing research focuses on federal efforts to secure government 
websites and networks, not on policies and programs at the state level. 
Problem Statement 
Cybersecurity is a rapidly evolving issue across all walks of life and has direct 
impacts on states, individuals, corporations, and national interests (Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Administration, n.d.).  Many news stories and research articles 
revolve around how national governments and private companies are fighting these 
attacks, with new information coming almost daily from around the world).  However, 
U.S. states are also addressing cybersecurity issues, with at least 35 states passing over 
312 laws on cybersecurity in 2018 and 2019 alone (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2019 (2)).  There is much less understanding of how well the current policy 
environment suits field agencies at the state level.  This gap in knowledge is important 
because such agencies play a pivotal role in addressing such threats.  During 2018 and 
2019, an average of 6 U.S. government agencies were reported hacked per month 
(Passeri, 2019).  Due to the nature of cybersecurity and the sensitive nature of the 
information, the true number of attacks and the impact of those attacks remains unknown. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the current policy development and 
environment in Middle Tennessee regarding cybersecurity.  The primary focus of the 
study was with federal policies and programs on cybersecurity; I tracked the guidance 
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and resources provided from the federal government to the lower tiers of government.  
The federal government has primacy in addressing cybersecurity policy and enforcement, 
but the state and local governments also have a place in the process.  I also sought to 
determine the impact of current policy development and enactment on cybersecurity 
agencies and operations at the state level, specifically in Tennessee.  With the rapid 
evolution of cyber threats and their increased preeminence, the standard policy process 
can leave agencies without required tools and resources (President’s Information 
Technology Advisory Committee, 2005).  The terror attacks of 9/11 marked a significant 
increase in the tools and permissions granted to intelligence and law enforcement to 
identify, track, and pursue those involved in terrorist activity and cyberattacks.  As the 
rate of attacks has increased in the intervening years, it is unclear whether the policies are 
keeping pace with the needs of the field agencies. 
Research Questions 
The main research question (Research Question 1) for this inquiry was whether 
the current cybersecurity policy at the federal level provides sufficient guidance and tools 
for the State of Tennessee, along with connecting state, county, and municipal 
governments.  I analyzed study data to assess whether the current guidance meets the 
threats and structure of the state, or if the changing nature of the threats against the state 
require a different methodology to better support the field agencies.  The secondary 
question (Research Question 2) centered on whether the current implementation of 
cybersecurity policies and programs match the original plans.  Discrepancies can arise 
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from a variety of factors, ranging from lack of resources or communication to conflicting 
organizational goals and legislative directives.   
Theoretical Framework 
As cybersecurity emerged as a topic of concern and importance for the United 
States, researchers have conducted numerous studies to clarify how policies came to be, 
what should happen next, and what needs to be done to fix the current state of the field.  
Although there are many perspectives on what is broken in the current cybersecurity 
system, how to fix it, and who is to blame for not having a better system, there is limited 
published research on how the policy decisions impact the operational field of 
cybersecurity, according to my review of the literature.  This is particularly true regarding 
the decisions and framework at the state and local levels.  I used the advocacy coalition 
framework (Sabatier, 1988) to evaluate the policy development and decision-making 
process around cybersecurity in Tennessee. 
Paul Sabatier first described the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) in 1988.  
Sabatier derived this methodology from the works of several other scholars, including 
Heclo, Weiss, Mazmanian, and Ostrom, and sought to both synthesize their work and 
close identified gaps.  In his readings and research, Sabatier stated that the higher-level 
influences included in established frameworks only captured part of the impact of the 
policy actors within the decision cycle (Sabatier, 1988).  To improve upon these 
influences and dynamics of the policymaking process, Sabatier identified three different 
aspects of policy development: inclusion of subject matter experts and groups working in 
the targeted field; the use of feedback loops in the decision-making process; and 
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recognition that interest groups in development cycles often behave similar to 
individuals, with corresponding beliefs and behaviors (Sabatier, 1988).  Each of these 
aspects supplements the macro approach originally described by Heclo and helps to 
provide a much more thorough exploration of the policy development and decision-
making process (Sabatier, 1988, p. 129-133). 
When examining the cybersecurity framework and policy environment in 
Tennessee, it is important to understand how policy decisions are made by the legislators.  
I used Sabatier’s (1988) ACF outline as shown in Appendix A to examine in detail the 
wide range of influences, actors, events, interest groups, and learning behaviors that 
affect the policy making process.  The policy subsystem is the area of the framework 
where Sabatier focused most of his attention, particularly the learning feedback loop.  
This subsystem includes policy analysts, subject matter experts, and others studying 
established policy to provide lessons learned, unintended consequences, and secondary 
impacts of the policy decisions (Sabatier, 1988).  Use of the ACF requires at least a 
decade worth of data to properly capture the learning process for a given policy 
environment (Sabatier, 1988).  For this study, I examined the United States’ 
cybersecurity policy from the 9/11 attacks onward. 
Nature of the Study 
I used a qualitative design and a case study approach.  This research utilized 
multiple sources of information to evaluate the nature and scope of guidance and 
resources provided by federal cybersecurity policy to the states, specifically Tennessee.  
Further, it examined whether the operational policies and programs in the State of 
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Tennessee match the published policies and legislative vision.  The first section of 
research included an in-depth examination of publicly available federal, state, and local 
policies, along with an outline of the various programs currently in use to improve 
communication and reporting among the states and localities.  
 Once I completed the policy analysis, I conducted targeted interviews with 
legislators and agency representatives to gain insight into the policy process.  I requested 
interviews with the Senators and Representatives at the Federal and State levels, along 
with representatives from the governor’s office, the state information officer, Safety and 
Homeland Security, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI), the Tennessee 
Emergency Management Agency (TEMA), cybersecurity experts working with the State, 
County, and local governments, and the county executive offices of the four counties 
targeted for this study.  I also contacted city leadership in each of the nine major cities 
located in the four targeted counties to solicit interviews for the study.  The intent was to 
conduct interviews with every willing participant to gain a broad base of understanding 
into the policy environment, process, and operations across the geographic area.  
Interview questions included how threats are identified, what the follow-up procedures 
are, how success is measured, and who is included in the development of new and/or 
updated policies. 
 I collated and evaluated the interview responses to provide a more robust 
understanding of the current state of cybersecurity in Tennessee.  The information from 
legislators provided details about policy development and what information feeds into the 
decision-making process surrounding cybersecurity.  This can assist in shaping future 
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discussions and policy development going forward, both within the current organization 
and ways to improve the process.  The data gleaned from the field agencies was 
examined alongside the responses from the legislators to identify any gaps or 
convergences in their views of cybersecurity in Tennessee. 
Definitions 
Cybersecurity literature and discussions of policy decisions include a myriad of 
specialized definitions.  Some key terms for this study and their definitions follow: 
Attack: Any unauthorized activity that attempts to collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, 
or destroy information system resources or the information itself (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2009. 
Blue Team: A term signifying a group of individuals who serve as defenders in 
training exercises during planned exercises.  This term also refers to groups brought in to 
harden commercial or third-party networks before attempted penetration by an authorized 
party (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Chief information officer: The agency official responsible for (a) providing advice 
and other assistance to the head of the executive agency and other senior management 
personnel of the agency to ensure that information systems are acquired and information 
resources are managed in a manner consistent with laws, executive orders, directives, 
policies, regulations, and priorities established by the head of the agency; (b) developing, 
maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated information 
system architecture for the agency; and (c) promoting the effective and efficient design 
and operation of all major information resources management processes for the agency, 
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including improvements to work processes of the agency (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2009). 
Computer network attack: Actions taken through use of computer networks to 
disrupt, deny, degrade, manipulate, or destroy computers, computer networks, or 
information residing in computers and computer networks (National Security Presidential 
Directive 54, 2008). 
Computer network defense: Actions taken to defend against unauthorized activity 
within computer networks. These actions include monitoring, detection, analysis (such as 
trend and pattern analysis), and response and restoration activities (Committee on 
National Security Systems, 2009). 
Critical infrastructure: Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health, or 
safety, or any combination of those matters (Committee on National Security Systems, 
2009). 
Cyberattack: An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of 
cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling 
a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing 
controlled information (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Cybersecurity: Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of 
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire 
communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, 
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to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation 
(National Security Presidential Directive 54, 2008). 
Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of 
the interdependent network of information systems infrastructures, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Denial of service (DoS): The prevention of authorized access to resources or the 
delaying of time-critical operations. Time-critical may be milliseconds, or it may be 
hours, depending upon the service provided (Committee on National Security Systems, 
2009). 
Digital forensics: The processes and specialized techniques for gathering, 
retaining, and analyzing system-related data (digital evidence) for investigative purposes 
(National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS): A denial of service technique that uses 
numerous hosts to perform the attack (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
e-government (e-gov): The use by the U.S. government of web-based Internet 
applications and other information technology (Committee on National Security Systems, 
2009). 
Enterprise risk management: A comprehensive approach to risk management that 
engages people, processes, and systems across an organization to improve the quality of 
decision-making for managing risks that may hinder an organization’s ability to achieve 
its objectives (National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
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Exposure: The condition of being unprotected, thereby allowing access to 
information or access to capabilities that an attacker can use to enter a system or network 
(National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS): A standard for adoption and 
use by Federal agencies that has been developed within the Information Technology 
Laboratory and published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a part 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009).  
A FIPS covers some topic in information technology in order to achieve a common level 
of quality or some level of interoperability (Committee on National Security Systems, 
2009). 
Incident: An assessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system, or the information the 
system processes, stores, or transmits, or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of 
violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies (Committee 
on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Information assurance (IA): Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009).  
These measures include providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 




Information operations (IO): The integrated employment of the core capabilities 
of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 
deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision-making processes, information, and information systems while protecting one’s 
own (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Information security (IS): The protection of information and information systems 
from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in 
order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2010). 
Information system: A discrete set of information resources organized for the 
collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of 
information (United States Code 44, 2009). 
Information system security officer (ISSO): An individual assigned the 
responsibility by the senior agency information security officer, authorizing official, 
management official, or information system owner of ensuring that the appropriate 
operational security posture is maintained for an information system or program 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017). 
Investigation: A systematic and formal inquiry into a qualified threat or incident 
using digital forensics and perhaps other traditional criminal inquiry techniques to 
determine the events that transpired and to collect evidence (National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
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Mitigation: The application of one or more measures to reduce the likelihood of 
an unwanted occurrence and/or lessen its consequences (National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
Network resilience: A computing infrastructure that provides continuous business 
operation (i.e., highly resistant to disruption and able to operate in a degraded mode if 
damaged), rapid recovery if failure does occur, and the ability to scale to meet rapid or 
unpredictable demands (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Passive attack: An actual assault perpetrated by an intentional threat source that 
attempts to learn or make use of information from a system, but does not attempt to alter 
the system, its resources, its data, or its operations (National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
Penetration testing: A test methodology in which assessors, typically working 
under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent or defeat the security features of an 
information system (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Phishing: The act of deceiving individuals into disclosing sensitive personal 
information through deceptive computer-based means (Committee on National Security 
Systems, 2009). 
Red Team: A group of people authorized and organized to emulate a potential 
adversary’s attack or exploitation capabilities against an enterprise’s security posture 
(Committee on National Security Systems, 2009).  The Red Team’s objective is to 
improve enterprise information assurance by demonstrating what works for the defenders 
in an operational environment (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
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Security policy: A rule or set of rules that govern the acceptable use of an 
organization’s information and services to a level of acceptable risk and the means for 
protecting the organization’s information assets (National Initiative for Cybersecurity 
Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
Security test and evaluation (ST&E): Examination and analysis of the safeguards 
required to protect an information system, as they have been applied in an operational 
environment, to determine the security posture of that system (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2009). 
Social engineering: An attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., 
a password) that can be used to attack an enterprise (Committee on National Security 
Systems, 2009). 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA): Networks or systems 
generally used for industrial controls or to manage infrastructure such as pipelines and 
power systems (Committee on National Security Systems, 2009). 
Threat assessment: The product or process of identifying or evaluating entities, 
actions, or occurrences, whether natural or constructed, that have or indicate the potential 
to harm life, information, operations, and/or property (National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, n.d.). 
US-CERT: A partnership between the DHS and the public and private sectors, 
established to protect the United States’ Internet infrastructure (Committee on National 
Security Systems, 2009).  US-CERT coordinates defense against and responses to 




There were four main assumptions for this inquiry.  The first and greatest 
assumption was that some level of access will be granted to both legislative and field 
offices to conduct the interviews.  While each of the individuals included in the 
description of the study had a full schedule and many duties, I assumed that either the 
lead or a representative from each office would be made available to provide insight and 
a response for the inquiry. 
 The second assumption was that any feedback or information received would be a 
true and honest representation of the current operating environment to the best of the 
ability of the respondent.  There are many reasons why responses could have been 
incomplete or not fully accurate.  These include everything from an incomplete 
knowledge of the situation, a rushed response, conflicting loyalties, or suspicion of a lack 
of anonymity of the responses.  I did not attempt to qualify responses or determine the 
veracity of each response.  Multiple sources were targeted for this inquiry to help identify 
outliers and mitigate the potential impact of inaccuracies or incomplete information. 
 The third assumption was the current policy environment had a measurable or 
demonstrable impact on field agencies in Tennessee.  With cybersecurity a rapidly 
evolving and high-visibility issue in the world today, any new policy could have a major 
impact.  The last assumption was that each of the targeted individuals (legislators, subject 
matter experts, law enforcement officers) had some level of engagement with the 
cybersecurity environment.  The legislators and law enforcement professionals have a 
wide range of demands on their time, but it was expected they would have at least a basic 
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knowledge and understanding of the current policy and operational environment.  The 
lack of resources available agencies to undertake all desired cybersecurity activities or 
programs was also assumed.  It was hoped participants would provide wider insight into 
the challenges faced than simple lack of manpower, specialized training, or additional 
funding on their own. 
Scope and Delimitations 
 
Scope 
 This inquiry began with a brief exploration of the history of information security 
and cybersecurity policy from their inception until approximately 2000.  The overview of 
these areas provided background about cybersecurity, framed current policy issues and 
concerns, and identified trends in security posture and oversight through the years.  A 
more in-depth examination of the cybersecurity policy environment from 2000 through 
the 9/11 terror attacks, and the implementation of the USA Patriot Act and related 
legislation through 2003, was also conducted.  This period provided insight into law 
enforcement and government attitudes on cybersecurity before 9/11 and the significant 
changes in legislation, oversight, and authority that originated from this period.  The main 
focus of the inquiry traced the cybersecurity policy environment from this post-9/11 wave 
of legislation to the present day.  The intervening span of 14 years met the ACF time 
requirement to capture the learning and feedback loops and allowed for tracking and 
identification of trends and changes within the environment.  Department of Defense 
Policies and Organizations and the current federal priorities, issues, and pending 
22 
 
legislation were also addressed to capture the emerging state of the federal policy 
environment.  At that point, legislative actions since 2003 in the state of Tennessee were 
examined, along with current state operations, programs, and pending legislation.  The 
differences or gaps between the federal and state policies and programs were used to 
create the interview instrument and shape the inquiry going forward. 
 The interviews, as noted previously, reached out to legislators, appointed officials, 
and subject matter experts of multiple tiers within three counties in the state of 
Tennessee.  This included the Governor, state Chief Information Officer, county mayors 
and information officers, sheriffs, local mayors, chiefs of police, chief detectives, and 
cybersecurity professionals supporting or assigned to public agencies.  If the principal for 
each if these offices was not available, representation from the offices was requested for 
the targeted interviews.  Over 100 interviews were requested during this process.  The 
information from the initial round of interviews was collated and analyzed to determine if 
any individuals stand out for follow up or additional requests.  The interviews focused on 
policy development and engagement levels around cybersecurity by the participants, how 
well they feel the state’s needs are being met, and any areas they felt should be improved. 
Delimitations 
 The most important delimitations for this study were gaining Institutional Review 
Board permissions and presenting a clear and concise plan to the agencies targeted for 
inclusion.  The Institutional Review Board, or IRB, is an organization within a university 
(Walden University IRB for this study) that ensures research conducted by students 
“complies with the university’s ethical standards as well as U.S. federal regulations.  IRB 
23 
 
approval is required before collection of any data, including pilot data” (Walden 
University Center for Research Quality, n.d.).  As noted in the subsequent discussion of 
limitations, gaining access and overcoming resistance of agency officials will be among 
the most significant hurdles.  Being able to ensure the anonymity of all those involved in 
the study, along with providing information on what information will be collected and 
how it will be used are critical for the success of the study.  The secondary delimitation 
for the study was to be as efficient as possible in my dealings with the different agencies 
and when conducting interviews to make the inquiry as painless as possible for those 
willing to participate. 
Limitations 
There were several different limitations for this inquiry into the current state of 
cybersecurity policy in Tennessee.  While the Congressional Record has many different 
pieces of legislation and many Executive Orders are public knowledge, some aspects of 
cybersecurity policy are classified.  The same may also be true for state and local 
governments, constraining this investigation to publicly available information.  This left 
the inquiry open to incompleteness but does not obviate the potential benefits of the 
study.  There were also time limitations for the inquiry, especially regarding the demands 
on the time of the individuals targeted for the study.  Legislators, subject matter experts, 
and law enforcement professionals each have many daily demands on their time, 
requesting dedicated time beyond their scheduled duties added to that workload.   
 Alongside the time constraints, gaining access to each of the individuals targeted 
was also a potential limiting factor.  Along with the concerns about time available of each 
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of those targeted, there were also concerns about the line of questioning or how responses 
would be communicated.  Politics, fear of reprisal, concern about the responses provided, 
unwillingness to admit limited knowledge, or lack of control all tempered the willingness 
for individuals, agencies, or groups to participate.  Each of those concerns was addressed 
to ensure maximum participation and adequate coverage of all viewpoints. 
 The final limitation also tied into the access question and dealt with the possibility 
of identifying weaknesses or openings in the current cybersecurity framework.  This 
limitation was potentially the most significant issue to be addressed when dealing with 
the legislators and field agencies targeted.  The purpose of this study was not to delve 
into specifics or operational concerns but focus on the policies and procedures that allow 
field agencies to conduct cybersecurity operations.  Providing advance information on the 
type of responses requested and explaining how that information would be packaged and 
utilized assisted in setting parameters for interviews. 
Significance 
 The results of this study are important as they can help define the existing 
cybersecurity environment in Tennessee from multiple perspectives.  By examining the 
current framework from different points of view, a better snapshot could be taken of 
opportunities for improvement and areas of strength.  Currently, only minimal research 
exists on how states are reacting to the threat of cyberterrorism and other cyberattacks, 
leaving a gap in understanding of how the different sides view the whole.  It was 
anticipated this inquiry would suggest additional research areas to better define the 
current cybersecurity environment and available options.  It was also hoped this inquiry 
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would help to open dialogue on both sides, legislative and operational, particularly in 
areas of disagreement.  Identifying such areas of opportunity may also help push 
conversations on other topics, such as adding a cybersecurity post to the Tennessee 
Cabinet, creating additional opportunities or programs for cybersecurity education and 
training, or establishing best practices for vendor selection and security considerations. 
 With differences in perspectives shared between legislators and field offices, it 
may be possible for the subject matter experts to better fill in the gaps.  Those individuals 
in the Strategic Technology, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, Tennessee Department 
of Homeland Security, and others remain best positioned to react to changes in the 
cybersecurity landscape and keep both legislators and other field agencies apprised of 
emerging trends.  Law enforcement professionals and legislators alike are not always 
educated and equipped to follow technical trends and may not be able to work proactively 
with regard to cybersecurity. This research could help to inform those involved in the 
policy development process of the challenges and impacts faced by the cybersecurity 
field as a result of the current environment.  While making this information available may 
not change the way policies are created or developed, it can be utilized to start the 
conversation or push for additional updates. 
Social Change Implications 
 The primary benefit of this inquiry from a social change standpoint is the 
improved safety and security for both the state and the individual.  By collecting data 
from the legislative and operational sides of the cybersecurity environment gaps and 
potential weaknesses could be more readily identified and solutions prepared before they 
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become significant issues.  Addressing these issues from the state level could also help 
inform discussion at both the federal and local levels, further enhancing security and 
counterterrorism initiatives. 
Another social change benefit is the potential for the protection of civil liberties.  
As proactive measures are put into place to correct weaknesses and identified gaps in the 
cybersecurity framework less drastic measures will likely be needed in the event of a shift 
in threat or severe cyber-attack.  One legacy from the 9/11 attacks was the discussion on 
whether the regulations put into place in the immediate aftermath of the attacks went too 
far in their authorizations for surveillance and other activities.  By establishing a more 
dynamic system such transformative events may be prevented or the impact or reality of 
them better understood. 
Summary 
The complex and diverse nature of the cybersecurity threat in the current global 
environment is difficult to overstate.  Reports on new threats, attacks, or tools used by 
nation-states, terrorists, or hackers appear daily in news reports around the world.  With 
much of the focus going towards national security and developing cross-border standards 
to combat this threat, it is critical to improve our understanding of the effectiveness of the 
current cybersecurity environment at the state and local levels.  This chapter outlined the 
issue and discussed the advocacy coalition framework, which can impact the direction 
and effectiveness of policy decision-making.   
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth overview of cybersecurity, highlight critical 
legislation over the years, and conduct and intensive review of cybersecurity policy from 
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five years ago through current day.  The next chapter provides insight into the origins and 
usage of the advocacy coalition framework in qualitative research and the existing policy 
development and operation framework in Tennessee.  Chapter 3 describes the research 
methodology, the instruments that will be utilized for both the interview and survey 
portions of the inquiry, and the utility of the measuring instruments.  Chapter 4 will 
present the results of the study, and Chapter 5 will summarize the findings of the study, 
and offer possible recommendations for social change, potential changes in the 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Protecting the United States against cyber threats is a complex undertaking with 
no single solution or path to prevention.  The very underpinnings of cybersecurity 
strategy vary depending on the source of the strategy and the focus of the agency 
involved.  The individual citizen has a very different set of risks and behaviors than a 
local bank, and each of these differ from government entities and industries at the 
national and international level.  Much of the current literature focuses on cybersecurity 
at the larger scale, along with how to protect interests through national and international 
action (see CITE).  To address this gap in the literature, I examined the role played by 
state and local legislators and agencies, as the federal government lists these as the first 
line of defense and investigation in cybercrimes (see CITE).  Specifically, I examined the 
current state of cybersecurity legislation and policy from both elected official and 
emergency management perspectives. 
This chapter includes an overview of the literature search strategy and theoretical 
foundation of the study, along with a detailed review of the scholarly literature on 
cybersecurity.  The literature review includes sources from the past 5 years. I consider the 
history of and ongoing issues in cybersecurity, as well as review material related to the 
development and deployment of cybersecurity strategies in the United States and 
Tennessee.  The discussion also includes the rationale for the emphasis on cybersecurity 
at the state and local levels.  A brief history of cybersecurity from the 1970s onward is 
also included to provide a frame of reference for the current discussion and policy 
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environment.  The chapter begins with an overview of my literature search strategy.  In 
the section on the theoretical foundation for the study that follows, I will provide 
background information on and explain the choice of the ACF for this study. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature review for this study includes several different sources.  For the 
initial search I used the White House Archives and Congressional Records at the federal 
level and the Tennessee Congressional and Gubernatorial Legislature Records for the 
state level.  The searches of the records included key words such as telecommunications, 
computer security, critical infrastructure, cyber, cybersecurity, and state/local 
governments.  Congress did not have a single definition or usage for cyber issues prior to 
the Clinton Administration, which was the first presidential administration with 
widespread access to computers and e-mail (Warner, 2012).  Throughout the government 
an evolution of descriptors can be seen, from telecommunications, critical infrastructure, 
computer security, and various uses of cyber, in tracing the legislative and executive 
records from the earliest decisions to the current results.  My search of the Congressional 
Record, including all legislative formats, and using the specified key words, yielded 
several thousand results going back to 1850.  These results included bills, amendments, 
and resolutions of various types proposed by Congress, the majority of which are only 
remotely related to the matter at hand, if at all.  The earliest results concern installing 
communications wires in Florida while the latest provided specific details on 
cybersecurity operations and issues in today’s digital environment.  While most of the 
information does not apply, or need consideration in this study, these proposals are 
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instructive, if only to gain additional insight into the policy development process for 
telecommunications networks over time.  The search of the National Archive’s 
Presidential Libraries similarly returned a range of results on similar topics over time.  
The decision directives and executive orders over the past 40 years, however, provided an 
overview of the federal government’s priorities for communications security and 
structure of oversight (National Archives, 2016).  The search of the Tennessee 
Gubernatorial and Congressional Archives yielded many fewer proposals or directives. 
I performed secondary searches using the Homeland Security Digital Library, 
Walden University' online library, and Google Scholar.  These sites provided academic 
sources and articles on the history, scope, and nature of current cybersecurity policy and 
the different theoretical frameworks currently utilized in policy development.  The 
Homeland Security Digital Library yielded a number of sources and articles from 
individuals working in the cybersecurity and homeland security fields.  Use of this 
database also helped me to frame the standard problems cybersecurity researchers, 
scholars, and operators identify in the course of their work, along with proposed solutions 
and counters.  Demographic material and information on the different departments and 
agencies in the area came from the Tennessee government websites in the respective 
state, county, and local jurisdictions. 
I conducted a number of separate searches using Walden University Library 
resources.  A search for cybersecurity on the Thoreau multidatabase engine for peer-
reviewed articles returned 20,298 results.  A time-limited search between 2012-2017 with 
the same database and search term returned 9,500 results.  A search in SAGE Premier 
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journals (2001-2017) within the Public Administration and Politics and International 
Relations databases yielded 302 results.  A search for cybersecurity in the ACM Digital 
Library (2002-2017) returned 294 results.  The same key word search on Political 
Science Complete (1988-2017) returned 426 results, including 301 peer-reviewed articles 
in the full time period and 167 from 2012-2017.  A key word search of Science Direct 
yielded 2,296 results from 1998-2017 and 1,763 from 2012-2017.  Various key word 
searches were also conducted using a combination of terms (computer security, 
information security, cyberattacks, and cyberwarfare) across several other electronic 
databases, returning several hundred results.  I conducted these searches until July of 
2017, at which point I closed my literature review and competed the research proposal 
section of the research. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Cybersecurity is an inherently complex subject with different levels of oversight, 
engagement, and investment throughout the various layers of government.  When 
beginning the conversation about cybersecurity policy, it is important to realize it is not a 
recent issue.  One of the first works concerning information security was a paper by 
Thomas Rona, a scientist for Boeing, in 1976 (Berkowitz & Hahn, 2003).  Over the next 
four decades, cybersecurity gradually became known and generally accepted as an issue 
in public discourse (see Warner, 2012).  The public demand for additional protections 
was limited over the next several decades.  That attitude has changed significantly in the 
last few years, as identity theft, ransomware, and other malicious attacks have risen 
dramatically (Warner, 2012).  
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Within the context of this increasing demand by the public, officials at all levels 
of government in the United States have and continue to develop policies and procedures 
to secure cyberspace.  While much of this activity occurs at the federal level, state and 
local officials also have a role to play, along with law enforcement and emergency 
directors.  Federal cybersecurity policy establishes that federal agencies will assume 
primacy in most cyber cases, which is consistent with the international or interstate nature 
of many computer crimes (National Cyber Strategy, 2018).  The same policies, however, 
note that state, local, and tribal law enforcement will remain as the first line of defense 
and investigation for cybercrimes at these levels (Department of Homeland Security, 
2018 (2)).  Each of these policy actors brings their own views, responsibilities, 
experiences, and perspectives on which policies to give priority or include in disaster 
recovery plans.  In addition, a range of data streams, discussions, and coalitions on either 
side of the debate influence policy decisions (see Department of Homeland Security, 
2018 (2)).  The numerous actors, interest groups, and evolving information on 
cybersecurity threats, detection, and defense call for a framework that will address each 
in detail. 
Origin of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The development of the ACF followed the publication of a number of studies and 
theories, with precursor theories in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s by different authors.  
Sabatier developed this framework and published it in 1988 in Policy Sciences.  “An 
Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented 
Learning” therein contained a detailed review of previous work by Heclo, Weiss, 
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Mazmanian, and Ostrom, among others, and outlined the framework Sabatier asserted 
would build on and close gaps in earlier work.  The article dealt with environmental 
policy in general, and air pollution policy development from the 1950s-1970s, 
specifically.  Sabatier focused his efforts on evolutionary learning, belief systems, and 
advocacy subsystems in the policy development process (Sabatier, 1988, p. 129).   
Sabatier leaned heavily on Heclo’s work in developing the ACF, which he 
considered a practical application built upon Heclo’s theories.  Heclo (1974) stated that 
the previously considered general or macro-level influences could only account for a 
certain portion of a given policy change or evolution.  To close the gaps, he believed it 
was necessary to incorporate individuals and groups working in the specialized field 
(Heclo, 1974).  Sabatier carried this line of thought throughout the advocacy coalition 
framework, broadening the scope of the idea of the lobbyist and policy actor.   
Overview of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 In the development of the ACF, Sabatier established three main pillars or 
premises.  The first premise, and one that underpins the rest of the discussion, is the 
requirement to evaluate policy development and evolution over a period of at least a 
decade.  As he read previous works and developed the ACF for application in policy, 
Sabatier focused on the so called ‘enlightenment function’ of research.  Under this line of 
reasoning, the development of additional knowledge by scholars, advocates, or other 
stakeholders in the policy process is a critical portion or the policy process.  There is a 
built-in delay in the time it takes from the identification of a particular problem to a more 
thorough understanding of the details and consequences, both intended and unintended, 
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of a policy decision.  As stakeholders, scholars, and advocates gather data and work to 
apply it towards the policy process, the feedback loops can become more complex and 
time-consuming (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131-133).  The figure shown in Appendix A outlines 
the ACF and demonstrates the feedback loops within the system, as well as how multiple 
variable types are incorporated into the framework. 
 The second pillar of the framework is to utilize the entire subsystem associated 
with a given policy as the unit of inquiry.  In reviewing previous research, Sabatier found 
earlier studies considered the agency or organization developing a policy, then examined 
the inputs and influences to ascertain what led to its implementation or evolution.  
Sabatier felt the lobbyists, interest groups, and other stakeholders provided significant 
input and influence into the process, along with scholars, journalists, and other analysts.  
Building off the first premise, these stakeholders and advocates provided the bulk of the 
information influencing public and institutional opinions on a given subject.  Neglecting 
to consider the impact these stakeholders have in the process left policy development 
with too many unknowns or unaccounted for variables (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131). 
The final pillar of the ACF is to view the behaviors and policies of stakeholder 
organizations like the belief system of an individual.  Sabatier argued that the behaviors 
of the groups in a particular policy subsystem reflect its preferred path and priorities, just 
as the individual’s beliefs translate into their politics (Sabatier, 1988, p. 132).  While an 
organization may demonstrate its core values or institutional vision, it is also possible for 
their actions to misrepresent them, as well.  These discordant actions might be the result 
of environmental factors, behavioral limitations, or economic priorities, and may or may 
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not be purposefully misleading.  One recent example of such behavior was the revelations 
regarding Volkswagen and their emissions control systems.  That company pled guilty to 
purposely misleading its consumers about the efficiency and environmental impact of its 
diesel vehicles.  Engineers for the company developed software designed to activate 
emission controls when the vehicle was tested, but remain off under normal operation.  
This was not an isolated incident, as a grand jury also indicted six senior executives at the 
company for their role and knowledge of this scheme, which lasted for a decade or more.  
In the public eye, Volkswagen was a leader in environmental protection within the auto 
industry, claiming its ‘green diesel’ engines surpassed regulatory requirements (Kennedy, 
2017).  In reality, the company suffered a significant reputation and business impact 
while attempting to chase larger profits. 
The figure Sabatier provided for the ACF contained principal areas of constraint 
or input into the policy process.  These are relatively stable parameters, external events, 
constraints and resources of subsystem actors, and the policy subsystem itself.  The stable 
parameters are those core principles that evolve very slowly and are most unlikely to 
change.  These parameters frame the larger policy environment the rest of the changes 
and actions operate within.  Changes in these parameters may significantly alter the 
policy environment and cause major shifts to adjust.  The external events are those driven 
by changes in the subsystem within the larger framework.  As constraints are added and 
the environment takes shape, the events and parameters filter through the constraints and 
resources of the subsystem actors.  The policy subsystem is where the majority of the 
changes happen within the advocacy coalition environment.  In this area, the separate 
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coalitions create strategies and policies based on their beliefs and available resources.  
The coalitions address the policy authorities and influence the decisions regarding 
governmental policies and procedures.  The outputs and impacts of the policy decision in 
turn feed back into the beliefs of the coalitions, further shaping the discussion and debate 
(Sabatier, 1988, pp. 132-138) 
Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
In order to demonstrate the ACF in more detail, Sabatier examined police 
brutality and accountability from 1991 forward.  On March 3, 1991, police in Los 
Angeles, California pulled Rodney King over after a pursuit through the city.  A nearby 
witness caught the traffic stop and the subsequent assault on a video camera.  Four 
officers tazed, kicked, and struck Mr. King with batons over 50 times during the stop 
despite his protestations he did not resist arrest.  The major public reaction to events 
occurred in April of 1992 when the jury acquitted the police officers at trial.  The 
resulting riots left 55 dead and thousands injured, with millions of dollars in damages 
from the looting.  One can then fast forward to the period of 2014-2016 and review the 
coverage of police-involved shootings and violence.  Incidents in Ferguson, New York, 
Baltimore, Charlotte, and elsewhere led to protests, riots, and continued violence in the 
streets (Adams, 2016).   
Using the pillars described by Sabatier, the first requirement is at least a decade to 
review policy evolution and development.  The 26-year span from the Rodney King 
assault to the present covered that requirement and allowed for multiple or overlapping 
feedback loops regarding police violence and community relations.  Sabatier stated the 
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accumulation of knowledge has the largest influence on the direction of policy, so 
ensuring enough time to evaluate this accretion is essential.  For this subject, the policy 
subsystem is very robust and complex, including stakeholders in both the public and 
private sectors.  Law enforcement organizations at the state, local, tribal, and federal 
levels represent a significant portion of the subsystem.  Other public servants, including 
elected and appointed officials, policy analysts, and others, also occupy the subsystem.  
Alongside that sector, there are a myriad of organizations working exclusively or 
occasionally on improving police-community relations, securing civil rights, and 
reducing racial tensions.  Each of these sectors of the subsystem contain a wide range of 
actors and opinions, with different actors grouped into coalitions based on their actions 
and behaviors on different sides of the debate.  This subsystem follows Sabatier’s 
description of the broader definition, not restricted to the “‘iron triangle’ – administrative 
agencies, legislative committees, and interest groups at a single level of government” 
(Sabatier, 1988, p. 131). 
Application of the third premise of the ACF is labor-intensive, especially for such 
a complex subsystem.  The last section provided a description of the separation and 
classification of the actors and coalitions.  The last portion involved identifying each of 
the belief systems, perceptions, relationships, and priorities of the different coalitions.  
These aspects are subsequently used to evaluate policy changes throughout the period in 
question and evaluate causal relationships and their effectiveness (Sabatier, 1988, pp. 
132-133).  For the police-community discussion, this portion of the framework would 
require a review of policies and procedures from the federal down to the state and local 
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levels and include violence and rights issues across the country.  Further review requires 
investigation of the different dynamics at the separate levels, making an overall project 
on this topic cumbersome and laborious, at best.  Most policy actors specialize in a 
smaller area, whether is it restricted to a geographic region, type of incident, or a 
subsection of the larger criminal justice debate.  The advocacy coalition framework 
provides a blueprint for the evaluation, but it is incumbent on the researcher to frame the 
investigation in the most effective method.  
Evolution of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 Rising from its inception in 1988, with additional refinement in 1993 by Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, advocacy coalition continues as a popular framework for policy 
development and analysis (Weible, et al, 2011).  Over the last decade, Sabatier and 
Weible contributed to multiple studies examining the advocacy coalition framework, its 
uses, and potential future courses of investigation.  In one of these, Themes and 
Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Framework, Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 
2009 discussed 80 separate studies that utilized the framework starting at inception and 
continuing for twenty years.  This work included the 2007 revision of the framework 
outline discussed in the previous section.  The updated outline is shown in Appendix B.  
The key changes in the update are the separation of the constraints and resources in the 
first draft into short- and long-range categories and removing single path decision-
making (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). 
In the earlier versions, constraints and resources were a single category, with the 
decision process moving from stable parameters through system events and constraints 
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and into the policy subsystem.  That subsystem has internal feedback loops and fed into 
the system events.  In the updated version of the outline, the authors acknowledged a 
more complex and simultaneous policy development process.  The outline of the system 
in the newer version retained the relatively stable, system events, and policy subsystem 
sectors, and the short-term constraints remain a filter from the system events to the policy 
subsystem.  The addition of the long-term coalition opportunity structures (overlapping 
societal cleavages and degree of consensus needed for major policy change) were 
coupled with that sector, adding input into system events and short-term constraints, 
along with acting as a filter for the stable parameters to flow into the policy subsystem 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, p. 122-123).   
The Advocacy Coalition Framework and Cybersecurity 
 For the purposes of this study, the 2007 ACF outline was utilized to examine 
cybersecurity policy in depth.  Policy at the federal level was addressed in a more general 
sense, with policy development at the state and local level receiving a more thorough 
examination.  The ACF was selected as the lens for this study due to its applicability 
across wide policy frameworks, its utility in complex areas such as environmental policy, 
and the incorporation of the various constraints and pressures on the policy process.  As 
will be addressed in the subsequent sections, cybersecurity is far from a new 
phenomenon, despite the recent increase in news coverage and discussion.  The origins of 
cybersecurity date back over one hundred and fifty years to the first telecommunications 
systems.  While the U.S. originally declined to take part in international treaties on the 
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subject, several incidents and issues led to the signing of the 1850 Dresden Treaty, the 
first the U.S. affirmed in the cybersecurity realm (Rutkowski, 2011). 
Review of Literature Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts 
 The literature review encompasses several different aspects.  First, this study 
examined the origins of cybersecurity policy and trace its evolution to the current day.  
This research began with the origins of the computing program in the United States and 
discuss national policies created to erect security policies in the earlier environment.  It 
then follows the evolution of computing to the present day, followed by an in-depth 
examination of the organizations responsible for different aspects of cybersecurity at 
federal level.  The current national cybersecurity policies and procedures for the civilian 
sector will then be discussed.  The military cybersecurity framework will also be 
discussed, but specifics about defense cyberwar and technology are beyond the scope of 
this inquiry.   
History of Computing and Security from ARPANET to the Patriot Act 
 While cybersecurity is an emerging topic of discussion in the news today, it is far 
from a new area of concern for those in the field. The idea of computer security can be 
traced alongside the development of the computer.  One of the first computers unveiled to 
the public was the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) at the 
University of Pennsylvania in 1945 (da Cruz, 2013).  This system was exceedingly large 
and functioned as an automated tabulation machine.  While an impressive demonstration 
of technological advancement and innovation, ENIAC and its immediate followers 
lacked the ability to execute a stored or embedded program.  The Electronic Discrete 
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Variable Automatic Computer (EDVAC), was developed to resolve the lack of a stored-
program capability and completed in 1951.  This was the first true electronic computer 
and paved the way for future development and the computing industry (Pugh & Aspray, 
1996).  With these large, cumbersome computers, initial concerns for security centered 
on physical security.  The computers could only run one operation at a time, with the 
results returned to the researcher who designed the operation.  With no connectivity, 
computer security could be limited to the specific area and designated time periods 
(Warner, 2012). 
 With the stored-program capability, computers then benefitted from engineering 
of smaller and more capable processors.  The development of the microprocessor in the 
1960s and 1970s evolved computers from the behemoths requiring massive space to the 
smaller desktop models (Abbate, 1999).  Alongside these developments, researchers at 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (now referred to as DARPA, or the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency) sought to find a way to connect computers 
remotely.  The development of packet switching theory and connective technology 
allowed them to establish the beginnings of the modern Internet.  The system began with 
individual computers connected as nodes in a limited network, slowly adding additional 
machines and locations as technology allowed.  This network debuted in October of 1972 
at the International Computer Communication Conference (ICCC) (Leiner, Cerf, Clark, 
Kahn, Kleinrock, Lynch, Postel, Roberts, & Wolff, 2009).  Also, during this time, the 
U.S. government presented legislation to separate how networks would be classified.  
The Brooks Act, passed in 1965, gave the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) oversight 
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over government networks and required government entities to purchase their computing 
equipment from the General Services Administration (GSA) (Garland, 2015).  There 
were, however, some provisions built into this legislation.  First, the Central Intelligence 
Agency and those elements of the Department of Defense handling classified data were 
exempt.  The Brooks Act classified these networks as ‘operational’ in nature and 
separated them from the general and administrative networks that handle most 
government traffic (Warner, 2015). 
 As the networks expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government in 
general, and the National Security Agency (NSA) specifically, identified the risks 
associated with remote access and the need for limits on access.  The government, federal 
agencies, and researchers all sought to develop methodology for securing the networks, 
but ultimately concluded it was not feasible to close all of the gaps in an integrated 
secure/nonsecure system.  Furthermore, even inside a theoretically closed, secure system 
there was still the concern for human failure or action to compromise established 
measures. Whether the human error resulted from negligence, unknown system openings, 
or deliberate act to compromise security, the most effective actions were to develop 
measures to limit mistakes and seek to protect data where possible.  In response, 
engineers developed and incorporated file security and protections, administrative 
privileges, new password protocols, and digital encryption.  The development of the 
Digital Encryption Standard (DES), derived from the algorithm used by IBM for its 
commercial customers, also marked one of the first instances of government agencies 
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(the NSA in this instance) being accused of manipulating security measures to enhance 
its surveillance (Warner, 2012). 
 Several security violations occurred during this time that reinforced the findings 
of security weaknesses.  The first federal prosecution of a computer crime occurred in 
1967, “after a bank employee reprogrammed the bank’s computer to ignore his own 
overdrawn checking account” (Slayton, 2016).  One of the first computer espionage cases 
publicly available occurred in 1968, when police in West Germany apprehended an East 
German spy in an IBM subsidiary.  Building on the earlier theme of human error, in late 
1979 a test scenario was loaded into the computers at the North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD) that triggered alarms and sent false warnings throughout the 
national security system that the Soviets had launched over 2000 ballistic missiles 
(Warner, 2012).  It is instructive to revisit these headlines and stories to frame the 
cybersecurity challenge over time.  These are crimes and areas of concern from 50 years 
ago but are incidents that could easily appear in the news tomorrow.  The first proposal 
for information and cyberwarfare came in 1976, composed by Thomas Rona, a staff 
scientist at Boeing (Berkowitz & Hahn, 2003). 
As computer networks expanded in the 1980s and connected users and 
organizations the globe, the risks and threats of intrusion, theft, malicious programming, 
and espionage increased exponentially.  This included domestic hackers seeking to find 
and exploit vulnerabilities in networks to gain access to systems and information.  While 
not all these individuals were believed to be malicious in their desire to break into 
classified or proprietary systems, the fact that the vulnerabilities existed was problematic.  
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These actions, and increasing skepticism by defense agencies about their security, led to 
the issuance of the first major federal policy, National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD)-145 on September 19, 1984.  Under this guidance, the NSA assumed primacy 
for cybersecurity, an arrangement that lasted until 1987, with the passage of the 
Computer Security Act.  This effectively split the oversight of cybersecurity between the 
NSA and the NBS, allowing the NBS to assist with federal networks not belonging to the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  In 1990, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), the successor to NBS, was given the primary role of cybersecurity 
for all U.S. networks, ending the military and NSA’s lead role.  The NSA was authorized 
to continue to monitor government and military networks containing classified data, but 
oversight was not included (Warner, 2012). 
With more and more connectivity in the early 1990s, security of the Internet was 
an increasing concern.  At the outset of the decade, the United States engaged in Desert 
Storm, the first Gulf War.  Because of the exceedingly rapid success of that effort and the 
activities employed by military assets, it was the initial information war, with enemy 
command and communications capabilities systemically attacked, limiting the 
effectiveness of organized resistance.  The benefit of this was codified by the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs at the time, Colin Powell, in a policy memorandum in 1993 (Warner, 
2012).  As the military found new opportunities to utilize the Internet, a number of other 
actions shed light on weaknesses in the DoD’s own networks and those across the United 
States.  Several instances in the late 1980s and early 1990s. including the introduction of 
the Morris Worm and the Michelangelo Virus, garnered the public’s attention with regard 
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to computer security and potential vulnerabilities.  Wargames and other training exercises 
conducted during this time found glaring inadequacies in connectivity between 
government agencies, coordination, and cybersecurity in general.  The DoD experienced 
roughly 250,000 penetration attempts per day in 1996, putting increased pressure on the 
sector to not only harden their defenses, but to take active measures to close any 
loopholes identified and shore up security across a range of networks and locations 
(Warner, 2012).  
In the middle of the 1990s, government researchers came up with a new idea, 
using the Internet to cause physical damage or service interruption remotely.  This issue 
was particularly relevant to critical infrastructure across the country, an area ever more 
reliant on computers.  The DoD in 1997 launched ELIGIBLE RECEIVER, an exercise 
designed to test the reaction and coordination of DoD agencies of a cyberattack on 
critical infrastructure.  The DoD failed to protect the target and the results of this exercise 
showed how vulnerable critical infrastructure was and how much work needed to be 
done.  This dovetailed with a Presidential commission that reported more or similar 
damage could be done with a computer as with a bomb in an attack on critical 
infrastructure.  Two hacking attacks around this time, one via Chinese Telecom on 
California’s power grid in 2001, and a possible Russian operation against the DoD 
detected in 1998 both lent credence to the conclusions and recommendations provided by 
these panels (Warner, 2012). 
A trio of legislative actions from 2000-2002 altered the cybersecurity framework 
and how U.S. agencies interacted with the surrounding world.  The first, Defending 
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America’s Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems Protection was published 
in January of 2000 by the Clinton administration.  This was the first national strategy, and 
it divided cybersecurity between three different elements, the NSA, through the National 
Security Incident Response Center, the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense, 
and the Federal Intrusion Detection Network (FIDNet).  This legislation also made the 
point that the government oversees government networks only, private sector networks 
were the domain of the companies that use them.  The second was the USA Patriot Act, 
which provided sweeping powers and authorities to law enforcement in pursuit of terror 
organizations and to secure the homeland.  The third was the creation and organization of 
the Department of Homeland Security (Warner 2015).  These policies are discussed in 
more detail in the following section, and their impact on computing and security is 
addressed in the subsequent section that covers operations and incidents from the passage 
of the Patriot Act through 2016. 
History of Cybersecurity Policy in the United States through 2000 
 The investigation of cybersecurity policy in this country is a cumbersome and 
exhaustive undertaking.  There are a few reasons for the complexity: the evolution of 
definitions and descriptions of computers and related networks over time, competing 
interests of military and civilian oversight, national security versus privacy 
considerations, public and private networks and systems, and various limitations on the 
powers of the United States government.  Each of these issues adds additional challenges 
in tracing policy, but one of the strongest continuing criticisms is a lack of a single, 
coordinated, comprehensive policy over all computer or cyber security (Trautman, 2015).  
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With such a wide-open policy environment, this study will provide as wide a viewpoint 
as possible on policy evolution while narrowing the focus to relevant legislation, with the 
greatest focus on the federal side on the executive branch memoranda and congressional 
actions over the last decade. 
The United States and other countries around the world have long acknowledged 
the need for policies for communications networks.  Some of the earliest date back to the 
1850 Dresden Treaty, which sought to forge an agreement among member nations to 
assure the operation of the new electrical communication networks as previous 
agreements had for postal and other visual systems.  Subsequent international treaties 
followed the evolution of electric communications, including the first international 
meeting regarding the Internet in Melbourne, Australia in 1988 (Rutkowski, 2011).  In 
the United States, regulation and oversight of computer networks was first addressed by 
the Brooks Automatic Data Processing Act of 1965, more commonly known as the 
Brooks Act.  This legislation consolidated procurement of automation data processing 
equipment under the General Services Administration and granted National Bureau of 
Standards authority to set policies and procedures for government networks.  As noted in 
the previous section, there were built in exceptions for intelligence and military 
operations networks, which were designated as operational in nature and outside the 
GSA’s purview (Public Law 89-306, 1965).  
The Brooks Act formed the core of computer security policy for a decade, when 
the Carter administration released Presidential Directive 24 (PD-24), 
Telecommunications Protection Policy, in 1977.  In PD-24, the federal government 
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established policy that limited classified data to secure networks, protections for networks 
transmitting useful but unclassified information, and standards for working with the 
private sector to secure nongovernmental networks containing useful but unclassified 
information.  Further, this directive required department heads within the government to 
ensure appropriate security protocols were enacted for their networks, working under 
Executive Agents.  This also assigned the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce as the 
agents for national security and administrative government networks, respectively 
(Presidential Directive 24, 1977).  Presidential Directive 53, published in November 
1979, continued the efforts from PD-24, but added language for the continuity of 
communications networks in the event of nuclear attack or other major event that might 
disrupt communications (Presidential Directive 53, 1979).   
Executive Order 12333 put several policies in place regarding intelligence 
activities, including naming the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for all 
military and classified intelligence networks.  This policy further placed the National 
Security Agency (NSA) as the lead agency for the collection and running of all signals 
intelligence for the government, including procurement and protection of signals 
networks, research and development for signals security, and “executing the 
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the communication 
security of the United States Government” (Executive Order 12333, 1981).  Two years 
later, NSDD-97/EO-12472 (National Security Decision Directive 97/Executive Order 
12472) superseded PD-53 and established a new National Communications System.  This 
order established a working group with responsibility for national security and 
49 
 
emergency preparedness communications.  This included creating standards, procedures, 
and expertise for the current and future operations and ensuring the networks were 
survivable in all contingencies and could be rapidly resurrected or covered, as needed.  
This legislation also required evaluation of new technologies and the creation of disaster 
training, among other contingencies (National Security Decision Directive 97, 1983). The 
continuing need for security of communications networks, especially mobile networks for 
senior U.S. leaders, was addressed in NSDD-113, issued in November 1983 by President 
Reagan (National Security Decision Directive-113, 1983). 
While previous executive memoranda addressed telecommunications security, 
National Security Decision Directive 145, or NSDD-145, was the first to place exclusive 
emphasis on “microelectronics technology”.  President Reagan published NSDD-145 in 
1984 in response to several hacking and intrusion events in the early part of the decade.  
These included a widely publicized story in the New York Times about teenagers gaining 
access to unclassified defense networks, and the military losing faith in its security 
moving forward (Warner, 2012).  This directive established three policies to support the 
government’s efforts to establish, maintain, and protect a continuing telecommunications 
network.  First, classified systems were to be secured against accidental or intentional 
breach by whatever means necessary.  Those systems with proprietary but less than 
classified information needed protection according to the level of threat they might 
experience to secure national security interests.  Finally, government assets would 
provide recommendations and assistance to private sector actors or agencies that 
maintained networks with proprietary information.  This policy also created a steering 
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group, an executive committee and subcommittees to develop, implement, test, and 
provide continuing guidance for the effective security of telecommunications networks 
across the federal spectrum.  This further granted the NSA sole authority of government 
networks (National Security Decision Directive 145, 1984). 
The decision to place the NSA as the primary agency for federal networks across 
the board received an immediate and strong reaction from Congress.  Leaders in both 
chambers, led by Representative Jack Brooks, the author of the original Brooks Act in 
1965.  After several hearings and deliberations, the Computer Security Act was passed in 
1987.  This legislation was considered an updated version of the original Brooks Act, as 
it transferred the NSA to its previous mission of overseeing the national 
security/classified military networks and restored the NBS over the unclassified systems.  
The Reagan administration was successful in changing the original dual definition of 
national security/unclassified systems to include a third type: confidential systems.  The 
NSA and NBS were granted joint advisory roles over the third type of networks, 
fundamentally granting the administration its main objectives (Warner, 2015). 
The NSDD-145 continued in its amended form until its recension in 1990 by 
National Security Directive (NSD)-42.  This directive established the Policy 
Coordinating Committee (PCC) for National Security Telecommunications and 
designated the Secretary of Defense to chair it.  It also provided for operations-level 
groups to ascertain the state of networks, the nature of current and future threats, and 
work to develop policies, standards, and protections against them.  This again placed the 
Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for telecommunications networks and the 
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Director of the NSA as the National Manager in charge of system security and 
development, subject to approval of department heads (National Security Directive 42, 
1990).  The High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 created a program that involved a 
range of departments to improve coordination, oversight, software, technical support, 
education and security in federal computing systems.  The main contribution to 
cybersecurity of this act was twofold: it increased the research and development of 
networking and security throughout governmental systems and tasked NIST with 
developing security measures, standards, and tests for the developing systems (Public 
Law 102-194, 1991).  President Bush also created the National Industrial Security 
Program in 1993 under Executive Order 12829.  The program director assumed control of 
the security and integrity of national security and classified information released to non-
government organizations, including issuing policies and procedures and conducting site 
reviews to ensure compliance (Executive Order 12829, 1993). 
The next step in presidential action was President Clinton’s Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD)-5, Public Encryption Management.  This document identified the 
emergence of public encryption keys and their potential to impede law enforcement 
efforts.  To counter this, PDD-5 tasked the Attorney General with coordinating with 
encryption manufacturers to place government-developed keys into their products.  These 
would allow law enforcement, after appropriate judicial permission, to bypass encryption 
no matter the source.  Coupled with this, it directed the Secretary of Commerce to create 
a process to procure and install the key-enabled devices into government systems 
(Presidential Decision Directive-5. 1993).  The Clinton administration reinforced its 
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desire for improved security with PDD-63 in 1998.  This directive set a goal of 2000 for 
an initial capability and 2003 for federal agencies to be able to defend critical 
infrastructure against attack, including cyber systems.  The intent was that the 
government would be able to provide a minimum level of service no matter how 
extensive the attack or threat to critical infrastructure.  To achieve this, the directive 
planned to lean heavily upon the public-private partnerships and desired for market 
pressures to motivate cooperation, leaving additional regulations as a last resort.  Each 
department was given six months to secure its systems and was required to appoint a 
Chief Information Assurance Officer (CIAO) to take the lead on system security 
(Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998). 
 Public-private partnerships and the need for positive working relationships with 
non-governmental agencies is a continuing theme in both Congressional and Executive 
policies.  The Brooks Act acknowledged the use of outside actors on government 
networks and the Computer Security Act recognized not all government operations 
remain solely within government-controlled systems.  The addition of the CIAO in PDD-
63 provided an assurance side to the installation of a Chief Information Officer (CIO) in 
major federal agencies by the Information Technology Management Reform Act 
(ITMRA) of 1996, otherwise known as the Clinger-Cohen Act.  The Clinger-Cohen Act 
is an amalgamation of both the ITMRA and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA).  
This legislation ended the provisions of the Brooks Act, removing government 
procurement duties from the GSA and investing newly established CIOs with that 
mission.  It also acknowledged the growing use of private networks and joint systems of 
53 
 
government agencies, areas not secured by federal authorities.  Within the next two years 
the Department of Defense would be tasked with eliminating redundancies between the 
different branches of service and agencies, as well as ensuring connections between 
secured and administrative networks (Warner, 2015). 
 Also, in 1996, President Clinton published Executive Order 13010, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection.  This memorandum split threats to infrastructure into two 
sides, physical threats and cyber threats, established the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, and established an Infrastructure Protection Task Force 
(IPTF).  The President’s Commission was tasked with analyzing the critical infrastructure 
network, determining the major players in the public and private sectors, and 
coordinating with Congressional leaders and other stakeholders to develop a new CIP 
program.  This directive tasked this committee to incorporate legal and policy issues and 
recommend policy and regulatory changes to counter both physical and cyber 
vulnerabilities (Executive Order 13010, 1996).  This order tied into the Clinger-Cohen 
Act to improve public-private partnerships in cybersecurity and contributed to Executive 
Order 13011.  This legislation established the CIO position in all federal agencies and set 
forth their duties and responsibilities, with a significant emphasis on security of the 
national security systems (Executive Order 13011, 1996). 
 Around this time, the federal government established security rules and standards 
for industries in the private sector.  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) established a five separate rules for the health insurance sector, 
including the Privacy Rule, Transactions and Code Sets Rule, Security Rule, Unique 
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Identifiers Rule, and the Enforcement Rule.  Each of these had its own impacts, but the 
Security rule had direct effects on cybersecurity, including administrative, physical, and 
technical safeguards.  The administrative included how companies would comply with 
the regulations, including written rules and regulations, restrictions on which employees 
had access to data, training, and contingency standards for emergent issues.  The physical 
guidelines outlined preventing unauthorized access to hard copy files and information.  
The technical safeguards outlined required and recommended security protocols for 
health information, networks, and computer systems utilized by companies in this sector 
(Public Law 104-191, 1996). 
 In 1999, Congress also established new standards for the financial sector.  The 
Gramm-Leach-Blilley (GLB) Act, also known as the Federal Home Loan Bank System 
Modernization Act of 1999, repealed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, removing barriers to 
mergers between banking, securities, and insurance companies.  Under Glass-Steagall, no 
company could serve as a combination of investment, commercial, and insurance agency 
nor could officers at those institutions work in simultaneous position with multiple types 
of companies.  Along with modifying restrictions for mergers and the types of business 
financial institutions could conduct, the GLB Act also put security requirements into 
place in this sector the way HIPAA did for the healthcare industry.  These requirements 




Cybersecurity from 2000 to 2003/Post 9/11 Actions 
The Bush Administration published the first of a series of executive orders in 
October of 2001 concerning cybersecurity.  The first, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
in the Digital Age, set standards and policies for securing CIP in the interconnected 
information age in which we now live.  This order built off the previous policies 
established by President Clinton and set the stage for legislation coming later in the year.  
Assignments were given to the OMB and DCI for the oversight of policy creation and 
security of federal networks.  A Critical Infrastructure Protection Board was also named, 
with the Chair also tasked to serve as the President’s senior cybersecurity advisor 
(Executive Order 13231, 2001).  One of the most important and far-reaching policy 
initiatives in the United States was Public Law 107-56, Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, 
also known as the USA Patriot Act.  This act was a direct response to the September 11, 
2001 terror attacks and included a wide range of actions dealing with counterterrorism, 
enhanced surveillance for law enforcement agencies, money laundering, border 
protection, communications between agencies, improving intelligence, and others.  The 
Patriot Act contained several different aspects relating to cyber and computer security.  
This included an increased budget for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) 
technical division, expansion of the National Electronic Crime Task Force Initiative, a 
significant expansion of electronic surveillance and authorities for law enforcement 
agencies, and the creation of additional cybersecurity capabilities, among others (Public 
Law 107-56, 2001).  This legislation had an enormous impact on agencies and security 
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considerations at many levels and served as a precursor to the first official Homeland 
Security policy and the Homeland Security Act, both published in 2002. 
 The first of these published policies was the National Strategy of Homeland 
Security in July of 2002.  This document, from the Office of Homeland Security, laid out 
three strategic objectives: “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, [and] minimize the damage and recover from 
attacks that do occur (Office of Homeland Security, 2002).  In addition, it identified six 
critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, 
domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against 
catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response” (Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002).  For each of these six areas, the policy provides major initiatives to guide 
planning and preparation.  The final section of the strategy document outline four major 
foundations and outlines both federal- and state-level initiatives to support those areas.  
This initial document lays out a multi-tiered and complex policy environment 
encompassing a wide range of topics and agency responsibilities (Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002).  The national strategy document provided the foundation and guidance 
codified in the Homeland Security Act which was enacted later that year. 
 Public Law 107-296, also known as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 sought to 
close some of the gaps in the operational and oversight in these areas by creating the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  This department was given the primary role 
of preventing terrorism across the United States, with multiple roles and points of 
emphasis (Public Law 107-296, 2002).  This reorganization encompassed 22 federal 
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agencies and over 170,000 employees.  One of the main purposes of this was to 
consolidate intelligence operations and provide central guidance and direction for 
counterterror and security operations.  Among these were communications security and 
interaction and coordination with non-federal entities, including state and local agencies 
(Clarke, 2004).   
Of the departments within the DHS, the most pertinent to this study is the 
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP).  Requirements 
for the directorate include collecting information from federal, state, local, and private 
agencies and organizations to identify, detect, understand, and communicate emergent 
threats and vulnerabilities to the appropriate departments.  To accomplish this, tasks 
include conducting assessments of potential vulnerabilities, identifying risks and potential 
mitigation factors, make recommendations to outside departments on vulnerabilities and 
collection priorities, liaise with state and local governments for needed information, and 
to ensure a secure telecommunications and information system, among others.  Under the 
new law, responsibilities for the department included all critical infrastructure, including 
all physical and computer-based telecommunications, information systems, storage, or 
processing elements, and all of the peripheral equipment required for transmission.  The 
new reporting structure also transferred reporting requirements for elements of the FBI, 
DoD, Department of Commerce (DoC), Department of Energy (DoE), and the GSA to 
the Under Secretary for IAIP.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also included 
additional provisions for cybersecurity.  The IAIP was granted authority to supply state 
and local authorities, along with those private agencies that own or operate critical 
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infrastructure, with information on threats and vulnerabilities to CIP and support in 
response to a threat or an attack on those systems.  The Cyber Security Enhancement Act 
of 2002 is also included within this Act, addressing sentencing, disclosures, and 
amending U.S. codes regarding computer crimes (Public Law 107-296, 2002). 
The Homeland Security Act also established the Office of Science and 
Technology (OST) with the oversight of the development and deployment of different 
technologies across the federal, state, and local levels.  Assigned duties included creation 
and maintenance of performance standards, certification of technology used at the 
federal, state, and local levels, ensuring interoperability of telecommunications, and 
overseeing programs to develop and distribute tools to counter cybercrime, among others.  
Included with discussions on telecommunications technologies was the need to share 
information with agencies at all levels and the reliance of the federal government on State 
and local law enforcement to serve as the first line of defense against terrorism and other 
attacks.  Decisions on the sharing of information require a balance between the need for 
information in the field and restricting access for national security purposes. (Public Law 
107-296, 2002).  Coupled with the Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act represented a 
paradigm shift in security in the United States. 
Where the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act focused on terrorism and 
homeland security, the Cyber Security Research and Development Act, enacted in 
November 2002, set out a plan to close both knowledge and technical gaps in the national 
computer security framework.  This legislation laid out several the findings originally 
published after the 1997 “Eligible Receiver” exercise previously discussed while also 
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acknowledging the increasing pace of interconnectivity and the lack of adequate planning 
and support for these within the government.  This legislation established programs 
within the National Science Foundation (NSF) and National Institute of Science and 
Technology (NIST) to expand cybersecurity programs throughout academia, including 
grants for research, undergrad, and graduate programs.  The Director of NIST also gained 
responsibility for coordination with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct 
research on network and computer security across the critical infrastructure system in the 
United States (Public Law 107-305, 2002).  Public Law 107-347, the E-Government Act 
of 2002, contained one final publication for 2002, the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002.  This act placed the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) as the overseer for information security across the federal system and 
required all agencies to care for their own information security.  This security included 
not only network security, but that of information and supporting infrastructure, along 
with threat prevention and mitigation.  The Director of NIST became responsible for the 
creation and distribution of standard information protocols and providing security (Public 
Law 107-347, 2002). 
 In addition to these policies, there a number of Executive Orders published 
between 2001 and 2004 that modified different aspects of cybersecurity oversight and 
management, with the next major change occurring in 2004 with the creation of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  This organization was given primary 
oversight of all intelligence relating to terrorism, apart from purely domestic issues, 
which remained the purview of the FBI.  This included service as the primary 
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clearinghouse for intelligence and liaising with and assigning operational tasks to federal, 
state, local, and tribal organizations and law enforcement for issues related to their 
jurisdictions.  The NCTC took over intelligence responsibilities previously handled by 
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and received information from intelligence 
agencies under authority of the DCI (Executive Order 12333, 2004).  Changes to 
Executive Order 12333 were incorporated in Executive Order 13355, Strengthened 
Management of the Intelligence Community (Executive Order 13555, 2004).  Executive 
Order 13470, Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, further refined these 
orders and noted the need to account for state, local, and tribal government agencies in 
the collection and distribution of intelligence, along with applicable.  This order also 
designated functional managers for different types of intelligence, including the Director 
of the NSA as the manager for signals intelligence, including aspects included in 
cybersecurity, the NSA as the head of signals intelligence operations, and the DIA as 
primary overseer of defense operations and excepted from the oversight of the NSA for 
DoD operations, as well as the intelligence assets of the armed forces.  The intelligence 
agencies in other federal departments were also tasked with supplying supporting 
intelligence to support designated needs (Executive Order 13470, 2008). 
Presidential Actions on Cybersecurity Post 9/11-2014 
 In 2007, the Homeland Security Council published an updated policy directive, 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  This was an update of the original policy 
published in 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks.  This strategy document 
provided an overview of the new security environment, outlined a strategy and vision for 
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the future, and addressed methods to protect against threats, recover from potential 
attacks, and proposals to ensure success moving forward.  One area of emphasis in this 
strategy was to reiterate the prominent role State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
governments and agencies maintain in serving as first responders and subject matter 
experts on how to protect their citizens.  Also incorporated was the private sector, 
especially those organizations owning or operating critical infrastructure.  While the 
federal government and its agencies maintain primary responsibility and authority for 
prevention of attacks on the homeland and their investigation, localized attacks and 
events place burdens on lower levels of government in the immediate results, impacts on 
citizens, and response.  The strategy noted the increased coordination and increased level 
of grant issuance to lower governments to bring them up to speed and address identified 
vulnerabilities (Homeland Security Council, 2007). 
 In addressing current and future threats, the 2007 strategy drew on the ongoing 
threat of terrorism, natural disasters (especially the lessons of Hurricane Katrina), and 
other accidents and hazards.  This strategy outlined a few different techniques to protect 
against terrorism, including intelligence-led policing in the U.S. and increased border 
security and screening to prevent terrorists from entering.  For a cybersecurity standpoint, 
the strategy centered on countering extremism and radicalization online, securing 
cyberspace, and updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  
Cybersecurity was noted as an especial in the strategy, with previous directives and 
policies referenced as guiding principles for the ongoing battle to harden the networks, 
reduce vulnerabilities, and improve recovery operations.  This strategy covered a range of 
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policies and procedures but maintained focus upon the primacy of the federal effort to 
protect the nation and on the importance of the SLTT governments and private sector 
organizations to support that effort.  Another major theme of this strategy was the 
inclusion of risk-based management and incorporating lessons learned to improve 
operations and plans on a continual basis (Homeland Security Council, 2007). 
 Also, in 2007, Congress, acting on recommendations of the 9/11 Commission’s 
report, created the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) within the 
Office of Policy within the DHS.  This department received primacy as the lead agency 
for coordination and communication of standards and policies with the SLTT agencies in 
areas including disaster management, terrorism, or other incidents.  As the lead liaison for 
SLTT agencies, the OSLLE did not gain authority for operational control or jurisdictional 
powers within the separate states.  The intent for this organization was and is to serve as a 
single point of contact for the various agencies around the country with the federal 
government and push best practices and DHS standards out to the field (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). 
In Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for 
State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities, President Obama expanded upon 
previous orders and consolidated others regarding the access to classified information by 
State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Actors.  With the ever-increasing interconnected 
nature of different levels of government, the oversight of CIP across multiple levels, and 
the complexities of cyber resources, previous legislation left potential gaps related to this 
type of information.  This program provided for the accreditation of different agencies to 
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receive and store classified data, but also provided for oversight and monitoring of 
facilities, whether in or outside of the federal government.  The Secretary of Defense 
received oversight of this program, with the DNI also receiving authority over 
intelligence affairs (Executive Order 13549, 2010).  Executive Order 13587, Structural 
Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and 
Safeguarding of Classified Information, enacted various reforms to improve the security 
of classified information around the world while maintaining appropriate protections for 
civil liberties.  To accomplish these goals, the order established the Classified 
Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office (CISSO) to support, advise, and consult 
various federal agencies on the security of classified networks.  It also created an Insider 
Threat Task Force to create and administer programs to counter potential threats across 
federal networks (Executive Order 13587, 2011). 
In 2013, the Obama Administration published two separate policies regarding CIP 
and cybersecurity.  The first was Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.  This order reiterated the increasing reliance on the cyber 
environment in both the public and private sectors.  To counter increasing threats against 
the cyber domain, this order directed significant increases in communications with 
private sector partners and expediting granting of clearances to those agencies and 
entities needing access to classified information under EO 13549.  A framework to 
identify and mitigate cyber threats against the CIP resulted from this legislation.  The 
primary framework fell under the purview of NIST as a required, risk-based tool to assist 
federal agencies in the risk identification and mitigation process.  NIST also published a 
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second, voluntary version, of the framework for private CIP entities and other interested 
parties to enhance their cybersecurity, as well (Executive Order 13636, 2013).  The 
administration published Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security 
and Resilience, within days of EO 13636.  This policy reiterated the need for the federal 
government to work with SLTT governments and agencies, along with private-sector CIP 
owners, operators, and international partners to identify and address vulnerabilities, 
mitigate threats, improve recovery efficiency, and minimize disruptions or downtime.  
The Secretary of Homeland Security received authority and responsibility for oversight 
of this program, along with the charge to partner with Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) to 
utilize their expertise and knowledge.  Each of these SSAs (Commerce, Energy, Justice, 
GSA, Communications, and others) acquired additional responsibilities and tasks in 
support of this policy and its strategic initiatives.  These imperatives included improving 
functional relationships regarding CIP, setting minimum needs and standards of operation 
for networks and systems, and developing and deploying actionable policies for CIP 
maintenance and protection.  The implementation of this policy included updated 
visibility of the status of CIP threats and operations across systems and enhanced risk 
management programs to guide future needs and research priorities (Presidential Policy 
Directive 21, 2013). 
Cybersecurity Policy Actions 2014 to Present 
 In December of 2014, Congress did something it had not done in twelve years, 
which is pass cybersecurity legislation through both houses.  A number of pieces of 
legislation were proposed between 2003 and the earlier part of 2014, but nothing 
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substantive passed or became law through Congressional action.  In December of 2014, 
however, Congress approved five separate pieces of legislation: The National 
Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, The Federal Information Security Modernization 
Act of 2014, the Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, the Homeland Security 
Workforce Assessment Act, and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (Trautman, 
2015). 
The National Cybersecurity Protection Act (NCPA) amended the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 and provided for the creation of the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCIC).  The NCPA directed the NCIC to serve as 
the “federal civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis, and 
warnings for federal and non-federal entities” (Public Law 113-282, 2014).  The NCIC 
also received responsibility for enabling action across federal and non-federal entities, 
facilitating coordination to address risks and incidents across sectors, conducting and 
sharing analysis, and providing “technical assistance, risk management, and security 
measure recommendations” (Public Law 113-282, 2014).  The NCPA also tasked the 
Under Secretary of Homeland Security to create and maintain response plans for 
cybersecurity incidents and risks against critical infrastructure and required the OMB to 
submit reports to Congress and impacted individuals when data breaches occurred in 
protected federal systems (Public Law 113-282, 2014). 
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 amended 
the FISMA of 2002 to reset the Director of the OMB with oversight over information 
security policies and the Secretary of the DHS with implementation authority of the 
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same.  The FISMA further provided for the DHS to operate the Federal Information 
Security Incident Center (FISIC), deploy technology to assess and mitigate cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, and required several reports on data breaches, effectiveness, and major 
incidents on an annual basis (Public Law 113-283, 2014).  The Cybersecurity Workforce 
Assessment Act required an assessment of the cybersecurity workforce within the DHS 
by its Secretary and required a report within 120 to the appropriate Congressional 
committees on the cost and practicality of creating a Cybersecurity Fellowship Program 
for the DHS for a designated period.  The Homeland Security Workforce Assessment Act 
provided improvements for compensation rates and hiring practices for cybersecurity 
positions within the DHS and was enacted as part of the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform 
Act of 2014. (Trautman, 2015).  
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2014 amended the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology Act to allow the Director of NIST to facilitate and 
support the development of voluntary cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure.  
This program required the Director of NIST to coordinate with public and private 
partners in critical infrastructure sectors to identify risks, best practices, corrective 
measures, and methodologies to mitigate potential impacts and threats against critical 
infrastructure assets.  This program created a revolving, four-year program window, 
whereas a new set of standards went into effect their effectiveness and utility came under 
immediate review and those results drove the following set of standards.  As this program 
was voluntary for the public and private partners, the legislation specifically prohibited 
the Director of NIST or other federal entity from requiring organizations to comply with 
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the accepted standards.  The CEA further expanded the research and development for 
cybersecurity under the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (Public Law 
113-274, 2014). 
After this wave of legislation, President Obama published Executive Order 13691, 
Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, in 2015 to build upon 
previous policies and improve communications within the cybersecurity arena.  This 
order encouraged the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations 
(ISAOs), units that could be based on one of several different common traits to improve 
communications.  The order further directed the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), established in the 2002 HAS, to maintain 
communications with these groups and act as overseer and facilitator for needed 
improvements, along with other minor adjustments (Executive Order 13691, 2015).  Six 
weeks later, President Obama published Executive Order 13702, Creating a National 
Strategic Computing Initiative.  This established the Initiative, an effort to incorporate 
academic and private sector research and improvements across the entire range of 
government networks and systems to maximize the benefits of the ongoing high-
performance computing (HPC) efforts.  This initiative involved the DoE, DoD, and NSF 
as lead agencies, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) and 
NIST as research and development agencies, and NASA, FBI, NIH, DHS, and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as deployment agencies, 




 In February 2016, Executive Order 13718 created a Commission on Enhancing 
National Cybersecurity across government, business, and society.  This commission 
included representatives with knowledge or experience in cybersecurity, law 
enforcement, technology, private industry, and other areas, with further positions 
available based on recommendations by senior elected officials.  This order assigned the 
commission to recommend improvements and enhancements for cybersecurity across all 
levels of government and the private sector.  The mission and goals of the commission 
were wide-ranging and complex, including identifying vulnerabilities, threats, and 
barriers to enacting proposed changes and how to overcome them (Executive Order 
13718, 2016). 
 Presidential Policy Directive 41, Directive on United States Cyber Incident 
Coordination, and its annex, were published in July of 2016.  This effort further codified 
the coordination and communication among federal and other governmental agencies and 
outside partners regarding responses to cyber incidents.  This policy directive provided 
guiding principles for incident response, including shared responsibility, risk-based 
responses, respecting affected entities, unity of effort, and enabling restoration and 
recovery of impacted resources.  The policy also designated several efforts to be enacted 
simultaneously in response to an attack, each of which addressing a separate aspect in a 
effort to counter and mitigate the threat, enable law enforcement and intelligence 
operational needs, and bringing any impacted systems back online as rapidly as possible.  
To coordinate these efforts, a Cyber Support Group received primary authority, with 
Cyber Unified Coordination Groups (UCGs) available to act in the immediate aftermath 
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of events under the improved agency and government-wide communications protocols 
established under this directive and others (Presidential Policy Directive 41, 2016). 
This also involved the creation of the Office of State and Local Coordination.   
Cybersecurity in the United States 2002 to Present 
 In the early part of the 2000s, a wide range of cyber threats emerged with little 
clear guidance or mitigation techniques in place.  Around the turn of the century, 
businesses and agencies did not understand the impact the so-called Y2K bug would 
impact systems.  Computers produced over the previous decades only recognized a two-
digit year identifier, meaning when the calendar rolled over to 2000, computers would 
default those transactions to 1900, potentially effecting entire sectors.  Multiple other 
attacks also raised the profile of cybersecurity without legislative changes.  President 
Bush started addressing this in 2001-2002, as discussed in other sections.  However, even 
with the updates three different issues were identified with the policies.  First, assessment 
and identification of threats lacked specificity or other evidence-based foundation, 
instead relying on anecdotal information and institutional knowledge.  Secondly, policies 
and procedures lacked linkage between objectives and incentives, often relying on 
publishing a policy for how to act but failing to provide with positive or negative 
consequences for compliance.  Last, the established policies averted adding regulations or 
standards for cybersecurity especially as it related to private sector entities, despite the 
noted impact and vulnerabilities they faced.  The new policy was initially released to the 
public in late 2002 and published as The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in 
February 2003 (Berkowitz & Hahn, 2003). 
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Reviewing cybersecurity from 2002 to 2012, one can argue computer systems 
ended less secure than they started.  There are a few contributing factors for this, 
beginning with the increasing number of targets to exploit.  If cybersecurity remained 
constant in its success in preventing attacks, the overall volume would increase in 
proportion to the larger number of targets.  As attacks evolve and become more complex, 
they also can disrupt wider sectors and impact more systems.  Working to counter these 
trends requires an understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities.   While many policies 
and news stories promote threats as individual or state-sponsored hackers, the insider 
threat also needs to be considered and addressed.  The internal threat, or the risk 
associated with employees or agencies representatives, can be more difficult to disrupt 
with policies and procedures, depending on the nature of the threat.  If the risk associated 
is due to a lack of training or understanding, such measures can be beneficial.  They are 
less impactful when insiders take active efforts to circumvent security to steal or 
introduce vulnerabilities for their own benefit.  Mitigating this type of risk requires 
addressing technical and nontechnical factors, including software development cycles, 
lack of adequate talent, and inherent security structures and architectures.  Many security 
managers struggle to adequately quantify the risk and financial impact of not making 
changes to security protocols, which can lead to vulnerabilities left unaddressed and 
additional risk (Garfinkel, 2012). 
At the beginning of this period, cybercrime existed, but was still very much in its 
infancy.  According to the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) 2002 Internet Fraud 
Report, the financial impact of cybercrime ran $61 million, arising from virus recovery, 
71 
 
computer fraud, and denial of service losses (National White Collar Crime Center & the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002). In the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, 
individual users assumed primary responsibility for protection against from hacking and 
cybercrimes, as most Internet service providers (ISPs) and networks did not actively filter 
information.  As the number of users grew and more information passed through and 
‘lived’ in these networks, ISPs and other organizations gradually realized the value of 
providing some level of security to the systems (Eeten & Bauer, 2009).   
This early era of cybercrime also saw an evolution from smaller, singular attacks 
to broader, wider spectrum ones.  At the outset, most computer attacks arose from a 
hacking event or malicious software attacking a single or small group of computers 
through and e-mail or other entry point.  These attacks caused substantial damage to the 
targeted system, but also alerted the user quickly of the impairment.  As users and 
networks adjusted to mitigate these types of attacks, hackers and other cyber criminals 
adjusted tactics.  This era saw the rise of malware distribution used to infect targeted 
computers and allow the hackers to take control of these systems and attack third-party 
systems.  These types of attacks, known as ‘botnets’, can include hundreds, thousands, or 
even millions of corrupted systems remotely controlled by an individual or group to 
cause significant outages to sites, networks, or systems (Eeten & Bauer, 2009). 
As access to technology grew easier over the last decade and a half, the frequency 
and impact of cyberattacks increased exponentially.  Not only more users logged into 
networks around the world, but more business was and is conducted in the digital realm, 
and more data is stored there.  In 2012, Norton reported 556 million individuals as 
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victims of cybercrime at a cost of $388 billion (Galeotti, 2012).  A 2014 report by the 
University of Singapore put the damages of cyberattacks for that year at over half a 
trillion dollars and a 2015 study from the Ponemon Institute found a 19% increase in 
cybercrime from the previous year (Greengard, 2016).  Over the last few years, reports of 
hacking and its impacts on companies, organizations, and citizens garnered much 
attention.  Government agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service and Office of 
Personnel Management, and private companies like Target, Wells Fargo, and Home 
Depot suffered massive data breaches.  In each of these both the companies and the 
consumer/citizen suffered as a result.  The companies dealt with loss of consumer trust, 
loss of proprietary information, and investment to harden systems while the individual 
faced a range of possibilities from identity theft and damaged credit ratings to loss of 
confidence, but little to no damage (McCollum, 2015). 
Even with all the reports, data, training, and investment in cybersecurity over the 
last few decades, cybersecurity remains a widespread issue from the individual to the 
national level.  Over the last two decades several different descriptions and views of 
cybersecurity arose, each with its own strengths and weaknesses.  Cybersecurity can be 
viewed as an insider issue, an economic problem, a public health-type issue, and a 
wicked problem with no obvious solution.  The insider issue seeks to prevent individual 
users from making poor decisions, either maliciously or in error, that cause security 
vulnerabilities inside the systems.  The economic model seeks to match increased 
spending with improved security, but to date evidence does not support direct correlation 
between straight investment and improved security due to outside factors.  The public 
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health description frames cyber hygiene in the context of keeping systems clean by 
running up-to-date antiviral programs, making proper decisions about browsing and file 
downloads, and user security protocols.  The most common description, however, is 
cybersecurity as a wicked problem with a myriad of inputs and variables and no single 
solution or set of steps to take to improve the situation (Garfinkel, 2012). 
Department of Defense Policies and Organizations 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long and complex history regarding 
computers and cybersecurity policy and development.  From the few operators and 
rudimentary operations of the ARPA Net to the billions of users and complex activities of 
today’s world, the Department of Defense remains on the forefront of cybersecurity.  As 
noted previously, legislation throughout the years saw changes in the oversight of federal 
networks and security between the military and civilian control.  The DoD had some of 
the first cybersecurity organizations in the U.S. as a result of their early responsibilities, 
but these evolved over the years and currently focus on defense intelligence operations 
and national security networks.  Military agencies were established at different points and 
with different types of missions from the creation of the first telecommunications 
networks onward.  The defense agencies with primary missions centered on cybersecurity 
itself were the Air Force Information Warfare Center (1993), the Navy Information 
Warfare Activity (1994) and the Army Land Information Warfare Activity (1994).  The 
Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force published Cornerstones of Information 
Warfare in September 1995, which served as an initial glance at the possibilities and 
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threats in the cyberwarfare arena.  This was not the first time it was considered but served 
as one of the earliest cyberwarfare policies in the U.S. (Warner, p. 791). 
 In its current form, DoD cyber operations are overseen by the U.S. Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM), an organization encompassing all military branches and 
the federal government.  The Secretary of Defense signed the order to establish this 
organization on June 23, 2009 as a support unit for the U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM).  USCYBERCOM was designated as fully mission capable on October 
31, 2010.  Under USCYBERCOM are five separate service elements: Army Cyber 
Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBER), Air Force Cyber 
Command (AFCYBER), Marine Corps Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER), and Coast 
Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER).  CGCYBER, while in a direct support role for 
USCYBERCOM, is also a subordinate command for the Department of Homeland 
Security (U.S. Strategic Command, 2016).  In its current form, USCYBERCOM is jointly 
located with the NSA, utilizes personnel and networks of that agency, and is headed by 
the Director of the NSA.   
As a mission, USCYBERCOM oversees the operation and defense of the DoD 
information networks (DODIN) and both prepares and conducts military cyber operations 
to secure and ensure viability of cyberspace for the United States and its allies and deny 
use to enemies of the state.  To complete these tasks, USCYBERCOM “has three focus 
areas: defending the DODIN, providing support to combatant commanders for execution 
of their missions around the world, and strengthening our nation’s ability to withstand 
and respond to cyber-attack” (United States Strategic Command, 2016).  Defending the 
75 
 
DODIN is an incredibly complex task with multiple layers of oversight, coordination, and 
communication required from departments across the defense sector.  The DoD Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) published new guidance for the department in November of 
2013, with an unclassified version following five months later.  The DoD Cybersecurity 
Policy Chart is the visual map of the strategy laid out by the DoD CIO and is updated as 
needed, most recently on June 30, 2017.  The strategy issued included four focus areas 
that the policy chart is organized to address: “establish a resilient cyber defense posture, 
transform cyber defense operations, enhance cyber situational awareness, and assure 
survivability against highly-sophisticated cyberattacks” (Cyber Security & Information 
Systems Information Analysis Center, 2017).   
The DoD Cybersecurity Policy Chart includes five separate goals, along with 
authority, guidance, and oversight offices for each.  The chart is also color-coded, based 
on the office of primary responsibility (OPR), and provides hyperlinks to many external 
resources.  This chart demonstrates the complex and interconnected nature of the 
cybersecurity environment at the federal level.  The chart includes fifteen separate OPRs, 
in addition to other sources, including Executive Orders and other national strategies and 
policy documents.  The policy chart includes overarching authorities for cybersecurity, 
and flows from organization (leading and governing, designing the fight, developing the 
workforce, and partnering for strength), to enabling (securing data in transit, managing 
access, and assuring information sharing), anticipation (understanding the battlespace and 
preventing and delaying attackers and preventing attackers from staying), to preparation 
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(developing and maintaining trust, strengthening cyber readiness, and sustaining 
missions) (Cyber Security & Information Systems Information Analysis Center, 2017).   
To support combatant commanders and ensure the continuity and utility of 
cyberspace for the United States and its allies, USCYBERCOM operates across multiple 
sectors. First and foremost is the need to transform cyber policies, programs, and 
activities into elements that can be used to support operational objectives and needs 
around the world.  This includes integrating cyber capabilities into operational planning, 
strategic, and tactical decision-making processes.  To support this operationalization, 
USCYBERCOM has to not only field a range of support teams, but also must ensure 
those teams have proper training, capacity, and authority to protect national interests and 
continue to improve the security and resilience of cyberspace moving forward (United 
States Cyber Command, 2015). 
As described above, each military department maintains their own specific cyber 
command, which include Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTS) and Cyber 
Mission Forces (CMFs). The CMFs, as envisioned in this policy, consist of 133 separate 
units, organized to provide a defense-in-depth against cyberattacks and closely aligned 
with other cyber forces both within the DoD and those outside.  The construct and overall 
design of the CMF program flowed from the nature of the networks maintained by the 
DoD, especially the size, complexity, and the fact the DoD does not own and operated its 
entire network, relying in some areas on private sector resources.  The prevalence of 
private sector assets is another reason the DoD felt the need to alter its policy to include a 
greater emphasis on deterrence before the attack and risk-based analysis to cover the 
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highest threats as quickly as possible.  By decentralizing the CMF structure, the DoD also 
gains the ability of highly flexible and narrowly focused cyber teams while maintaining a 
larger vision and set of strategies to guide their efforts (Department of Defense, 2015).   
Under the ‘133 teams by 2018’ goal, the DoD currently fields 13 National teams, 68 
cyber protection teams, 27 combat mission teams, and 25 support teams consisting of 
over 6,000 personnel from the military and private sectors (Department of Defense, 
2015).  
The changing landscape of cyber networks and cybersecurity over the years 
necessitated changes and updated priorities.  Defense strategies likewise adapted to 
changes and priorities, with new guidance and policies periodically released.  Department 
of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace released in July of 2011 included an 
overview of the strategic cybersecurity environment and five strategic initiatives to 
provide a roadmap forward for the DoD.  The strategy noted at the time the DoD ran 
more than 15,000 networks with over 7 million connected devices, and the department 
was ever more reliant on information systems to conduct its operations and ensure 
national security.  The strategic initiatives included reorienting cyberspace from a support 
structure to an operational domain, developing proactive techniques for network defense, 
establishing working relationships with SLTT governments, private CI partners, and U.S. 
allies, along with leveraging the knowledge and abilities of the citizenry to strengthen 
operations (Department of Defense, 2011). 
 The DoD overhauled its cybersecurity strategy in 2015 after additional changes to 
their mission and increasingly destructive and frequent attacks.  The department, as 
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referenced in the new strategy, owns and operates one of the most extensive computer 
networks in the world.  As this grew in complexity and scope, the needs for improved 
cybersecurity and policies to safeguard it expanded.  In 2012, President Obama tasked the 
DoD to develop more robust cybersecurity and risk mitigation in concert with other 
federal departments.  The DoD also needed a new guiding strategy that incorporated the 
Cyber Mission Force (CMF) concept, a group created by the department in 2012 to 
execute its cyber operations.  The 2015 Cyber Strategy drew on those three key 
motivators and sought to capture the need to bring in assets from the private sector and 
community, along with improving the deterrence aspect of cyber operations and 
providing a roadmap for DoD cyber operations through 2020.  The policy laid out five 
key goals for DoD cybersecurity: build and maintain forces and capabilities for this 
domain, defend networks while securing data and mitigating risks, create plans for 
significant cyberattacks that could disrupt CI, develop new cyber weapons to shape the 
battlefield and control the fight, and work with international partners to improve cross-
border security.  (Department of Defense, 2015). 
 In the latest decision-making paradigm, DoD cyber leaders are treating 
cyberattacks like other domains of warfare.  Based on the DoD Cyber Strategy published 
in 2015, DoD officials examine attacks individually to determine their level of impact to 
classify the nature and severity of each incident.  As discussed in earlier sections, 
cyberattacks are no longer constrained to denial of service or information security 
operations, but can now cause physical damage to systems or, in the case of CIP attacks, 
death due to service interruption.  While no absolute threshold is provided, there is a level 
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of impact and injuries to citizens that can equate a cyber-attack to a more traditional 
armed attack.  The specifics of each attack are collected and provided to senior leaders 
and the Office of the President to determine how the threat will be addressed.  The 
inclusion of cyber into this conversation is another facet of deterrence, which was a key 
point in the 2015 Cyber Strategy.  At this time, it is unknown how this evolution of 
warfare will play out, or what type of impact it will have on international and interstate 
relations (Pellerin, 2016). 
Current Federal priorities 
 As the federal government evaluates is cybersecurity policies and priorities, there 
are several different factors to consider.  One of the main issues the current 
administration must address is what shape does the United States want the Internet to take 
in the coming years and what type of governance will be acceptable.  The Internet is a 
worldwide asset that largely ignores borders and jurisdictional considerations, forcing 
countries around the world to work together to manage growth, capacity, security, and a 
myriad of other issues regarding cyberspace.  Federal authorities need to develop plans 
for security, privacy, governance, freedom of speech, and any other priorities desired and 
work to collaborate with international partners to push the desired agenda (Healey & 
Jordan, 2016). 
Another issue is whether to rely on defensive measures for protection or to 
develop offensive countermeasures for first strike/retaliatory capability.  For several 
years, the U.S. government was adamant its interest was in defensive measures only, but 
events over the last decade showed the development and willingness to use offensive 
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capabilities.  The STUXNET worm previously discussed was the first publicly 
acknowledged use of offensive cyber tactics by the U.S. government against a foreign 
power, but there have been other reports, as well.  There are multiple questions that arise 
from the militarization of cyberspace and the development of offensive weapons to 
deploy in this space.  Policy questions on when cyberattacks can be used, if they are an 
appropriate counter or response to physical attacks, who can conduct attacks, and what 
types of attacks can be utilized are all emerging issues under development (Gjelten, 
2013). 
 In developing techniques, tactics, and weapons to be utilized within cyberspace, 
there remains a debate on how defined the cyber arena is for warfare.  Cyberspace is 
often described as an alternate domain like the more traditional arenas of land, air, space, 
and sea.  There is still discussion about the characterization of the virtual world and 
whether it should be considered as a separate battlefield or dealt with as a business 
environment (Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012).  Wingfield and Sharp discuss this 
difference in opinion, likening it to the development of the tank in World War I.  When 
first conceptualized, many military leaders had difficulty figuring out how to use the 
machine effectively.  The machinery broke down frequently, were underequipped, and 
did not possess enough firepower.  By World War II, however, the Germans recognized 
the potential of the tank in maneuver warfare, creating new doctrine and shifting the 
course of the war.  Cyberwarfare and the tools for cyberattacks are following a similar 
path as the tank in the early years of its development.  Governments are still debating 
how to effectively and properly use cyber warfare, but different actors have varying 
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opinions on how to use cyberwarfare.  The threat now is the same as it was with the 
development of the tank, allowing enemies to develop offensive weapons or tactics while 
leaders debate proper applications (Wingfield & Sharp, 2014).  
 With the DHS serving as the primary government agency for cybersecurity 
policy, oversight and conflicting political motivations complicate the development 
process.  Over 100 separate committees in Congress claim some level of oversight of 
DHS programs, requiring leadership to spend significant amounts of time testifying 
before Congressional leaders and limiting the time available for running the department.  
The DHS, with such extensive oversight commitments, is effectively accountable to 
everyone and no one at the same time.  The federal government not only needs to 
determine where its priorities lie, but also to streamline the oversight and guidance for the 
DHS if it hopes to reach the level of agility needed to address the cyber threat going 
forward (O’Hara, Murphy, Vreeburg, Giaier, Maurer, Geffroy, & Lowe, 2015). 
Policy analysis – Current Issues in Cybersecurity at Federal Level 
 Cybersecurity policy, like many others, reaches across many different stakeholder 
groups and sectors.  Fewer and fewer industries and organizations in the world today are 
without some level of online footprint.  Digital presence and marketing are now an 
integral part of the business cycle, along with utilizing digital resources for storage, 
collaboration, and governance.  As cybersecurity grows in importance, stakeholders and 
those seeking policy changes need to mold their message to target different distinct 
audiences: businesses, governments, elected and appointed officials, the public, security 
professionals, and others.  One on the larger issues remaining, however, is that 
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cybersecurity does not generally fit neatly within the security or national security 
conversations and techniques utilized in the past.  Cyberspace does not, to a large extent, 
recognize international borders, making it difficult for law enforcement or government 
agencies in one country to independently pursue foreign agents conducting cyberattacks.  
Reliance on militarization of cyberspace, or employing similar tactics, also runs into a 
few issues due to the public and private ownership of much of the infrastructure and the 
lack of oversight the government has in that realm (Lobato & Kenkel, 2015). 
 Cybersecurity policy development, as discussed earlier, relied heavily upon 
executive action between 2002 and 2014.  In 2002, sweeping legislation passed Congress 
following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks that included numerous provisions for 
counterterrorism and cybersecurity.  While both houses of Congress proposed several 
bills in the interim, it was 2014 before an agreement, with five separate pieces of 
legislation related to cybersecurity published in December of that year.  As evidenced by 
the verbiage of the Presidential Actions over the last 15 years and the verbiage of the 
2014 legislation, cybersecurity at the national level is frequently framed as a critical 
infrastructure issue.  Within this larger debate, there are issues of technical knowledge, 
conflicting priorities of different stakeholders (consumers, governments, businesses, law 
enforcement and national security, among others), political considerations, and lack of a 
cohesive starting point or policy to draw from (Trautman, 2015). 
 Looking at the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) discussion, there are several 
factors relevant to cybersecurity.  Many of the industries and sectors are increasingly 
controlling widely distributed networks using the Internet.  Two types of components, 
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supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and distributed control systems 
(DCS), are the most vulnerable to cyberattacks.  These are so vulnerable due to their 
function: providing command and control to flow in distributed systems and managing 
processes across entire facilities.  The Stuxnet worm attack was a type of SCADA attack, 
infecting SCADA files across a network to eventually cause physical damage in an 
enrichment facility.  The infrastructure across the United States relies on the same 
systems and exhibits similar vulnerabilities, increasing their vulnerability.  Before the 
Internet, such systems were protected with physical barriers, but the inclusion of Internet 
protocols for backup, troubleshooting, and coordination also removed the need to 
physically enter a site to take control of such critical infrastructure.  Adding to the 
complexity of securing critical infrastructure is the fact that many of it is privately 
owned, with only recommended cybersecurity protections and reporting in place.  Even 
the latest legislation enacted placed voluntary protocols on CIP and prohibited federal 
authorities from requiring public and private partners from to adhere to specific 
standards.  Authorities reported an almost 400% increase in cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure around the country between 2012-2013, making it apparent that this is not 
an issue likely to abate without significant intervention (Pedersen, 2014). 
 To counter this trend, the federal government sought and seeks to create 
partnerships with public and private sector entities involved in critical infrastructure.  
Critical infrastructure in the United States covers a variety of elements, from nuclear 
energy and transportation to agriculture and cybersecurity.  When developing a 
partnership, government agencies need to bring together disparate outside parties that 
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may or may not see themselves as part of the infrastructure sector, or who may not wish 
to take part.  There are also issues of oversight, accountability, and enforcement.  It was 
noted earlier that the DHS is prohibited from requiring third parties from adhering to 
cybersecurity standards, so they must find alternate ways to bring partners to the table 
and convince them of the utility of cooperation.  Public policy in this area applies funding 
to improve cybersecurity, but there is little evidence of improvement.  In past reviews of 
CIP partnerships, the GAO concluded the lack of accountability to standards and fiscal 
expenditures may lead to a less secure environment (Koski, 2015). 
  While the current cybersecurity standards and policies from the federal 
government lack accountability and enforcement, there are indications the policies and 
frameworks from 2014 are making an impact.  Several industry leaders in CIP and other 
industries incorporated these standards and some require them of their vendors, as well.  
Further, the NIST policy adopted in 2014 is considered the standard for due diligence 
when developing cybersecurity policies.  With elected officials and industry leaders 
unable or unwilling to develop and enact wider-ranging and binding cybersecurity 
legislation, this type of voluntary, grassroots-type movement could be the best option for 
improving industry buy-in and security on a wider scale (Shackelford & Bohm, 2016) 
Policy Analysis – Security policies and operations in Middle Tennessee 
 Cybersecurity at the state level in Tennessee falls mainly under the purview of 
two different departments: the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) and the 
Tennessee Office of Homeland Security (TOHS), depending on the nature of the 
situation.  The TBI focuses on the law enforcement issues, such as child victimization, 
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child pornography, fraud, and hacking, malware, computer intrusion, and identity theft 
(Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).  The TOHS deals with homeland security 
issues, including responding to suspicious activities around the state, raising cyber 
awareness, protecting critical infrastructure, providing training for law enforcement, 
partners, and citizens, and management of emergency protocols (Tennessee Department 
of Safety and Homeland Security 3, n.d.). 
The State of Tennessee has two major sections of its code addressing 
cybersecurity.  The first is Title 39, Chapter 14, Part 6, the Tennessee Personal and 
Commercial Computer Act of 2003.  This section of Tennessee law addressing computer 
hacking, malware, unauthorized access, trespass, and installation of viruses on private or 
commercial computers.  This further specifies punishments for various cybercrimes, 
including theft, destruction of files, illegal access of networks, and use of computers or 
networks in connection with terrorism (Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer 
Act, 2003).  The second major piece of legislation within the Tennessee code is Title 47, 
Chapter 18, Part 52, the Anti-Phishing Act of 2006.  This act addresses phishing activity 
within the state and establishes penalties for such actions (Tennessee Anti-Phishing Act, 
2006). 
Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, state-level security policies and 
procedures in Tennessee followed a similar path to that laid out at the federal level.  In 
the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks, on October 2, 2001, the State created the 
Tennessee Homeland Security Council.  The council was composed of “representatives 
from state and local departments and agencies who are tasked with helping plan and 
86 
 
direct the statewide homeland security activities” (Tennessee Department of Safety and 
Homeland Security n.d.).  The Council is headed by the Commissioner and Homeland 
Security Advisor from the Tennessee Department of Safety, and is members are tasked 
with coordination at higher and lower levels of government for homeland security 
purposes (Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security n.d.).  On October 1, 
2002, the Governor of Tennessee issued Executive Order 36 on September 11, 2002, 
creating the Tennessee Office of Homeland Security, codified the Homeland Security 
Council, and created the Tennessee Governor’s Citizen Corps Advisory Committee (State 
of Tennessee Executive Order 36, 2002). 
In 2005, the State of Tennessee followed the lead of the federal government and 
established the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the standard for all 
incident management in the State.  As the NIMS system was the national standard and 
incorporated communication and operational considerations for state and local 
governments, it was the most effective option for the State, as well (State of Tennessee 
Executive Order 23, 2005).   Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), 
Management of Domestic Incidents, established the NIMS program by tasking the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with developing and administering the Management 
system and a National Response Plan for all manner of domestic incidents.  The NIMS 
program sought to create a single set of standards and practices for federal, state, and 
local governments and agencies for incident response and management.  The description 
and standards set out for the program in HSPD-5 also consolidated crisis management 
and consequence management for domestic incidents into a single category.  Prior to this, 
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federal agencies and programs would have separate planning procedures for each side.  
HSPD-5 also noted the primacy of state and local governments in local disaster response 
and management and established certain situations where the DHS would assume control.  
In all cases, however, HSPD-5 directed response plans at all levels to be compatible and 
interoperable (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 2003). 
 The Office of Homeland Security, Security Council, and Citizen Corps Advisory 
Committee were originally a subset of the Governor’s office, but were transferred to the 
Department of Safety under Tennessee Executive order in June of 2007 “in the interest of 
economy, efficiency, and better coordination of the functions of state government” (State 
of Tennessee Executive Order 48, 2007).  In 2012, the Governor’s office issued 
Executive Order 16, dissolving the Tennessee Governor’s Citizen Corps Advisory 
Committee based on direction from the U.S. DHS and in the interests of administrative 
efficiency (State of Tennessee Executive Order 16, 2012). These changes brought the 
Department of Safety and Homeland Security to its current functional structure and 
mission.  Homeland Security in Tennessee is currently collocated in the Department of 
Safety, alongside the Tennessee Highway Patrol, Driver Services, and the Tennessee 
Highway Safety Office.  The Office of Homeland Security is further broken down into 
three divisions: Analytics (Including the Tennessee Fusion Center), Operations, and 
Preparedness (Including Cyber and Special Programs) (Tennessee Department of Safety 
and Homeland Security 2, n.d.). 
 With the TBI focusing on the law enforcement side of cybercrime, the TN DOHS 
shoulders much of the responsibility for cybersecurity within the State of Tennessee.  The 
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Governor laid out a plan to create a Cyber Security Advisory Council in the Safer 
Tennessee proposal for 2016-2018 to “establish and oversee implementation of a 
comprehensive cyber security plan for the executive branch of state government” 
(Tennessee State Government, 2016).  Throughout the research for this project no 
information on this advisory committee was found online or in other related materials.  
The DOHS cyber awareness portal section of the website contains information on 
ransomware attacks, monthly security tips, phishing and social engineering, frauds and 
scams, cybersecurity awareness month, a cyber reference aid, cyber safety tips, and a 
scam alert.  The monthly security tip links to a 2015 document, and of the two links in the 
frauds and scams, one is an up-to-date FBI link and the other is from 2013.  The phishing 
and ransomware link on the site are also up-to-date, but the rest of the links all connect to 
forms and ages from 2013, with correspondingly dated information (Tennessee 
Department of Safety and Homeland Security 4, n.d.). 
 A search for cybersecurity and related legislation in the online archives for the 
Tennessee legislature do not reveal any notable action at the state level.  There is a 
similar lack of information available on cybersecurity policies at the county and local 
levels.  While governments at the county and local levels have their own sites, 
cybersecurity and assurance are not action items on the county of local government sites.  
The lower government sites also do not include any information on cybersecurity 
programs, policies, or procedures at these levels of operation.  Additional information 
and clarification will be sought in these areas during the interview process. 
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In the following chapter, the role of the researcher, methodology, and 
trustworthiness of the proposed research will be discussed.  The role of the researcher 
will cover any potential biases, conflicts of interests, or any relationships that could 
impact the proposed study.  The methodology of the study will include an examination of 
the population and sample size to be used in the study, including selection criteria and 
explanation of saturation.  The methodology section will also include descriptions of the 
proposed contacts with the participants, instruments to be utilized, and a discussion of the 
data collection methods.  Finally, questions of credibility, transferability, dependability, 
and confirmability will be addressed. 
90 
 
Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Over the past several decades, cyberattacks rose from a concern of IT departments 
and financial institutions to an issue of national prominence and seemingly part of the 
daily news cycle.  Historically, public policy is a slow-moving process that requires 
significant investments in time, resources, and political will (Sabatier, 1988).  In a 
technically complex and broad-ranging area such as cybersecurity, policy development 
faces additional challenges and roadblocks, slowing the process and requiring operational 
decisions on how to operate while awaiting guidance.  Depending on the nature of the 
field agency in question, these gaps can be bridged by executive order or legislative 
guidance or governed by the mission of the agency itself.  At the federal level, 
cybersecurity policies and procedures for intelligence and law enforcement evolved after 
the terror attacks of 9/11.  The USA Patriot Act included changes across multiple areas, 
including cybersecurity, wiretapping, money laundering, and others (USA Patriot Act, 
2011)  As attacks increased in frequency, scope, and effectiveness, however, it became 
unclear whether updated policies and procedures kept pace and provided agencies with 
the tools needed in the current environment (Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012). 
This chapter includes detailed information on the research methodology and 
instrumentation.  First, I will provide an overview of the research design and rationale, 
including the research questions, central concepts, and research traditions.  Next, the role 
of the researcher will be defined, and relationships, potential biases, power relationships, 
and other ethical issues will be identified, along with plans for addressing these areas.  I 
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will then discuss the methodology, including the participant selection process; 
instrumentation; procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection; and data 
analysis plan.  Issues of trustworthiness and ethical procedures, including IRB 
documentation and participant protections, will then be discussed. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Cybersecurity at the federal and international level is in the news on a consistent 
basis.  Executive orders and Congressional actions provide governance at the federal 
level, with different agencies enacting policies under that guidance to protect citizens and 
national assets (National Cyber Strategy, 2018).  Below the federal level, the process is 
less clear as there is no mandate or standard for cybersecurity, with states and different 
sectors managing their processes according to individual preferences and governance 
(Glennon, 2012).  Reviewing intended policy outcomes against what the emergency 
management officials and field agencies observe in their operational fields may help 
identify and define disconnects around cybersecurity.  With this information, policy 
makers at the state and local level may be able to pursue policies or identify resources to 
assist with closing gaps or improving communications between partners. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the current state of cybersecurity 
policy at the state and local level, specifically in Middle Tennessee and its surrounding 
areas.  The principal research question answered by this inquiry was whether 
cybersecurity policy at the federal level provides enough guidance and resources for state 
and local governments and agencies.  I queried elected officials, agency representatives, 
subject matter experts, practitioners, and emergency managers to ascertain how the 
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federal policies and procedures guide lower-level legislation and operations.  Of interest 
were issues of resource allocation, authority, oversight, and coordination with public and 
private partners. 
One additional question considered was whether there is a discrepancy in the 
established public policy on cybersecurity and the reality in the operational environment, 
along with what changes occurred from initial implementation to field readiness.  
Discrepancies can develop for a variety of reasons, including lack of understanding of a 
given policy or piece or legislation, limited funding, or conflicts in organizational mission 
with established policies (Hudson, Hunter, and Peckham, 2019).  The lack of awareness 
between emergency managers or field agencies and the policy developers or elected 
officials of a gap in implementation creates an environment where neither side is really 
addressing the needs of the community, as both are working on different problems with 
different resources. Hudson, Hunter, & Peckham (2019) discussed some of the problem 
areas for implementation.  These areas of concern include:  
complexity (underestimation of the delivery challenges); evidence base 
(insufficient objective, accurate and timely information on costs, timescales, 
benefits and risks); misunderstanding of stakeholders (optimism about the ability 
to align different views); behavior and Incentives (interested parties boosting their 
own prospects); and challenge and accountability (decision-makers seeking short-
term recognition).(Hudson, Hunter, & Peckham, p.2) 
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If multiple policies require similar changes after implementation to make them acceptable 
or feasible for field operations, there may also be a systemic issue or lack of 
understanding on the part of the elected officials that needs to be addressed. 
Research Tradition 
Qualitative studies, such as this, encompass a range of designs.  Creswell (2013) 
detailed the five primary types of qualitative research: narrative, phenomenological, 
grounded theory, ethnographic, and case studies.  In the third edition of his work 
Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among the Five Approaches, Creswell 
provided definitions, background information, examples, procedures, and challenges for 
each type (Creswell, 2013, pp. 69-107).  The first of these designs, narrative inquiry, has 
a history reaching back into the mid-1800s, when researchers used narrative-type 
inquiries in social science studies with educational components (Connelly & Clandinin, 
1990).  The narrative description defines not only the structure of the study, but also the 
pattern of the study, as well.  As humans recount experiences through a series of stories 
and experiences, the narrative inquiry lends itself to documenting human experience on a 
personal level (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990).  Connelly and Clandinin (1990) provided 
an in-depth explanation and exploration of narrative inquiry for a variety of social 
sciences (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990).  Authors of several studies on cybersecurity have 
used narrative inquiry, including Hopkins, Wilson, Silva, and Forsythe (2015).  In their 
inquiry, Hopkins et al. grouped participants into two groups to track, solve, and identify 
possible suspects of cybercrimes.  Participants in one group focused on narrative inquiry 
while participants in another group focused on association of elements of the crime 
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(Hopkins et al., 2015).  The researchers found that the group focused on the narrative 
achieved more accurate results and identified more aspects of the crime, along with 
gaining better insights into possible suspects than the group focused on simple 
association of elements (Hopkins et al., 2015). The narrative inquiry model could be 
utilized for some studies on cybersecurity, but, this study involved  consolidating a 
number of potentially conflicting viewpoints and missions.  I opted against using the 
narrative model because I concluded that it might not allow me to grasp the complexity 
of the study phenomenon.  In addition, I was worried about potential conflicts in 
incorporating conflicting narratives. 
The second qualitative design, phenomenological, traces its roots to the beginning 
of the 20th century.  At the beginning of the 1900s, Edmund Husserl published a series of 
treatises regarding a new philosophical approach to research, one that focused on the 
human experience as a method for collecting data.  Husserl, and later Heidegger, 
expanded upon this theme, positing that the human experience and ego were the central 
driving force for behaviors (Carr, 1970).  Phenomenologists seek to explore the 
individual lived experience of the participant to achieve a better understanding of the 
individual’s view of the world (Carr, 1970).  Researchers have published several 
phenomenological dissertations on cybersecurity in recent years, from Caudle’s 2010 
Decision-Making Uncertainty and the Use of Force in Cyberspace: A Phenomenological 
Study of Military Officers to Andrè’s 2016 A Phenomenological Study of Frontline 
Hiring Professionals that Recruit in a Cybersecurity World.  The first study centered on 
the lived experiences and perceptions of the decision-making process of several military 
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officers working at various cybersecurity commands in Washington, DC, to develop 
common themes, characteristics, and recommendations for future improvements in the 
process (Caudle, 2010).  The second study focused on the experiences and perceptions of 
hiring and recruiting managers in the cybersecurity sector (André, 2016).  André (2016) 
found that compensation was a primary driver in the ability to recruit and retain 
professionals in a limited pool and showed a significant increase in investment in 
cybersecurity resources across companies to protect infrastructures and assets.  
Phenomenology is an emerging research method in cybersecurity, with doctoral 
dissertations occupying most of the published research currently available.  This study 
involved not only individual perceptions and experiences, but policy development as 
well; for this reason, I concluded that phenomenology was not well suited for my 
investigation. 
 The grounded theory arose from a perceived gap between empirical research and 
theory on the part of its creators.  Those researchers, Glaser and Strauss first published 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory in 1965 as an introduction to their new approach.  
The pair believed their approach bridged the gap between theory and research left by the 
Columbia and Chicago schools of sociological research.  Their approach significantly 
differed from more traditional research methodologies in that there is no predetermined 
problem or question at the outset of the study.  Instead, the inquiry begins with a general 
research topic and the researcher collects data based on the research methodology 
(interviews, surveys, questionnaires, et cetera).  The researcher begins forming the 
theoretical concepts at the outset of data collection, identifying themes and key phrases 
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and reintegrating these into later collection and theory development efforts.  The results 
are coded and further grouped together and compared to both a selected theoretical model 
and each other.  This can provide either positive or negative correlation, depending on 
how well each data set fits the selected model and compares to others collected (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1965).  As I previously identified both research questions to answer and theory 
before beginning research, the grounded theory was also not a fit for the proposed study. 
 Next is the ethnographic method, which can be traced to anthropological research 
conducted in the early part of the 1700s.  As originally conceived, ethnography was a 
field of study concentrating on how cultural groups interact over time, both within and 
outside of the group.  The expansion of the Russian Empire across Europe and eastward 
towards Kamchatka greatly impacted the development of ethnography.  Gerhard Muller 
travelled from Germany to Kamchatka conducting anthropological research on the tribes 
and native groups encountered during the Russian expansion.  During the Kamchatka 
expedition (1743-1753), Muller identified Volker-Breschreibung as a field apart from 
anthropology.  Schlozer and Gatterer took this concept and further developed it into 
ethnography.  As ethnography gained acceptance and usage in France in the mid-1800s, 
its usage shifted to “physical organization, intellectual and moral characteristics, 
languages, and historical traditions (Vermeulen, 1995, p. 50).  As study did not deal as 
much with culture and tradition as policy and evolution, ethnography was not seen as a 
fit. 
 The final of the five principal qualitative research methodologies is the case 
study.  The case study can be traced back hundreds of years in its current form and much 
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further as a general process originating in the medical field, as the collection of data on 
individual cases and patients (McLeod, 2008).  Case study research as it is currently 
known has roots in Western Europe and the University of Chicago School of Sociology.  
Chicago was an epicenter for the case study methodology in the first part of the 1900s 
due to the influx of immigration in the city.  The case study method proved particularly 
well-suited to many issues related to immigration as it allowed an in-depth examination 
of the situation and cases studied.  One of the most discussed criticisms of case study 
research is its limited applicability to different populations.  The case study typically has 
a limited focus and provides an in-depth look at a phenomenon, decision-making process, 
or policy impact on the selected population (Tellis, 1997). 
 The case study research method has a two-tier definition dealing with the scope 
and features of a case study.  According to Yin (2014), the scope of a case study method 
states: “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
(the ‘case’) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2014, p. 16).  This 
description helps the researcher separate case studies from other methods.  Yin’s second 
aspect outlines the characteristics of the case study: 
“a case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2014, p. 17) 
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 Taken together, the dual definitions of case study research show this methodology as one 
that returns a detailed and thorough examination of a limited subject field.  Limiting the 
scope of the inquiry to a single case or subset of a larger population allows the researcher 
to investigate the selected problem at length and follow the research wherever it may 
lead.  Such a design, as noted previously, can limit transferability of the results of a case 
study to other groups as the environment and behaviors, responses, and decision-making 
of the participants of the inquiry all impact the results (Yin, 2014). 
 The case study follows a linear process, but that process also builds upon itself 
and follows the data throughout the inquiry.  The case study originates from a general 
plan for the inquiry, then the researcher develops questions to be answered by the 
investigation.  Next the target population, instrument, and research design are selected 
and preparation for data collection begins.  Once the collection phase begins, multiple 
stages may be impacted: analysis, sharing, design, and preparation.  Depending on the 
nature of the results, the researcher may need to redesign part of the inquiry, adjust 
questions or instrumentation, or conduct secondary analysis based on emerging trends in 
the data.  The researcher continues the collection, analysis, design, and preparation 
iterations until all data is collected and the final analysis can be conducted (Yin, 2014).  I 
selected the case study method for the proposed inquiry based on its ability to follow 
emerging trends in current environments and the ability to incorporate many unknowns 
into the study.  I collected and analyzed data from interviews with targeted individuals 
along with data from agency procedural documents and public policies. 
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Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher in the study was to analyze data collected from 
interviews on cybersecurity policies and procedures at the state and local level in Middle 
Tennessee. During the interview process, I observed and documented responses and 
experiences of the interviewees for data collection.  After each collection I conducted the 
iterative analysis/design/preparation process discussed in the previous section to capture 
emerging trends and prepare for subsequent interviews.  I did not have professional 
connections to any individual participating in the inquiry, and my past personal 
interactions were limited to brief meetings with local politicians during community 
events.  These interactions did not include any personal or individual contact outside of 
community forums or events open to the general population.  As the individuals 
participating in the study were elected officials, appointed officials, subject matter 
experts working with the government, and emergency managers, there was no issue or 
subordinate workplace relationships. 
As a result of my work experience with the military and in the transportation 
industry, I have experience and knowledge of typical interactions between state and local 
officials and their associated emergency managers in many different states and local 
areas.  My current role is a university professor in Middle Tennessee, where I have little 
interaction with the elected officials or emergency managers.  To eliminate potential bias 
based on previous experiences the proposed study focused on a geographic area outside 
territory I worked in previous positions.  The subject matter of cybersecurity was also a 
significant departure from the operations and transportation focus of my previous 
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experience, further insulating the study.  The most important element to prevent personal 
bias was to focus on the opinions and experiences of the participants during data analysis 
and adhere to selected instrument during the interview process.   
Methodology 
A qualitative approach was selected for the proposed inquiry due to the nature of 
the information sought and the data to be gathered.  According to Patton (2002), 
qualitative research typically derives from one of three types of data: interviews, 
observations, and documents.  The data is generally collected through fieldwork, and the 
quality of the data, especially with interviews and observations, is directly related to the 
planning, skill, and quality of work by the researcher.  Unlike quantitative research, 
where statistical analysis and other mathematical techniques define relationships, 
qualitative research seeks patterns in behavior, perspective, and experiences of the 
participants.  Qualitative research has two principal purposes: research and evaluation.  
When using the qualitative method in a research capacity, the focus is on testing or 
generating new theories for a given scenario.  Program evaluation, which I conducted for 
the study, “is the systematic collection of information about the activities, characteristics, 
and outcomes of programs to make judgments about the programs, improve program 
effectiveness, and/or inform decisions about future programming” (Patton, 2002, p. 10). 
The qualitative method is especially well-suited to evaluate and capture localized 
differences within larger programs.  Case study designs can further be used to evaluate 
whether the program in question is implemented in the manner intended, if the program 
deviates from the intended direction during evolution, or if different areas of local 
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programs or entire local organizations are straying from the intended direction and goals 
of the original program (Maxwell, 2002).  The research focused on these questions 
related to cybersecurity policy at the State and Local level in Middle Tennessee, making 
the qualitative case study an appropriate design.  
Participant Selection Logic 
For the proposed study, elected and appointed officials in four Middle Tennessee 
counties, along with their corresponding emergency managers, subject matter experts, 
and select officials at the state level were interviewed.  The list of targeted offices and 
agencies across Middle Tennessee is located in Appendix C, along with the associated 
level of government, and potential number of interviews at each location.  To gain access 
and assistance from Senators and Representatives, initial requests for cooperation were 
sent to the offices of the Chief Clerks for screening and processing.  I selected the target 
area for the study based on lack of personal connections within the area, a range of 
socioeconomic and political perspectives and backgrounds within the target population, 
and a mix of technology-based, urban, and rural economies. 
I targeted the Senators and Representatives at both the state and federal level for 
the state to gain insight into the current legislative mindset on cybersecurity.  As noted in 
Chapter 2, cybersecurity is commonly described as a federal issue, but it has become 
more and more problematic for lower levels of government.  Including state and federal 
legislators was an attempt to shed light into the proceedings and discussions behind the 
laws (or lack thereof) on the books in Tennessee.  Each of the federal officials of the state 
was contacted for this study, but only a select few of the Senators and Representatives at 
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the state level. At that level, those officials serving on State and Local Government, 
Transportation and Safety, Government Operations, Judiciary, Business and Utility, and 
Criminal Justice Committees were identified for potential participation.  These legislators 
had direct insight into how cybersecurity is viewed within the state, how officials believe 
it impacts state business, and how it should be integrated into the state and local 
governments. 
The information and insight provided by the lawmakers from the Congressional 
offices was then to be compared with the information provided by the Governor’s office 
to determine the consistency of the message and vision of the cybersecurity program at 
the state level.  Administrators and field managers at select state agencies (Tennessee 
Bureau of Investigation (TBI), Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA), and 
Safety and Homeland Security) were then targeted for interviews to gain insight into the 
instructions, missions, and priorities received and how well actions and programs in place 
match the intended and publicized policies in place.  This first set of interviews served as 
the foundation for the remainder of the inquiry into the county and local behaviors and 
will be utilized to adjust interview questions and directions, as needed. 
After completing the state-level interviews and data analysis, the inquiry shifted 
to the lower levels government and emergency managers in the four targeted counties.  
County mayors, county information officers, economic and development officers, and 
county-level emergency coordinators were contacted for interviews.  These interviews 
shed light on the level of engagement with cybersecurity in the counties, ascertain how 
well the county’s programs and policies align with the state, and investigated whether the 
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emergency and field operating managers saw implementation in line with established 
policies and procedures, or disconnected. The inquiry also sought opinions and 
experiences that could correct areas that operate differently on the ground than the 
original or established concept, identify resources needed to implement changes, and/or 
identify gaps between existing and needed policies.  At the local level, mayors, city 
information officers, city administrators, subject matter experts, and emergency managers 
comprised the last set of interviews requested.  These interviews followed along the same 
path as those with the county described above, with the collected data providing a 
comprehensive view of cybersecurity policy at the state level and across the county and 
city levels in the targeted Middle Tennessee area. 
The overall population identified for the study consisted of 100 individuals spread 
between Congressional seats and state, county, and city officials and emergency 
managers.  This population represented elected and appointed officials from the federal to 
local levels in the target area, along with associated emergency managers, subject matter 
experts, and supporting practitioners that oversee cybersecurity operations in their 
assigned territories.  I sent invitations to participate in the study to the offices for each of 
the potential participants, with a target response and participation rate of around 25% for 
the local and state locations and half of the counties.  Sampling was not used for the 
target population prior to receiving commitments.  If a significantly higher number of 
participants elected to participate than anticipated, a filter would be applied to balance the 
participants by levels of government and geographic location within the selected area. 
104 
 
The number of interviews required for a meaningful and valid study is not based 
on a mathematical formula but achieving saturation with the data.  Collecting enough 
data to reach saturation is essential for the validity and replicability of the study.  
Saturation in qualitative research, particularly in one including interviews like this study, 
occurs when no new data is collected from additional participants, despite interviewees 
answering the same questions regarding the subject matter.  Throughout the course of the 
data collection and analysis, additional interviews would be sought if either data 
saturation was not reached with the original interviewees or if alternate subject matter 
experts or critical stakeholders were identified in the process that were not included in the 
study (Fusch & Ness, 2015).   
Selection of participant agencies for the proposed study focused on the elected 
and appointed officials in Middle Tennessee concerned with cybersecurity.  I identified 
potential state Congressional participants based on their membership on committees that 
dealt with cybersecurity most directly.  The same logic went into the selection of state 
agencies, with those coordinating with federal cybersecurity assets and addressing state 
issues chosen for the study.  Geographic constraints on the area of the study constrained 
the potential participants at the county and city levels.  Representatives from the four 
counties and nine major city governments in the region were contacted to participate in 
the study as each location has the potential to add unique perspective to the study.  
Smaller towns scattered throughout the geographical area were not included in the initial 
request for participation, as most of these locations rely on the surrounding counties for 
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much of their infrastructure (fire and police protection, water treatment and waste 
collection, emergency response, et cetera).   
I e-mailed the initial cooperation request letters to the appropriate clerk for each 
agency or congressional office.  Upon receipt of letters of cooperation and approval from 
IRB to conduct the study, additional communications followed, including e-mail, phone 
calls, and face to face meetings.  Different offices or agencies had additional protocols or 
permissions required, so process and procedures differed slightly depending on individual 
requirements.  As noted previously, analysis took place as data collection occurred, 
allowing identification of emerging trends or stakeholders not captured in the original 
participant pool.  Due the rural/suburban/urban mix within the geographic area, care was 
also be taken to incorporate participants from each category as well as the different levels 
of government.  Saturation for the study occurred when subsequent interviews from an 
area return the same results or participants in each of the required categories were 
incorporated in the results, along with any emergent stakeholders. 
Instrumentation 
The primary focus of this study was to determine whether federal cybersecurity 
policies and procedures provide adequate guidance, resources, and oversight for state and 
local policies and agencies, especially within Middle Tennessee.  Of interest was the 
level of engagement the state officials have with this area and how important or relevant 
they considered it to the governance of their state and location.  Along with gauging the 
level of interest and engagement, it was also necessary to determine if federal policies 
and programs provide requisite resources and authority to carry out a cybersecurity 
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program below the federal level.  Most of the interview questions focused on these issues, 
working to define the operational environment for cybersecurity in Middle Tennessee.  
The secondary focus of the proposed study was whether the current policies and 
programs currently in place are being implemented properly in the field.  To that end, 
part of the interview questions inquired about the level of engagement of each participant 
with cybersecurity operations.  Those with firsthand knowledge were asked to compare 
the intent and published policies with the reality of the mission and focus of the 
operational units on the ground. 
The instrumentation for the proposed study included use of a digital audio 
recording device for face to face interviews.  The intent was to conduct face to face 
interviews with each of the participants using the digital audio device for transcription 
recordings.  If there are willing participants that cannot conduct face to face interviews, 
Skype and telephonic options will also be offered to collect the data.  As an option of last 
resort, the interview protocol (shown in Appendix D) was able set up in Survey Monkey 
for participants to complete asynchronously. I developed the data collection instrument to 
be used in the study based on the research questions.  At the outset of the data collection 
process, the interviews were the primary source of information.  Policy documents, 
guidance, and directives for emergency departments and other legislative committees 
were also utilized where they contributed to the study, as well. 
With a researcher-created data collection instrument, a pilot study was needed to 
test the instrument.  The pilot study was performed with a subject matter expert working 
in cybersecurity.  This individual had similar knowledge and experience as the other 
107 
 
individuals targeted for participation and will demonstrate whether questions need to be 
modified, removed, or additional added to gain insight.  Feedback and commentary were 
also sought on the areas of potential bias, subject knowledge, and applicability to 
location-specific resources.   
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The data collection was conducted at the offices of each of the participants that 
volunteer for the study, or at an alternate location of their choosing.  This included 
government buildings in the different counties, coffee shops, and other locations the 
participants deemed favorable.  These included the state Capitol, County Seats, and city 
halls for the locations listed in Appendix C.  Interviews were also conducted via 
telephone and through Survey Monkey.  The procedures for participant selection, data 
collection, and data analysis follow.  These will occur in separate phases: study 
development, recruitment, data collection, and analysis stages. 
In the study development stage, I sent letters of cooperation out to the offices of 
the participants listed in Appendix C via e-mail.  For the federal Congressional officials, 
letters were sent to their individual offices.  State Congressional contact was made 
through the Office of the Clerk for both the Senate and the House for the initial 
cooperation.  County and local official contacts went through their respective offices in 
their geographic locations.  With e-mail serving as the primary method of contact for this 
initial contact, follow up communication followed two weeks after the initial e-mail for 
any office without a response.  Based on the nature of the responses (positive and 
negative), the need for expansion of the study or participant population was examined six 
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weeks after the initial contact e-mail.  To assist in the cooperation process, I also 
contacted community partners to assist with introductions to potential participants.  The 
next steps in the development process was completing the Walden IRB process.  Once 
IRB approval was obtained, I conducted my pilot survey, examined the results, and 
moved on to recruitment.  Next was the recruitment stage, where I reached out to the 
individual participants identified to gauge their interest.  Interviews were then scheduled 
with the participants using their preferred method (face to face, telephone, Skype, or 
Survey Monkey). 
 The data collection stage of the study commenced with the first scheduled 
interview.  Before each interview began, the participant received a copy of the Informed 
Consent form to sign for the interview, and a copy of the interview protocol.  The 
interview opened with standard opening comments that provided an explanation of how 
the interview will run, the type and scope of the questions, and reminding each 
participant they were not obligated to answer any questions and that I would record the 
interview with their permission.  Within a week after the interview each participant was 
provided with a copy of the transcription of the interview to verify for completeness and 
accuracy.  The participants were given a week from receipt to make changes to the 
transcript before the data is coded for analysis.  A lack of response after a week was taken 
as acceptance of the provided transcription, a fact that will also be explained during the 
interview process. 
 The interview protocol (shown in Appendix D) was designed utilizing 
McCracken’s questionnaire construction guidelines from The Lone Interview 
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(McCracken, 1988, pp. 34-38), and began by thanking the interviewee for their time and 
participation in the study.  The structure of the interview was provided, along with topics 
of the different sets of questions.  The participant was reminded that all responses are 
voluntary and they may choose not to answer any question or come back to a question 
later in the interview, if desired.  Participants were also reminded that all responses are 
confidential and no identifying information would be included in the results of the study.  
The first set of questions served to establish the participant’s background, expertise, and 
current role and responsibilities.  Participants were asked to provide a brief synopsis of 
their professional and educational background, along with their time in current position 
and the primary responsibilities of that role.  Next, each was asked about what issues are 
of greatest import to citizens, businesses, and special interest groups in their districts, as 
well as the issues of greatest concern among their peers (other legislators, mayors, 
emergency managers, et cetera).  The final two questions in the opening section sought 
insight into the participant’s comfort level with cybersecurity from both policy and 
technical perspectives and if the participant had any areas they wish to incorporate into 
the interview. 
 The main research question for the study asked if U.S. cybersecurity policy at the 
federal level provides enough guidance and resources for state and local governments and 
agencies to enact and implement cybersecurity policy.  The data collection instrument 
contained eight questions designed to gain insight into legislative priorities in the targeted 
area and the current policy environment around cybersecurity.  The first question asked 
the participant about what drives legislative priorities from year to year.  Next, 
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interviewees were asked to provide examples of issues that rose from either not on the 
legislative agenda or of marginal importance to a major issue during a session in the last 
decade.  Taken together, these two questions provided insight into how lawmakers 
establish priorities, set their agendas, and the types of issues important enough to create a 
large enough consensus or grassroots support to demand immediate attention.  Next, 
participants were asked their opinion on the responsibilities of the various levels of 
government with respect to cybersecurity.  Question four asked which of the federal 
cybersecurity policies and procedures are most relevant and applicable to the policy 
environment at the state level in Tennessee. 
 The next question in this section asked how cybersecurity is viewed by the 
participant’s peer group: as a need at the state level, a federal issue, or mixed, and if the 
opinions are divided, what is the composition of the opposing groups?  Under this 
question, there were three additional inquiries regarding special interest groups and 
stakeholders in the cybersecurity discussion.  These asked the participant to describe the 
belief structure and resources of the interest groups and stakeholders along with their 
preferred methodology. Participants were also asked how effective the special interest 
groups are at influencing opinions, topics of discussion, and decisions regarding their 
preferred interests.  Question six asked what the main influences are for cybersecurity 
policies and procedures.  Question seven inquired about how cybersecurity 
considerations have impacted emergency preparedness and planning at their level.  The 
last question in this section asked the participant to define changes over the course of the 
last decade regarding cybersecurity: attributes of the problem, fundamental social values 
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and structure, basic constitutional structure and laws, socioeconomic reform, systemic 
governing coalition, degree of consensus needed for policy change, overlapping societal 
cleavages, and general direction and focus of policy. 
 The second research question the study addressed is: how well aligned are current 
cybersecurity program implementation with the established policies and vision that 
created them?  To address this inquiry, there were seven questions for each participant to 
answer in the second set of interview questions.  The first question asked the participant 
to provide an overview of how cybersecurity is accounted for in policy and planning for 
the participant’s district.  Question two asked about the major constraints and limitations 
for emergency planning and operations around cybersecurity.  The third requested details 
about the authority and resources provided for the lower levels of government by higher 
government regarding cybersecurity.  Question four asked about the clarity of the 
organization’s cybersecurity mission, focus, and goals and requests the participant 
provide an overview of each along with an explanation of how each is measured.  Next, 
participants were asked if their agencies can fully accomplish their missions and 
objectives assigned with their current resources and authority.  If a negative response was 
given, a follow-up question inquired what resources are needed to bridge the gap between 
current operations and the ability to meet expected standards.  Question six asked the 
participant to compare the structure of their organization and operations in the field to the 
original vision and charter for the agency.  The final question asked the participant to 
provide their opinion on how to address any issues regarding disconnects in mission 
creep, conflicting directives, implementation of policy, or lack of resources.   
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At the close of the interview the interviewee was thanked once again for their 
time and participation in the study.  At this time, they were given the opportunity to 
revisit any topic they wish to provide any additional insight for or to provide information 
for topics not covered by the interview.  I also reminded the participants they will receive 
a copy of the transcript within seven days for their review and editing.  This process 
continued until all of the interviews are complete. 
Data Analysis Plan 
In the analysis stage of the study began after the transcript was reviewed and 
returned by the participant, or after a week with no response by the participant.  The 
analysis stage followed each data collection stage for the individual interview, but the 
coding and initial analysis occurred either before or during the period that other 
interviews took place.  This process, as noted previously, helped identify emerging 
patterns or items that need to be addressed or incorporated into future interviews.  In this 
stage, the digital recordings taken during the interviews (or responses if Survey Monkey 
was utilized) were converted into an electronic transcript and then analyzed using 
qualitative software.  Once the electronic transcripts were complete, they were coded and 
entered into Atlas.ti to analyze the data, trends, and patterns identified and discussed.  
Atlas.ti is a qualitative research program that assists researchers in organizing and 
analyzing large amounts of data across multiple media types.  Atlas allows for systematic 
coding, linking of topics and ideas, visualization and other tools to better understand the 
collected data (Altas.ti, n.d.). 
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For the data analysis, I utilized McCracken’s five-step process.  This five-step 
process is part of a larger narrative McCracken wrote on the use of the long interview as 
a tool of qualitative research.  McCracken utilized extended interviews of up to six hours 
(broken up into two- or three-hour segments) as an exploratory instrument.  The five-step 
analytic process described by McCracken is one element of his four-step method of 
inquiry.  The first step is the review of analytic categories and interview design, the 
second is the review of cultural categories and interview design, the third stage involves 
the discovery of cultural categories and the creation of the questionnaire and interview 
procedure, and the last includes discovery of analytic categories, analysis, and the write 
up (McCracken, p. 32-38). 
The first step in this analysis process starts with identification of each useful 
utterance within the individual transcript.  At this point, each of these observations will 
be considered on its own without relating it to other observations or other transcripts.  
This stage of analysis, per McCracken, is designed to determine if the utterances 
identified in the transcript can shed light on the underlying thought processes that led to 
its inclusion in the interview.  The investigator utilizes themselves as an instrument of 
analysis during this stage, not just a collector of data from the participant.  The 
investigator, per McCracken, should pay attention to not only what is included in the data 
from the interview, but also what context cues and additional information the data 
conjures for the investigator (McCracken, 1988, p. 32-34). 
The second stage of the analysis takes the initial observations from the first stage 
and expands the analysis over a wider swath of the transcript to further develop 
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relationships, both positive and negative.  This stage has three levels within itself, first, 
the utterances by themselves, secondly with the transcript, and finally, based on the 
literature and policy review.  In the third stage of analysis, the focus should now be the 
individual pieces of text specific ideas are lifted from and less the entire transcript.  
During this stage of analysis general themes and patterns are identified, along with 
general constraints and characteristics of the data (McCracken, p. 35). 
The fourth stage in McCracken’s analysis process is a major step in narrowing the 
focus of the analysis by eliminating redundant or repetitive theories or themes.  During 
this stage, the most significant and robust themes are elevated and all residual themes set 
aside and categorized.  At this point, it is imperative to ensure that these residual or 
seemingly less important themes or theories do not conflict with or contradict any of the 
main themes or theories.  Once any conflicts are resolved and the remaining themes and 
trends are ordered, analysis moves into the final stage.  In stage five, the responses and 
views of the interviews are combined to form larger, system-level theses not reliant on 
individual perspectives, but built on general observations and trends (McCracken, p. 35-
36). 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
To validate the quality and trustworthiness of qualitative research, there are four 
tests typically used: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability.  
Construct validity for case study research utilizes multiple sources of evidence, 
establishes a chain of evidence, or incorporates a review of the report draft by critical 
participants (Yin, p. 45).  The study relied primarily upon interviews for data collection, 
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but also requested relevant and supporting documents from participants, as well.  
Bringing in multiple sources of data can assist with either corroborating the information 
provided by the participants during the interviews or providing possible points of 
departure to investigate (Yin, p. 107-110).  With much of the data collection centering on 
legislators, public use files and organizational records from committee meetings and 
legislative sessions was examined for specific time periods or events discussed by 
participants during the interviews.  For participants working in other agencies, similar 
information was sought depending on recording standards and availability. 
For internal validity, typical case study tactics include pattern matching, 
explanation building, addressing rival explanations, and using logic models (Yin, p. 45).  
For the proposed study, I expended the most effort examining rival explanations for the 
data.  Per Yin, the more rival explanations and conflicting interpretations of the data 
considered and rejected within the analysis, the better quality the results will be (Yin, p. 
142).  For the external validity, the theory embedded in the design of the case study 
served as the basis for analytical generalization of the study as the data is analyzed and 
findings are incorporated.  The reliability of the study stemmed from documentation, 
construction of the data collection instrument, and use of accepted strategies by the 
researcher.  The structure and evolution of the instrument was provided in the previous 
section, along with documentation and analytical strategies to be used throughout the 
study.  The study is entirely replicable by subsequent researchers using the information 




The recruitment process began by e-mailing an invitation to participate to the 
office of the prospective participants.  This initial document outlined the proposed study 
and provided the initial opportunity for the individual to choose whether or not to 
participate.  Participants had multiple opportunities to select their level of participation 
and engagement at several steps before the interview begin.  As noted previously, each 
interviewee was advised during the data collection process that they have the option the 
decline to answer any question during the session or skip a question and return to it later 
if desired.  Considering the target pool and measures taken, there was no known risk to 
the participants of the study.   
Each agency and organization taking part in the study was contacted to ascertain 
if they have additional IRB requirements beyond that required for Walden University.  
During the data collection process, each participant was provided with a detailed 
explanation of their role in the interview process and asked to sign a consent form prior to 
beginning the interview.  The participants received a copy of their consent form, along 
with a copy of the interview protocol at the outset of the session.  Participant 
confidentiality was maintained and protected for all aspects of the proposed study, as 
only I have access to notes, recordings, and other materials associated with the data 
collection and analysis.  Additionally, when not in use all materials remain secured in my 
home office.  All digital materials were downloaded to and stored on my personal laptop, 




 A qualitative case study methodology was selected for the proposed study to 
collect and analyze data from elected and appointed officials and emergency managers in 
Middle Tennessee.  Concerns about bias and research quality were mitigated through 
instrument construction, awareness of the researcher’s place in collection and analysis, 
use of multiple sources of evidence, and addressing rival or conflicting explanations 
within the data.  Confidentiality concerns were addressed by removing all identifying 
information about the participants and their organizations from the data after the 
transcript is confirmed by the participant.  Data and materials collected for the study were 
stored according to requirements provided by Walden University to protect participants 
and maintain ethical handling of the material.  Coding and analysis of the data followed 
McCracken’s five-step analytic process, which took place in an iterative manner 
following each interview once the transcript was approved.  This process allowed 
following interviews to incorporate emerging trends or concepts as needed.  The next 
chapter will address the data collection, analysis, provide evidence of trustworthiness, 





Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will review the data collected for the study and present the 
results derived from analysis of that data.  The primary purpose of the study was to 
understand how federal cybersecurity policies, procedures, and guidance impact the 
cybersecurity operations at the state and local level, specifically in relation to the State of 
Tennessee and local governments in its midstate area.  In this chapter I will also explain 
the pilot study, setting and demographics, data collection and analysis methods, and 
evidence of trustworthiness. 
I sought to answer two research questions: first, whether the current cybersecurity 
policy at the federal level provides sufficient guidance and tools for the State of 
Tennessee, along with count and municipal governments in the midstate area, and, 
second, whether the current implementation of cybersecurity policies and programs 
match with the expectations and vision of the original plans that put them in place.  In the 
first part of this chapter, I will provide information on the pilot study developed to 
validate the interview protocol created for this study.  I will then discuss the environment 
surrounding the study, including emergent events relevant to the study and demographics 
of the target area.  Other information framing the study, including evidence of 
trustworthiness and characteristics related to the study and data collection, will follow.  
The chapter concludes with the results of the study, a discussion of their relevance to the 




I received Walden University IRB approval to begin collecting the data for this 
study on December 8, 2017.  The original approval number for this study was: 
2017.12.08.1:44:26-06’00’.  I conducted the pilot study on December 21, 2017, using the 
proposed interview protocol and with an individual having both extensive information 
technology and cybersecurity experience, in addition to decades of work in both the 
public and private sectors.  Based on the responses received from the pilot study and 
feedback on the setup of the study, I determined that the survey covered all of the 
elements in the research questions and elected not to alter the interview protocol. 
Performing the pilot study provided a number of benefits prior to the start of data 
collection and analysis.  First and foremost, it provided an outside perspective on the 
interview protocol and allowed me to determine efficacy and fit for the study.  With the 
results of the pilot study, I was also afforded an opportunity to test data collection 
methods, transcription, and coding protocols. The individual selected for the pilot study 
was outside the geographic area for the study and not currently serving as an elected or 
appointed official, nor was the person serving as a subject matter expert for the public 
sector.  The results of the pilot study were not included in the study.  Using these results 
did, however, allow me to enter data into the Atlas.ti program, perform code analysis, and 
verify that the preliminary coding structure developed was also relevant and capable of 




Throughout 2018 and in the first three months of 2019, as I conducted the data 
collection, several high-profile attacks, new policies and procedures in the United States, 
and some international cybersecurity events occurred that could have influenced 
participants.  In examining data from the online reference site Hackmageddon.com, I 
noted 1,749 successful cyberattacks in the 15-month period encompassed by the data 
collection cycle, or approximately 117 per month.  Of those attacks, 209, or 
approximately 14 per month, took place within the United States.  Finally, of the 209 
attacks taking place in the 15-month window, 89, or approximately six per month, were 
targeted against government agencies or facilities (Passeri, 2019).  A report published by 
Symantec for 2018 noted that one in 10 URLs (uniform resource locators) was malicious, 
that malicious e-mail had been sent to an increased percentage of users during 2017, that 
the percentage of malicious e-mail containing Microsoft Office documents jumped from 
5% in 2017 to almost 50% in 2018, and that employees with smaller agencies and 
organizations were targeted more than those at larger institutions (Symantec, 2019).  
Symantec also noted that the company alone blocked over 1.3 million web attacks per 
day by the end of 2018, blocking almost 350 million web attacks throughout the year 
(Symantec, 2019).  The number of web attacks was up 56% in 2018 compared to 2017 
(Symantec, 2019).  The number of mobile ransomware infections also increased in 2018, 
by 33% over 2017 (Symantec, 2019).  Not all the news was negative, however.  Although 
ransomware infections and attacks increased in mobile devices in 2018, ransomware 
overall decreased by more than 20% in 2018 (Symantec, 2019).  Phishing attacks also 
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declined in 2018, but at a slower rate of 7% compared to 2017 (Symantec, 2019).  The 
number of targeted attacks was also down slightly in 2018, but the largest attack vector 
remains spear-phishing (Symantec, 2019). 
In addition, there were several significant data breaches in the news throughout 
2018 and the early part of 2019.  One of the largest, with the most news coverage, was 
the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data breach.  This breach initially derived from a 
third-party application downloaded by approximately 270,000 Facebook users 
(Wipersoft, 2019).  From that original participant pool, the application gained access, 
through Facebook’s data collection and privacy policies, to the friend lists and other 
connections of the users on Facebooks network.  Facebook had knowledge of the data 
collection efforts of this application, and others, as far back as 2015, but declined to 
address the issue or make the information public (Wipersoft, 2019).  The story broke on 
news outlets in 2018, with an estimated final compromise of 87 million users’ data 
(Wipersoft, 2019).  Hackers and hacking groups reportedly utilized the data to create 
profiles of users to determine targeted advertising for a range of products, including 
political campaigns (Wipersoft, 2019).  The U.S. Congress deemed the breach and 
ensuing scandal significant enough to call Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerburg, to testify 
before Congress.  Facebook also reported a second breach in 2018, notifying users and 
the public that around 30 million user accounts were compromised through a security 
vulnerability (Wipersoft, 2019). 
 Other large data breaches in 2018 and early 2019 included the Google+ data 
breach and closure.  There was a discrepancy in the reporting of the breach by Google 
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and in the news.  Google, in 2018, stated that over 400 applications had an existing 
vulnerability, but that user data was not compromised, but instead immediately patched.  
Multiple sources reported, however, that user data was exposed as early as 2015 by this 
breach.  A second data breach was announced by Google in December of 2018 that 
included more than 53 million users.  Google announced the termination of this service as 
of August 2019 after the first breach.  After the second, the service termination was 
advanced to April of 2019.  Other major data breaches from 2018 include the Under 
Armor MyFitnessPal breach, which released data from over 150 million users, a Marriott 
hotels breach impacting data for over 500 million users, and a breach at the genealogy 
site MyHeritage that leaked data for over 92 million users (Wipersoft, 2019). 
As previously noted, the public sector experienced scores of cyberattacks in 2018 
and the early part of 2019.  At least 89 attacks were categorized as targeting public 
agencies or organizations during this time period (Passeri, 2019).  These data breaches 
and cyberattacks occurred across a wide range of targets in the public sector, including: 
candidates running for office, Republican and Democratic National Committees, Senate 
and Congressional sites and accounts, individual Representatives and Senators, the 
Department of Defense, individual branches and its contractors, State and Treasury 
Departments, the website for the Affordable Care Act, and agencies at the state, local, 
territorial, and tribal levels.  These attacks ranged in impact from minor disruptions, such 
as changing verbiage on Department of Transportation signs, short-term disruptions in 
service on websites and/or services provided, to massive, including: widespread data 
compromise, leak of personally identifiable information, theft of classified and sensitive 
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materials, significant disruption of government services, and ransomware attacks 
(Passeri, 2019).   
Agency impact and response was mixed during this time period.  Some locations 
and agencies felt it was more important to keep services up and running and paid the 
ransom demanded by attackers.  Others refused and dealt with the loss of their data and 
the resulting impact to services and its related toll on the public.  While the average 
ransomware ransom in 2018 increased to approximately $1,077, that figure includes 
individuals and small businesses (Dobran, 2019).  When ransom demands are sent to 
government agencies and larger corporations, the demands can go significantly higher.  A 
ransomware attack in 2017 requested $250,000 (unpaid) in bitcoin from the City of 
Spring Hill, Tennessee, a city with approximately 40,000 residents (Ervin, 2017).  Spring 
Hill lost access to some of their data permanently, residents could not use electronic 
payments for over a month, and the city was forced to recreate the utility billing system 
and others using manual data entry.  The estimated recovery cost for this attack currently 
tallies over $100,000, not including remediation efforts for risks going forward (Graciela, 
2018).  Hancock Health, a hospital based in Indiana, paid out $55,000 to restore their 
systems after a ransomware attack in early 2018, despite having security and backups in 
place.  This decision was made based on the estimated timetable to restore their systems 
utilizing the backups.  Administrators estimated it would take several days, if not weeks, 
to fully restore the data.  In the aftermath of the attack, the hospital reverted to pen and 




Some ransom demands in 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 were small and more 
manageable, including the City of West Haven, Connecticut, which had 23 systems 
locked by ransomware and elected to pay $2,000 in Bitcoin to restore service (Dillane, 
2018).  On the other side of the scale, Jackson County, Georgia suffered a ransomware 
attack and paid the $400,000 ransom demanded by the hackers to restore their files.  This 
attack came a year after the city of Atlanta fell victim to a ransomware attack (Padgett, 
2019).  The attackers on Atlanta requested $50,000 in ransom, which the city refused to 
pay.  This attack impacted not only the city of Atlanta computers, but had also potentially 
exposed those that conducted business with the city, as well (Blinder & Perloth, 2018).  
The total for Atlanta’s recovery efforts is expected to be between $2-3 million dollars in 
direct costs for the city and could cost the taxpayers of Atlanta as much as $17 million 
(Deere, 2018).  A cross-section of attacks over the fifteen-month period include shutting 
down the Massachusetts public defender system for weeks, and significant disruptions 
resulting from attacks on the Colorado Department of Transportation, the city of 
Sammamish, Washington, the city of Matanuska-Susitna in Alaska, Del Rio, Texas, and 
many others (Passeri, 2019).  A potentially devastating, but narrowly avoided, cyber-
attack of the year was against Harris County, Texas.  This attack was a phishing attack by 
a supposed contractor working on a project for the county, where the county initially 
transferred almost $900,000 to the contractor.  The agency reached out to the company 
that supposedly e-mailed them for clarification, but found the transfer instead went to 
hackers and the e-mail was a phishing attack.  The money was recovered, but the attack 
made headlines across the country and demonstrated potential threats and costs (Zaveri, 
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2018).  The State of Tennessee was not immune from these attacks during the period in 
question, either.  Knox County’s website was impaired by a distributed denial of service 
attack on election night in 2018, preventing the county from reporting election results for 
a period of several hours (Whetstone, 2018).  Columbia State Community College in 
Tennessee was also forced to shutter operations for two days in the first part of 2018 due 
to a cyber-attack (Malafronte, 2019). 
In the public sector during 2018, legislative changes regarding cybersecurity 
occurred across the country.  During this period at the state level, at least 35 states, Puerto 
Rico and the District of Columbia introduced or considered more than 260 bills related to 
cybersecurity, with 52 bills enacted in 22 states.  The primary areas for legislative activity 
during 2018 were: “Improving government security practices, providing funding for 
cybersecurity programs and initiatives, restricting public disclosure of sensitive 
government cybersecurity information, [and] promoting workforce, training, economic 
development” (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019 (1)). 
In Tennessee, this included one bill in the House and one in the Senate considered but not 
enacted, both bills requiring “the coordinator of elections to engage a cybersecurity firm 
to perform a study of the voter data system in this state and produce a report that details 
the risk to voter data posed by hacking” (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2019).   
In 2019, more than three dozen states have introduced more than 150 pieces of 
legislation through the first four months of the year.  The key areas thus far are improving 
government security practices, addressing the security of connected devices, relating to 
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cybersecurity insurance or standards for insurance data and information security, 
addressing elections security, [and] creating cybersecurity commissions, task forces or 
studies. To this point in 2019, the State of Tennessee has not introduced any new 
legislation related to cybersecurity (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019 (2)). 
 At the U.S federal level, there were also several changes in the last fifteen 
months.  One area was the release of the United States’ National Cyber Strategy, released 
in September 2018.  This strategy outlined cyber policy and strategy for the first time in a 
decade and a half.  Included in their strategy was a path forward, including: 
Defend the homeland by protecting networks, systems, functions, and data, 
promote American prosperity by nurturing a secure, thriving digital economy and 
fostering strong domestic innovation, preserve peace and security by 
strengthening the ability of the United States — in concert with allies and partners 
— to deter and, if necessary, punish those who use cyber tools for malicious 
purposes; and expand American influence abroad to extend the key tenets of an 
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet (National Cyber Strategy, 2018). 
In the federal arena, the Trump administration also oversaw the creation of the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Agency (CISA).  CISA Director Krebs noted:  
The CISA Act elevates the cybersecurity mission within DHS and streamlines our 
operations to better secure the nation’s critical infrastructure and cyber 
platforms,” said CISA Director Christopher Krebs. “CISA continues NPPD’s 
mission of leading the national effort to improve critical infrastructure security, 
coordinating the protection of the federal government’s networks and physical 
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infrastructure, and helping entities in the public and private sectors manage risk 
(Homeland Security Today, 2018). 
This agency adds to the national defense posture and seeks to reach out to public and 
private partner to improve the cyber posture across the United States. This agency also 
works to coordinate and consolidate public and private responses to cyberattacks 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2018). 
 In the international arena, there were two significant cyber events during the 
targeted time period: implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO’s) 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF).  The GDPR is the result of years of planning, 
preparation, and debate across the European Union.  The regulation was adopted on April 
14, 2016 but was not enforced until May 25, 2018.  This regulation sets forth data privacy 
laws for the European Union and replaces the previous privacy framework.  The GDPR 
has three objectives:  
1.   This Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons 
regarding the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement 
of personal data. 
2.   This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons 
and their right to the protection of personal data. 
3.   The free movement of personal data within the Union shall be neither restricted 
nor prohibited for reasons connected with the protection of natural persons 
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regarding the processing of personal data (Regulation 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament). 
 Under the terms for this agreement, citizens of the European Union (and those 
doing business with the EU) saw five significant changes in data protection.  The first 
was a more clear and concise language for data privacy standards.  Prior to this 
regulation, data privacy and collection efforts could be hidden behind complex legal 
documentation and language.  Going forward, these policies and procedures are required 
to be in a clear and concise language so users can understand them.  The next section 
requires affirmative consent from the users before data can be utilized by an organization.  
This closes gaps where silence or a lack of negative response from the user or consumer 
was previously taken for consent.  Users also gained additional transparency into how 
their data is used by companies.  Previously, users might not be aware whether their 
information was shared outside of the EU, how the data is used after it is collected, or 
whether certain actions and decisions are made using Artificial Intelligence or algorithms.  
Going forward, companies are required to provide clear information on data transfers, 
explain why data is being collected and for what purpose, and inform users which 
decisions are automated and provide an avenue to dispute them.  The GDPR also 
provided for additional rights for the users.  Previously, users may or may not know when 
a data breach occurred and their data was exposed, could have difficulties transferring 
data from one company to another, obtaining a copy of the information companies 
collected, or having their data deleted entirely.  The new GDPR requires businesses to 
inform users when breaches occur, allow users to move or request data, and a right to 
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have files deleted.  The last provision provides for stronger enforcement.  The previous 
regulation allowed for minimal means of redress, but the GDPR established a Data 
Protection Board that can adopt binding decisions and impose fines against businesses 
not adhering to the regulation (European Commission, 2018). 
 The other major international cyber event in 2018 was the Internet Governance 
Forum.  The 2018 IGF was the thirteenth annual meeting of the Forum, and it was a part 
of France’s ‘Paris Digital Week’ in November of 2018 that also saw the Paris Peace 
Forum and a Government Technology (GovTech) Summit.  On November 12, 2018, 
French President Emmanuel Macron announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in 
Cyberspace.  “This high-level declaration in favor of the development of common 
principles for securing cyberspace has already received the backing of 547 official 
supporters: 65 States, 138 international and civil society organizations, and 344 entities of 
the private sector” (Paris Call, 2018). 
The United States is not currently a signatory of the Paris Call, but many U.S. 
companies and interests signed.  These companies and agencies declared support of the 
call and developing better policies and procedures to work together to improve safety and 
security of cyberspace.  This call acknowledged and outlined many of the challenges 
facing the world at large regarding cyberspace, and called for increased collaboration 
between governments, private sector, and civil society to develop new standards, policies, 





In developing this study, I decided against relying on a partner organization to 
serve as an intermediary.  This decision was driven by the disparate organizations and 
locations of the targeted participants.  I felt that no single organization would be able to 
provide access across all levels of government and in desired locations, so direct contact 
with each of the individuals would yield better results.  I sent the initial contact e-mails 
(see Appendix F) to elected officials at the federal level (senators and representatives 
from Tennessee) the same week I set up the pilot study.  This included 11 potential 
interview targets.  At the same time, I sent initial contact e-mails to elected and appointed 
officials at the state and county levels in Tennessee and the initial target area.  This batch 
of e-mails included 65 potential targets.  I targeted specific individuals based on their 
positions in certain agencies and committees in each house of the Legislature (and joint 
committees).  The last set of e-mails went to officials at the city/town level in the target 
area and included an additional 24 potential participants.  Altogether, 100 individuals 
were identified for potential interviews.  At the outset of the study, and in my proposal 
defense, the expectation was that I would conduct a significant number of interviews, as I 
intended to interview every person who elected to take part in the study. 
Approximately two weeks sending the original e-mails to potential participants, I 
sent a follow-up e-mail (see Appendix G).  The follow-up e-mail generated the first 
responses to my requests for interviews, including several declinations and five 
individuals interested to participate.  I subsequently sent additional communications to 
the interested individuals to obtain informed consent and schedule interviews.  I received 
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the first informed consent for the study on January 9, 2018 and conducted the first 
interview on February 6, 2018.  The final e-mails (see Appendix H) were sent to the 
targeted participants 2 weeks after the second e-mail.  Based on the study design, a lack 
of contact from the targeted participants at this point indicated a lack of interest. 
Data Collection 
 During the data collection process, two obstacles added significant delays and 
barriers to success.  The first involved getting potential participants to buy in to the study 
and its relevance to their respective levels of government and day-to-day operations.  
This was a challenge as multiple officials in smaller jurisdictions declined to take part in 
the study as they felt upper level governments could better answer the questions posed.  
Some officials replied that cybersecurity was not an issue they felt qualified to speak 
about and felt they could not offer value to the study.  Part of the intent of this study was 
to gauge the level of engagement and understanding of cybersecurity issues across 
multiple levels of government.  Interviews with individuals in position as elected or 
appointed officials, no matter their experience level or knowledge of cyber operations, or 
lack thereof, help to answer that question.  The other major challenge was finalizing 
interview scheduling after potential participants agreed to take part in the study.  
Approximately a dozen participants expressed interest in taking part in the study but 
either changed their minds or stopped communicating altogether.  With the study 
focusing on elected and appointed officials and practitioners working for the state, the 
time commitment to participate in the study was also an issue for several potential 
participants.  Six individuals noted they would like to contribute to the study but did not 
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have enough time to schedule.  Alternative options were provided aside from the face-to-
face interview (telephone and Survey Monkey) to try and solicit more participation, but 
those individuals still declined.   
Due to the nature of the officials in the participant pool, there were no additional 
IRB requirements for this study beyond that required by Walden University.  I submitted 
my initial IRB application on November 27, 2017 and received IRB approval to begin 
data collection on December 8, 2017.  I submitted a continuing review to the IRB and a 
request to add two counties to my original three on November 23, 2018.  The IRB 
approved the continuation of the study and the change in counties covered on January 8, 
2019. 
  Interviews were conducted and data collected between February 6, 2018 and 
March 7, 2019.  Of the interviews, two were conducted face-to-face, one over the 
telephone, and two more submitted using a SurveyMonkey survey.  The 5 interviews 
conducted represent 5% of the targeted population for this study.  There were 18 other 
individuals that initially expressed interest that did not complete the process.  An 
additional dozen individuals were willing to speak with me in an informal capacity but 
declined to participate due to a range of factors, politics, confidentiality, and lack of 
technical expertise chief among them.  The face-to-face interviews took place in one 
participant’s place of employment and one was in a coffee house per the request of the 
participant.  Voice recording was done for one of the face-to-face interviews, with the 
permission of the participant.  This recording made transcription easier and ensured I did 
not miss any relevant data.  I recorded data for the other face-to-face interview and the 
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telephonic interview with notes.  After I conducted each of the live interviews, I 
transcribed the data collected and provided a copy for the participants to review for 
accuracy.  I did not receive any secondary documentation from any of the participants, 
but one participant returned the transcript with additional notes and clarifications.  In 
order to maintain confidentiality, participants were assigned numbers 1-5, and those 
numbers were utilized during the transcription and coding periods.  Participants in the 
study hold positions in Tennessee from the local to the state level and include 
practitioners that work with the state and public officials at multiple levels. 
Data Analysis 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, I analyzed the data using McCracken’s five-step 
process.  This process begins with identifying each so called ‘useful utterance’ in the 
individual transcript.  At this point in the process, these key words or phrases in the 
interview may help provide insight into the motivation of the participant to include them 
in the interview.  According to McCracken, the researcher is not simply retrieving or 
collecting data in this step, but they should also seek to identify contextual references and 
other information that can be gleaned from the interview.  In the second stage of analysis, 
the observations from the initial analysis step are expanded upon to determine positive 
and negative relationships among the data and utterances.  The second step encompasses 
three levels: looking at the utterances individually, looking at the utterances in the context 
of the transcript itself, and finally, looking at the initial observations through the lens of 
policy and literature review (McCracken, 1988, p. 32-35). 
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 The third stage of analysis focuses on ideas and the specific sections of text where 
they originate.  This phase of the analysis process seeks to develop overall themes, 
patterns, constraints, and characteristics of the data.  The fourth stage of analysis 
winnows out the minor and residual themes in the transcript and elevates those more 
significant.  While working on this stage, it is imperative to check that the apparently less 
important or relevant themes are not at odds with the major themes.  If a conflict exists, it 
must be resolved before moving on to the final stage of analysis.  The last step in this 
stage is to order the themes in order of importance and relevance to the study.  The fifth 
and final stage of data analysis combines the themes, responses, and viewpoints in the 
interviews to create system-level theses built on general observations and trends and not 
based on any one individual perspective (McCracken, p. 35-36). 
 I began the analysis phase of the study using the primary codes in the preliminary 
coding (see Appendix I) I developed before starting data collection.  The primary codes 
were selected based on expected responses and to create a baseline for initial analysis.  
Using Atlas.ti software, I coded each interview and identified emerging trends and 
patterns.  Interview questions were coded into cybersecurity and emergency preparedness 
in the initial pass.  This differentiation allowed me to separate responses into separate 
areas to assist with theme development.  The transcripts were coded sequentially as 
interviews were conducted and all transcripts were examined when all were complete to 
identify inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the coding.  A second coding pass identified 
areas related to Advocacy Coalition Framework and its components.  These codes 
included references to coalitions and opportunities, constraints, external events, 
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governmental decisions, policy considerations, and stable system parameters.  Finally, I 
went through the transcripts a third time and evaluated them based on recurrent themes as 
laid out in the tertiary code section (see Appendix J).  Taking this tiered approach 
allowed me to develop themes in a systematic manner and identify other codes needed 
based on participant responses. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
 
 To bolster credibility of the study, I sought to present all questions in the 
interview protocol in the same manner with each participant.  Some of the questions 
could be leading, or misleading, depending on phrasing and the nature of the 
conversation at the time.  It was also imperative to remain open to new avenues of 
inquiry as we progressed through the interview protocol.  As I served as the primary 
instrument for this study, I limited discussions of my personal and professional 
experience as they relate to Cybersecurity and public policy during the interviews.  This 
assisted in minimizing the bias or framing to guide how participants responded.  When 
participants responded in a manner not anticipated but the preliminary coding, I worked 
to remain flexible and responsive to those emergent themes and topics.  When these 
situations occurred, I asked follow-up questions to clarify responses and get a better 
understanding of the participant’s perspective and thought processes and to improve 
confirmability (Creswell, 2013).  During the data collection and analysis stages of the 
research, any information that could be used to identify the participant’s position, 
location, or agency was sanitized and/or generalized for inclusion in the final paper.  
Within a week following each interview, I sent a copy of the transcript to each 
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participant.  The participants were given an opportunity to add or remove information 
obtained in the interview process.  I reminded them at this point the study was voluntary 
and they did not need a justification to remove or edit responses.  Of the participants, one 
made a few corrections and returned the transcript.  The others stated the information 
contained was accurate and could be included in the study. 
 One of the hallmarks of a properly designed and executed qualitative study is its 
ability to be replicated (Peng, 2012).  While the study should be reproducible and provide 
similar outcomes, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to exactly replicate a study, 
particularly when the study includes interviews.  A second researcher or research team 
can pull from the same population, or a similar population, but the individual dynamics 
and interpersonal communications can alter responses and data gleaned from the 
interviews.  Barriers in communication, having multiple people present in the interview 
instead of one-on-one, a change in experience level, and environmental conditions at the 
time of the interview can all influence the results.  If a second study is undertaken with 
the same population as the previous study, participants may respond differently based on 
their previous interviews or if they became more engaged in the subject matter after their 
previous interview.  Changes in geographic location and participants can also drastically 
alter outcomes for interviews.  If you conducted the same cybersecurity study utilizing 
officials in Michigan, Alabama, Research Triangle, or other high-tech corridor, those 
officials and practitioners would likely be better equipped to provide insight into 
cybersecurity policies and procedures.  The basic outcomes of this study, however, 
should be transferable to an extent, as they show some of the challenges facing state and 
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local governments in the current policy environment.  Other locations may be more 
engaged or have a larger budget for security and/or training, but they still need to contend 
with similar issues as the counties chosen for this study in Tennessee.  Additional studies 
across the State of Tennessee should result in outcomes close to this study, as well.  The 
oversight provided by the State is uniform across all 95 counties, the major differences 
are socioeconomic, funding, and training. 
Results by Code 
 Results in this section will first be discussed according to the coding conducted on 
the data, then by conceptual framework.  Results will generally follow the sequence of 
questions to provide an understanding of the flow of the interviews and how each 
participant moved from question to question.  In the following section, relevant codes 
will be reported as they relate to ACF.  For each of the topics listed, I will discuss 
recurring topics, emergent trends, and any data in conflict from one interview to another.  
For a complete list of the codes, their grouping, and frequency across all interviews, see 
Appendix J. 
Professional and Educational Background, Time in Position, and Role 
 At the outset of the interview, I asked each participant to provide a brief summary 
of their time in position, educational, and professional backgrounds.  This information 
helped to frame the conversation, illuminate the qualifications of the participants, and 
create a more collaborative atmosphere for the interview.  The participants hold at least a 
bachelor’s degree, two a masters, and one a doctorate.  They average 20 years of 
experience in their fields, with a high of 28 years and a low of 12.  The participants also 
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average just under four years in their current positions, the most junior with just over a 
year for the most recent and over a decade for the longest-tenured.  One of the earliest 
and most discussed trends across the interviews was the myriad of hats these individuals 
wear and the multitude of areas of sole or shared responsibility. 
 The role of the participants varies depending on the nature of the agency or 
locality, but the need to simultaneously see to needs across diverse populations is a 
constant.  The participants not only have varying levels of education, but their 
backgrounds are similarly diverse.  Another aspect each of the participants referenced 
with their roles was working across multiple levels of government.  Participants in 
smaller locations manage their areas while interacting (to a point) with larger locations, 
counties, and the state.  Those in large cities and at the state level are required to be able 
to work with those larger and smaller agencies and governments, with varying degrees of 
authority. 
Special Interest Areas, Policy, and Constituent Concerns 
 I then asked participants about the main concerns of their constituents, special 
interest and policy issues in their community, and the most pressing legislative items at 
their level.  Each of the participants referenced two areas: communication and dealing 
with multiple issues and concerns of their citizens.  All volunteers noted multiple 
demands for their time and to some extent, conflicting demands on time and resources.  
One of the most common issues was improving efficiency and reliability while keeping 
costs and downtime to a minimum.  Each participant also touched upon the desire of the 
public to have greater security and protections against cyberattacks and privacy 
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protections, but also do not want the government to waste money chasing perfect 
protection or overly complicated systems.  Communication between levels of government 
and government agencies with the general public and smaller population groups is 
another area of significant concern.  Participants noted that some groups and citizens are 
better at providing communication when they disagree with a direction or would like to 
see a change.  The governments, they noted, could do a better job of communicating back 
to the constituents of decisions being made, justifications, and broadening transparency. 
 In the special interest area, responses were mixed.  Some participants saw robust 
special interest working to advance their point of view or preferred practices, while others 
saw little to no special interest or lobbying activity in their jurisdiction.  From a 
cybersecurity standpoint, vendors seem to drive the special interest groups, setting up 
meetings and conferences where they can provide demonstrations and offer their goods 
and services.  There were several policy areas participants felt more important than 
others.  These areas of emphasis included: creating policies and procedures to deal with 
ransomware, cyberattacks, data governance and security, and providing additional 
resources to lower level governments. 
Comfort Level with Cybersecurity, Emergent Issues, and Drivers of Policy 
 All the participants interviewed for this project felt they were well-versed in 
cybersecurity, which I expected based on their previously noted experience in the field 
and position.  When asked about emergent issues, participants returned fewer examples 
than anticipated, noting most areas fall under one of the broad-ranging policies or 
standard operating procedures already in place.  Participants stated that the policies they 
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create to govern their locations are typically sufficiently broad to allow them leeway to 
address any issues that arise throughout the year.  While there may be some unexpected 
bumps, most of the time emergent issues can be covered or at least addressed with 
policies and procedures currently in place. 
 When discussing the main drivers of policy; safety, resources, training and time 
were referenced by each participant.  Participant 5 noted:  
“training, time, and money.  Have a plan in place that will take a few years to 
fully implement.  Deal with issues related to continuing requirements, interaction 
across multiple government levels, and continue to improve security and 
operations among customer agencies”. 
Each participant stated education, training, and resources to accomplish everything 
desired are all lacking to an extent in their organizations.  With staffing and funds limited 
by government budget processes, agencies and localities have to get creative with how 
they address safety and security concerns, train staff, and hire and retain those with the 
requisite experience to guard against cyberattacks.  The technical expertise is an ongoing 
issue across the state.  Participant 2 noted:  
“Information and technology sharing also consumes a lot of time, pushing 
information from federal, DHS, and ISAC [Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center] down to lower levels of government.  Some counties across the state have 
no IT staff.  They have Emergency Managers, individuals that run the ambulance 
services or fire departments and they are told by the administrators that they are 
also in charge of IT…How do we find the talent and keep them?  In some places, 
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60 or 70k to handle IT is good money, on other places, kids straight out of school 
are making that kind of money, or better.  Makes it very hard for counties and 
small towns to recruit and retain qualified staff.  How do you know what training 
is sufficient?” 
Several participants referenced the budget process and not fully understanding who 
should be on staff or what the recommendations are from higher government levels or 
seen as appropriate for their agencies. 
Responsibilities of Government in Cybersecurity 
Next, participants were asked what responsibilities they believed different levels 
of government hold regarding cybersecurity.  Respondents provided a range of responses 
as to what level is responsible for which actions, but the consensus (supported by 
established policies) was the federal government has the primary responsibility.  While 
participants noted the federal primacy in the issue, differences arose when participants 
further discussed roles of government.  At levels below the federal government, 
respondents felt strongly that state and local should all have a hand in securing the 
networks and improving safety for the entire system.  One of the most significant themes 
arising from this study was the concept of shared responsibility.  Four out of five 
respondents used a similar term and the fifth explained the same concept but used 
different terminology.  This concept of shared responsibility manifests itself in several 
ways.  First, the local, county, and state governments and agencies all utilize, at some 
level, to federal systems.  If the lower government networks are compromised or a 
vulnerability exists, that in turn increases the risk and exposure for the federal networks 
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and everything it touches, as well.  Pushing out standards, policies, and procedures is part 
of a necessary cybersecurity plan, but that is not enough to provide protection. 
Once the federal standards are in place and distributed, the respondents felt the 
state has the responsibility to ensure those standards are met, train users, and protect 
assets at the state level.  The same goes for the county and local governments with federal 
and any state policies and procedures pushed down to their level.  Again, all levels have a 
piece of securing the data and ensuring training is done and protocols are followed.  
Participant 3 provided a more detailed answer on the relationship between government 
levels with respect to cyber: 
“Federal government provides framework, outlines minimum standards, and 
protects federal resources.  State will ensure compliance with federal and state 
mandates, user security training, and manage and protect state networks.  State 
also provides credentials and access to state resources, provides resiliency and 
continuity of services and networks, facilitates communication and information 
sharing across networks and government levels, works to identify potential 
methods to streamline work and services and ease the burden on state agencies as 
they work with and answer to federal departments.  The state agencies also 
provide continuous user support, sets policies and procedures at state level, 
conducts data analytics, provides professional support services, and manages 
vendors and requirements.” 
The participants agreed upon the need for additional actions and the responsibility of the 
lower-lever governments and agencies, but disagreement remain.  Participants had 
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divergent ideas on where best practices, rules, and regulations should originate, and what 
actions are needed or recommended. 
Federal Policies and Procedures Relevant to Tennessee Operations 
When participants were asked which federal policies and procedures are most 
relevant and applicable to the current policy environment in Middle Tennessee, the 
results and responses differed depending on the agency level.  When talking with 
individuals that operate beneath the state level, participants did not feel that many federal 
policies and procedures are relevant to their operations.  At the local and county level, 
managers typically create their own protocols and come up with mitigation, remediation, 
and security standards for their organizations.  The policies and procedures for the state 
and federal governments only come into play when lower level governments access their 
systems.  Depending on the networks, certification or clearance may be required to access 
some systems, requiring lower level governments to maintain them for necessary 
employees. 
 Participants that work at the state level provided a range of federal policies and 
procedures that are relevant to their operations and environment.  Participant 2 noted 
“multiple areas come into play, including FISMA, information sharing, user training, 
federal audits, and others.”  Participant 3 discussed FISMA and NIST standards that 
derive from the federal level.  Participant 3 also noted that the federal government has a 
range of monitoring and information programs, but believed the information pushed can 
overwhelm lower level governments that may not understand how to utilize the 
information or translate it, so it is relevant for their agencies or operations.  The concept 
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of ‘shared responsibility’ was also mentioned regarding the federal policies and 
procedures.  Weaknesses at the lower levels increase risk for upper levels of government.  
It makes sense, then, for upper level governments to push information, tools, and 
resources to lower levels to improve the system.  However, based on insight, there 
appears to be a disconnect between levels of government.  Much of the information 
provided from higher to lower is not actionable or is not provided to the appropriate 
people to act upon it.  This renders much of the shared information irrelevant and can 
lead to additional workloads on staff to attempt to translate to their agencies. 
View of Cybersecurity by Peers and Legislators 
 When I queried the participants about how cybersecurity is viewed by their peer 
group and legislators in their area, several strong trends emerged.  First, all participants 
felt cybersecurity is not well understood by legislators.  Participant 5 summed up the 
feelings of the group, noting “I don't think cybersecurity is viewed consistently because 
our legislators doesn't understand it. For the most part, I'm sure they have a concept of 
what cybersecurity is, but they don't fully understand what that means to them”.  The 
issue of legislators struggling with the importance of cybersecurity is magnified by 
several factors.  Participants noted the demands on time and budget and difficulty 
justifying additional resources in some areas, as well as the turnover and length of time it 
takes to appropriately develop, pitch, and enact programs and policies.  Beyond the belief 
that cybersecurity is not well understood by legislators and how it pertains to the different 
levels of government, participants also noted viewpoints in their respective peer groups 
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vary widely, depending on if their location (or one in proximity) recently experienced a 
cyber-attack. 
 Participants also noted that some type of coalition would at least be beneficial to 
the cyber sector, if not an absolute necessity.  The participants put forward several 
different types of coalitions and interest groups they believed would be beneficial, each 
with its own strengths and weaknesses.  The types of coalition participants referenced 
could enhance communication between layers of government, public and private partners, 
and provide common ground for similar locations and agencies to work together.  
Participants touched upon a few suggestions for partners and coalition members and 
added additional information in the following section.   
Special Interest and Advocacy Groups and Views 
In the discussion over advocacy and special interest groups, participants expanded 
upon their previous responses.  While the participants felt a coalition would be beneficial 
to support and expand cybersecurity policies and procedures across the public sector, 
they had disparate views of the type of partners and who they felt would be better 
advocates.  Participant 4 noted:  
“I feel that the main issue is that on a high level there are threats known by our 
government but that is as far as things go. local and state organizations that need 
to prepare or watch for these threats are often times left in the dark”. 
Participant 4 felt that cyber is seen as an important aspect of operations across the board, 
but silos (limited sharing of information or intelligence) exist between different agencies 
and levels of government.  On the topic of information sharing, Participant 2 felt one of 
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the struggles facing information sharing was the lack of actionable intelligence.  Just 
pushing threats or new vulnerabilities out to those tasked with cybersecurity and data 
integrity can be of little to no use if those individuals cannot translate the information to 
their level or provide patches and mitigation techniques to their agencies or 
constituencies.  Participant 2 also noted: “there are a lot of groups that do not have 
resources to handle additional requirements or issues, so they wait until new legislation or 
policies come out and adjust as needed”.  Developing an advocacy group could help 
translate this information, serve as a conduit, or provide expertise for implementation 
across multiple levels of systems. 
 Two major areas of consideration for advocacy and special interest groups are 
vendors and public private partnerships (PPP).  Participant 2 discussed PPP in depth.  In 
dealing with PPP in Tennessee he stated: 
“These PPP have not worked well in TN except for Knoxville.  Whether the 
organization or its leader is motivated, and how they are motivated makes a lot of 
difference.  In many cases, these organizations require a fee to participate.  That 
excludes a lot of the smaller tech companies, the mom and pop locations cannot 
afford some of these fees.  None of the governments can participate…Tried to 
build [one] for government and agencies, then wanted to build a portal.  Had a lot 
of vendors that helped put events on and worked with them, but the conferences 
and meeting became sales pitches and charging for the online portal meant that 
some people and elements would then be excluded”. 
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Participant 2 noted that while the conferences or events sponsored by vendors might 
initially reach a wide range of people, but it can be exceedingly difficult to maintain 
participation and gain buy-in when the setting devolves into vendors making sales 
pitches, smaller organizations and public entities excluded, and limited opportunities for 
true information sharing and communication without pushing for a particular response or 
service. 
 Respondents also put forward some existing groups and specific organizations 
that could serve the public sector in a more formal capacity with respect to cyber 
operations.  Among these groups were the Tennessee City Managers Association 
(TNCMA), the National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO), 
Chief Financial Officer groups, Infragard, technology councils, and the University of 
Tennessee Municipal Technical Advisory Service (UT-MTAS).  Participant 1 spoke at 
length regarding advocacy groups and how they could best serve the public sector.  The 
participant’s point of view was neither the state nor advocacy groups should push 
mandates down to lower levels of government but should instead focus on developing 
best practices.  Speaking of UT-MTAS, Participant 1 stated:  
“The Municipal Technical Advisory Service (UT-MTAS), they would be a group 
that could help to promote and manage those best practices.  Once again, it’s not 
mandates by the state but it’s an advocacy for recognizing the dangers and here 
are a litany of things you can do at various cost levels and you do what you can 
afford to do and it’s like how much insurance does a person buy?  You buy what 
you can afford, and you just know that there are risks after that.  And in my mind, 
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that is the way it should go.  And an MTAS or a Tennessee Municipal League 
those could be the carriers of the database if you will, they have the personnel that 
already do the training, that could just be one of the things that they could offer”. 
As further justification for the need for best practices and a strong coalition overseeing 
cyber operations, Participant 1 also noted: 
“I’ve had countless phone calls from peers that want to talk about what we went 
though and say ‘OK, what happened and how do I avoid it [cyber-attack]’.  Local 
agencies around here, not even cities but governmental/quasi-governmental 
agencies that I know the folks and they call and ask me to take a look at their plan 
and tell them if it is a good plan.  I do not have the expertise to tell them if each 
plan is a good one for their specific department.  It might look good, but I can’t 
tell them if they are good plans.  I can only tell them what we experienced and 
what we’re going to do to keep it from happening again”. 
The disparity noted in attitudes and proactive measures taken between those impacted or 
near those impacted by cyberattacks is an area advocacy groups should seek to close.   
Influences on Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures 
 The next question centered on what types of issues influence cybersecurity 
policies and procedures at the participants’ levels.  The two main influences discussed by 
the respondents were cyberattacks in the news and public consciousness and attacks 
occurring in the respondent’s jurisdiction or surrounding areas.  First, when considering 
news coverage, the participants split into two groups: one where current events and 
cyberattacks in the news raise awareness, help demonstrate opportunities, and help 
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resource requests get approved; and one where participants felt their agency or 
organization already planned and understood threats and those events change public 
perception.  The divide for the varying responses followed the level of the participant 
(state or below state level).  Those operating below the state level felt news was 
beneficial in communicating risks to leadership and helping with funding and resource 
allocation.  Participant 4 stated:  
“News stories and reports help, because that's what allows our executive staff to 
see what could happen. Recent cybersecurity issues in the City of Spring Hill, 
which is close by, and the City of Atlanta, which is a lot larger than us, also help 
to show that no one is exempt from cybersecurity issues. This helps with funding 
as well.” 
Those working at the state level felt their agencies generally had policies and procedures 
in place to address many cyberattacks, so news is less relevant to their operations.  The 
news can, however, influence public perception.  Participant 3 noted:  
“At times these issues can raise the profile of policies and procedures in the 
public’s consciousness, but from the agency standpoint these areas generally have 
already been identified and addressed.  Disconnect in how well an agency is 
handling an issue and what the public sees can be related to education, 
understanding, or what elements of practices are seen by the public.” 
When discussing attacks occurring in their jurisdiction or one, they are familiar 
with, respondents felt practitioners, professionals, and officials in the impacted districts 
were excellent resources to help them identify potential vulnerabilities in their own 
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systems and procedures.  Participant 5 felt this was essential, noting: “I learn more from 
the professionals in the business and life lessons from those whom have been on the 
receiving end of cyberattacks”.  Participant 1 echoed that sentiment and discussed 
previous efforts to understand cybersecurity risks and mitigation options in the past.  
Some conversations occurred between officials, but it did not take on a sense of urgency 
until they watched the City of Atlanta and other entities in Tennessee deal with 
cyberattacks over the last few years. 
Cybersecurity and Emergency Preparedness and Planning 
The next question in the interview asked participants how cybersecurity ties into 
the emergency planning and preparedness process at their level.  All participants noted 
cyber is integrated into their emergency planning and preparedness, albeit to varying 
degrees.  The state level participants documented a more complex and integrated version 
of cyber.  Participant 3 provided an in-depth explanation:  
“[Cyber] is integrated into emergency preparedness and planning at the state 
level…  From a practical standpoint, National Guard assets have been brought 
into the cybersecurity realm for prep and planning purposes.  Tabletop Exercises 
(TTXs) have been held with multiple agencies and senior leaders and 
practitioners.  These exercises provide communication and emergency planning 
outlines for different incidents… Additional training can further flesh out plans 




Integration of cybersecurity considerations happens across state agencies, but this 
integration is a mix of policies, procedures, and best practices.  In some areas, agencies 
advocating cyber do not have regulatory authority to enforce policies across all state 
agencies, forcing them to rely on best practices and working relationships instead of 
mandating changes.    
In contrast to the state-level agencies, those working below the state level have 
more circumspect cyber integration.  With the state-level agencies incorporating more 
cybersecurity practices and procedures, lower-level governments and agencies tend to 
focus on user impacts, needs, and efficiency.  Participant 4 provided an overview: 
“Everything we do from an emergency preparedness aspect, has to be looked at 
from a cybersecurity standpoint as well. This brings in things, such as a screen 
lock policy. How does the screen automatically locking after so many minutes of 
inactivity, affect an officer that is on their way to an emergency? It is always a 
balance act to make sure we don't secure the system so much that it's not usable or 
make the system so usable that we can't secure it.” 
Ensuring users have adequate training and that emergency and public safety systems are 
secure is a critical task.  Cyberattacks, as noted by Participant 1, can impact public safety 
systems along with business and financial systems.  Lower-level governments and 
officials can struggle to understand what networks are vulnerable or how they are tied 
together.  Some governments have their police, fire, and rescue communications and 
computer systems linked to business networks.  This can increase the exposure but may 
also help with efficiency and keep costs down.  Seeing ransomware, DDOS, and other 
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cyberattacks cause significant degradation of service in cities across the country has 
opened the eyes of leaders and officials and forced them to evaluate their posture and 
improve mitigation and recovery efforts. 
Policy Changes over the Last Decade 
 When asked about how policies regarding cybersecurity changed over the last 
decade, participants identified several trends.  First, policies changed significantly over 
the course of the last decade to decade and a half due in large part to the evolution of 
technology.  The technology in place in the first part of the 2000s had much different 
security needs than the more interconnected world that exists today.  As individuals 
increasingly telecommute, take work home with them, or continue to access networks on 
a variety of devices as they travel or are out of the office, additional policies and 
protections are required to protect against new vulnerabilities and reduce potential 
exposure.  Participant 2 spoke in depth about one initiative of the last Tennessee 
governor, who left the office in 2019.  That initiative moved a significant portion of 
workers in different state agencies to remote offices or allowed them to work from home.  
The state enacted several policies to mitigate potential risks.  However, Participant 2 also 
noted: 
“Information is out there, there are a combination of problems.  Boils down to 
information management.  Cannot say ‘do this and the risk goes away’.  At the 
end of the day, the largest risk will always be the end user.  That is where most of 
the problems exist.  State mandates training, and numbers and breaches are 
coming down when efficiency tests are run.  Where you run into challenges is that 
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the risks and attacks are ever evolving, so you cannot create a policy or practice 
and expect the risk to zero out.  The threat evolves, so your response and your 
users must evolve with the threat to stay safe and close loopholes and 
vulnerabilities.” 
Another trend noted by participants is that laws are not necessarily keeping up 
with the evolving cybersecurity landscape.    Participant 4 stated: “I don't think the laws 
are keeping up. Again, our law makers don't fully understand the cyber security issues, so 
they don't know how to create laws against it”.  The agencies at the state level can 
implement policies and procedures to close some of the gaps, but again, agencies do not 
have the ability to force everyone to comply, particularly at the lower government levels.  
Getting policies enacted that are approved by agency leaders then issued by the 
Governor’s office can help gain buy-in, but there are still training and communication 
needs to improve adoption and adherence.  
The last major trend among responses to the question on policies is the need to 
create strong and broad policies to cover as many vulnerabilities as possible and improve 
the security of the networks in the most cost-efficient manner possible.  With limited 
funding for lower governments available from the state, policies and procedures for the 
lower governments and partner agencies also need to consider the ability to fund 
compliance activities.  A town or county with 15-20,000 citizens has a radically different 
stream of revenue than large cities and counties with millions of people and major 
commercial interests.  The larger communities have integrated IT departments and 
agencies, where the small towns may not have staff or resources to address cyber 
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questions in house.  Where the large cities and higher governments employ certified 
cyber professionals, third-party vendors handle compliance and security programs for 
many counties and smaller cities and towns. 
Accounting for Cybersecurity in Local Planning and Policies 
 When asked about cybersecurity planning at the local level, respondents noted 
two focus areas: user training, education, and testing internally and the widespread use of 
third parties.  Most agencies in the higher levels of government have some form of an 
internal IT department with policies and protocols for user training and testing to one 
extent or another.  Participant 5 stated: “We currently have two Network Admins who are 
responsible for monitoring our system and preventing attacks.”  The training and 
education of users is critical, noted Participant 2:  
“At the end of the day, the largest risk will always be the end user.  That is where 
most of the problems exist.  State mandates training, and numbers and breaches 
are coming down when efficiency tests are run.  Where you run into challenges is 
that the risks and attacks are ever evolving, so you cannot create a policy or 
practice and expect the risk to zero out.  The threat evolves, so your response and 
your users must evolve with the threat to stay safe and close loopholes and 
vulnerabilities.” 
Participant 1 discussed the need to have open dialogue with users regarding security 
posture and potential issues.  If the users are afraid of getting into trouble if they click on 
a link that may contain malware the organization will likely only learn of the breach 
when found by IT or the system is locked, or the information shows up in the wild.  
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Participant 2 echoed this sentiment, noting that self-reporting of errors can drastically 
improve response time and allow for mitigation or isolation of an infected device before 
it has time to infect the entire system. 
As noted in the previous section, much of the cybersecurity planning and efforts 
at the local level is handled by third parties.  The use of a vendor can provide technical 
expertise and fully integrated solutions for smaller organizations and lower-level 
governments, but their use holds other vulnerabilities.  As Participant 2 noted: 
“Cities and counties do not have the resources to pay an IT manager with the 
needed credentials to run their systems.  They hire a vendor that charges a set 
amount per month to provide security.  Does that make them secure?  We (the 
state) cannot tell them what to do, they are a private company.  They do not 
always have the talent pool, or it gets mismanaged.  Some of the counties are on 
shared servers with some really bad people – not necessarily bad in terms of 
ulterior motives or bad intent, but poor security practices or they think they know 
what they are doing – goes back to a lack of education on the part of the vendor 
and the county not having anyone on staff to ask the right questions and determine 
whether the vendor is providing the services and protection they say they are. 
Do not know if there is a magic bullet, there are NIST standards and others, but 
what a lot of people do not understand is that just because you meet the standards 
and are compliant does not mean you are not at risk and are protected.   
Goes back again to the talent pool and education.  Compliance does not mean 
secure.  Not by a long shot, if you do not know how to defend you are in danger.  
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In some cases, compliance to a particular standard can be a godsend for hackers 
or malicious actors since agencies do not deviate from their established security 
protocols, leaving them open to 0-day issues or other emergent threats against the 
network.  Meeting standards and nothing else can lead back in a circle.” 
Across all participants, the use of vendors and their potential for additional vulnerabilities 
was a concern.  When the local governments do not have staffing or expertise to oversee 
cybersecurity in-house, they can develop blind spots, believing the vendor is handling 
security properly and protecting all their assets.  Officials in this position may not 
understand how the vendor sets up their security or know the right questions to ask when 
soliciting bids for security or selecting the protection that is right for their setup and 
operations. 
Constraints and Limitations for Cybersecurity 
 Questions regarding the constraints and limitations for cybersecurity returned 
three main trends across all participants: time, technical expertise, and money.  The time 
constraint discussed included both a lack of time for proper and continuing training, but 
also the limited time leaders and officials must fully understand cybersecurity and its 
implications for their operations.  Developing and maintaining a comprehensive and 
effective cybersecurity program requires a significant time investment, one that is 
continuous.  As noted in previous responses, technology, threats, and laws are constantly 
evolving, and each new change requires study to understand its implications on the 
security program and posture.  The larger the organization, the more complex the 
undertaking and the more time is involved. 
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 The technical expertise required for cybersecurity planning and activities is also a 
moving target.  As technology changes and threats evolve, those overseeing the 
cybersecurity program must keep abreast of changes and counters to mitigate threats.  A 
lack of technical expertise on the part of the users opens a range of potential attack 
vectors across networks and systems.  Participant 2 stated: 
“showing people that if they are all green and on open networks, they are giving 
their data and other information away for free.  Sometimes at conferences it is 
possible to have people look at their settings and talk them through the process 
and show them how open they are to attack.  Other times can set up a test network 
and show individuals how easy it is to gain access if they allow their phones to 
connect to such an open signal.” 
A lack of technical expertise by those running the program or selecting a vendor, as 
previously noted, can leave the organization vulnerable, unprotected, or under protected.  
The same issue can arise if those in charge of the cyber program do not understand the 
difference in certifications and education of applicants for an IT position. 
 The last and most discussed constraint or limitation for cybersecurity is budget.  
Each of the participants provided examples of budget constraints.  Lower level 
governments can have difficulty hiring and retaining certified and qualified IT 
professionals due to salary requirements.  Larger organizations and cities have more 
flexibility, but adequate expertise in in high demand in today’s operating environment, so 
retention can still be problematic.  Participant 1 discussed budget considerations in depth:  
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“I do not think it should be an edict [to maintain a certain vendor or security 
protocol].  I think there should be best practices.  For ultimate security, there are 
different levels of security, and it is basically what can you afford.  And that’s 
why I do not think it needs to be a mandate by the state because it’s what can you 
afford.  There are some municipalities… that have a shoestring budget, they are 
just breaking even and keeping everything going and they could not afford to 
spend $50,000 a year to have their e-mail run through third party servers.  And 
they only have 30 employees and only 10-15 of those have e-mail access so they 
need a different operation than maybe a Spring Hill that has 250 employees and 
300 e-mail accounts.  Maybe we can afford the $50-70,000 it’s going to cost to 
run our e-mail through a third-party server and let them get rid of the URL links.  
I don’t think it should be a mandated policy by the state.  I think it should be here 
are some best practices, but I am not sure that anybody with the state has figured 
out what those best practices are.” 
Participant 2 spoke about the limited funding available from the state to lower level 
governments.  The State can set requirements for access to its systems but has little 
recourse to require lower governments to adopt specific practices, procedures, or policies 
as they fund their operations and can acquire security and outside assistance to a point.  
There are a number of proposals in play at the state level, including providing additional 
training, possibly creating a Cabinet-level post for Cyber in the Governor’s office, 
working with technical schools to assist lower-level governments with penetration testing 
and security, along with possible grant programs and others. 
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Provisions, Authority, and Resources Provided for Cybersecurity 
 Inquiring about the provisions, authority, and resources the different levels of 
government and their agencies receive from higher sources revealed another state and 
lower than state differentiation.  At the state level, agencies have duties, responsibilities, 
and authority provided by federal requirements and mandates, executive orders, and state 
legislation and mandates.  The State of Tennessee has two main agencies overseeing 
cybersecurity, though there are cyber activities within many agencies.  Strategic 
Technical Services (STS) serves as the IT department for the state.  Participant 2 stated:  
“State IT is set up to handle big universities – UT, Memphis, Austin Peay, UTC. 
ETSU direct contact.  Issues at smaller schools are handled by DoS and contact 
with local governments.  STS handles all issues at the state level and while they 
have relationships with some of the local governments, they are largely on their 
own, with help from [the Department of Safety and Homeland Security]… [SHS 
is] Lead agency for terrorism related instances Identify, mitigate and apprehend – 
very broad.  Cyber falls under that umbrella.  Requirement with establishment of 
new cyber division at DHS – cannot hack or pen test, but everything else.” 
The Department of Safety (DoS) also serves as the bridge between larger government 
roles (state and federal) and county and local governments, along with smaller colleges 
and universities, public utilities and the private sector.  Many of the functions of the 
department involve pushing resources and opening lines of communication with the 
populations they serve.   
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 The participants involved with the lower levels of government all stated that state 
policies are sparse, requiring the lower level governments to develop their own 
cybersecurity programs, policies, technologies, seek, select, and hire vendors, and fund 
their activities on their own.  There was a hesitation from participants at the lower levels 
to seek a single policy pushed from the state, especially if it required an unfunded 
mandate.  One additional issue is that cyber and IT vendors do not all offer their services 
everywhere across the State.  Some IT companies are small operations only covering a 
single city or town.  Others may be more expansive but tend to stay within geographic 
regions.  There may not be a vendor in Middle or West Tennessee providing the same 
services and expertise as on in East Tennessee.  This limits options for pushing out broad-
based policies from the state or federal levels.  Regarding authority and policies from the 
federal government down to the State, Participant 2 stated: 
“Nothing in writing…  Feds want the states to take charge and handle cyber.  
Instruction to states is almost limited to ‘Do Cyber’… Every state very 
different…  Would need a lot of money spent to have similar system [to other 
states with larger budgets and more integrated cybersecurity agencies].  
[Tennessee has] no way to handle in real time.”   
Participant 2 also noted that some states, such as Michigan, have a larger budget for 
exercises and training than Tennessee has for its entire department.  The difference in 
levels of support can cause extremely different programs and protocols. 
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Clarity of Cybersecurity Policy and Mission, and Organizational Vision versus 
Actual 
 When asked about the clarity of the of the cybersecurity policy and mission 
within their organization, the results were mixed.  The issue is somewhat clearer at the 
state level.  As discussed in the previous section, state-level agencies receive mandates 
and requirements from the federal and state levels.  Even in those areas where policies 
and the mission cover a wide range of topics and organizations, the state agencies 
understand expectations and the end goal.  Clarity regarding mission and policies is less 
clear and defined with the lower-level agencies and government offices.  With many 
smaller cities and counties relying on third parties to secure their networks, mission and 
policies may be only vaguely understood.  The expectations to maintain secure networks 
and not introduce vulnerability on higher-level systems are understood, but practical 
application and how this is achieved is less evident.  Best practices or a set of norms for 
below state-level entities are recommendations made by multiple participants. 
 With clarity somewhat murky in less-than-state level organizations, it can also be 
difficult to determine whether the operations and programs in effect meet the 
expectations of the policies and vision that created them.  Participants in lower-level 
organizations felt clarity was an area they could improve upon.  Whether the program 
relies on conducting testing and evaluating the results or is more exhaustive and consists 
of multiple layers, communication and transparency are crucial for success.  Responding 
to the question about its ability to fulfill its missions and obligations, Participant 3 stated: 
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“The agency is able to fulfill its missions and objectives with some caveats.  
There are some federal mandates and requirements the agency is not able to fulfill 
(an issue across most states).  Without funding for federal mandates, states must 
decide which areas can comply, which will be addressed at a later time, and which 
areas require an exception to policy or other mitigation.  These areas can be 
addressed with federal authorities to maintain transparency and develop plans for 
current and future operations and expenditures.  Some areas may be nonstarters, 
depending on the funding needs and how they mesh with local requirements.  
Additional resources could help but would have to take the form of additional 
manpower, funds, time, and other items.  The environment is too large to be able 
to cover all eventualities and priorities.” 
Additional Information 
 At the close of the interviews, participants were provided an opportunity to add 
any information not covered in previous questions.  Four participants elected to add 
additional commentary.  The topics raised included establishing a new process at the state 
level to identify trusted and preferred vendors for lower-level governments and agencies 
to employ.  This type of program can reduce the number of contractors with access to 
local, state, and federal networks, theoretically lower the overall risk and number of 
potential points of attack.  Other programs currently being evaluated include adding 
internships for university students at the state and larger city departments to get them 
real-world experience while in school.  This would allow these agencies to expand their 
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skill sets, train a new group of professionals, and allow students to identify their own 
strengths and weaknesses before they leave school and enter the workforce full time. 
 Participant 5 included the following: “The technology is ever changing and that 
does worry me. How do we keep up? We are all more vulnerable than we would like to 
think”.  Participant 2 discussed the role of political and legislative turnover in gaining 
traction for new policies, procedures, and programs.  Participant 5 noted: 
“[There is a] lot of political turnover – working to learn players and important 
individuals.  Attempting to use legislative partners to get buy-in for the council 
and see how to help – knows they cannot circumvent the process or individuals 
but need to try to find a way to increase buy-in and get things moving.  Change in 
governors not helping continuity. Legislators many times more interested in 
pursuing issues that will help them politically and make them look good in the 
press than in effective leadership or helping with legislation needed by agencies. 
Issues of constitutionality and legality are wrapped up in the conversation, but it 
also distracts from worthwhile legislation and needed changes and improvements. 
Working to show free services and other options for those that have a budget.  
Can send things out, but easier for localities to filter what they want.  Some 
counties simply do not want any assistance – feel they have everything in hand.  
At time conflicts between counties and cities or different cities can lead to 




 Federal cybersecurity policy in the United States is generally believed to provide 
enough guidance for state-level governments and organizations, with some exceptions.  
The federal government provides some resources, but action at the state level is largely 
funded through the state.  This creates a network of dissimilar policies and protocols in 
states across the country, with state leadership in some locations better grasping what is 
needed and earmarking more resources to deal with the emerging cybersecurity needs or 
the public.  Below the state level, however, federal policies and guidelines are viewed by 
Tennessee agencies as largely irrelevant to their day-to-day operations.  Participants in 
the study felt some type of best practice or suggested policies and programs could help 
define outcomes and create a more cohesive network across the state.  The same held for 
how well implementation of policy compared to actions on the ground.  The state-level 
agencies feel they are meeting requirements and expectations to a greater or lesser extent, 
while lower-level governments and agencies feel clarity could be improved and 






Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss my interpretation of the study findings, consider the 
limitations and implications of the study, and offer recommendations for future research.  
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the current cybersecurity 
policy environment in Middle Tennessee.  I sought to answer two research questions, 
with the primary one being whether U.S. cybersecurity policy at the federal level 
provides sufficient guidance and resources for state and local agencies to enact and 
implement cybersecurity policy at their level.  The secondary question regarded 
cybersecurity programs and how well aligned the current implementation and operations 
are with the established policies and the initial vision of the legislation that created them. 
The first section of the chapter contains an interpretation of the results of the 
study, including discussion of limitations related to data collection and trustworthiness as 
noted during the data collection and analysis phases of the research.  Recommendations 
for additional research opportunities, methodologies for improving the study, and 
additional considerations follow in the second section.  Finally, I will delve into the 
implications of the study, including for social change, and provide a conclusion to the 
study. 
Regarding the primary research question, participants working at the state level 
indicated that federal cybersecurity policy and programs provide adequate guidance for 
many of their areas of responsibility.  State-level participants identified a lack of funding 
and resources from the federal to the state level to achieve expectations as the main 
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weakness.  At the agencies and governments below the state level, participants said that 
the policies and procedures did not translate well to their level or were irrelevant for their 
operation entirely.  Participants at lower-level entities also described a struggle with 
technical expertise, funding, vendor management, and a lack of best practices or guidance 
from the state to their level.  Participants at all levels did reference the concept of shared 
responsibility, or the idea that each level of government, and public and private partners, 
have a vested interest in secure networks and proactive communication and workflows.   
The findings for the secondary research question indicated that the policies and 
programs undertaken did not always meet expectations.  Participants at all levels stated 
that at times they needed to pick and choose which goals, mandates, or requirements to 
meet during a given time period.  The lack of funding provided for mandates by higher-
level governments and the wide range of support (or lack thereof) for cybersecurity at 
different locations and levels both had negative consequences on the ability to meet 
expectations, participants said. 
There were eight recurrent themes with more than 100 references during the data 
analysis portion of the study.  These themes were resources, challenges, education, 
technical expertise, best practices, impact, considerations, and relationships.  Resources, 
challenges, impact, and considerations are closely related within this study as each 
participant brought up individual struggles to fund and maintain cyber security programs.  
Participants noted how the lack of adequate resources (including financial, staffing, and 
legislative support) require their agencies to pick and choose where and how they will 
comply with mandates or policies or how they need to adjust to mitigate risks caused by 
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lack of resources.  Education and technical expertise were two areas participants grouped 
together but also distinguished between the education of individuals about a topic or 
process and technical expertise of those designing and overseeing the cybersecurity 
programs themselves.  The last two recurrent themes were best practices and 
relationships.  When participants referenced the need for best practices or how they 
employ them, they also spoke about establishing and maintaining relationships among 
different levels of government, the public, and public and private organizations. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the participant responses, coded in relation to 
characteristics of ACF and recurrent themes, confirmed the selected conceptual and 
theoretical framework as appropriate for this study.  The findings derived from this study 
can be beneficial in multiple ways.  First and foremost, this study expands the knowledge 
of the targeted discipline as there has not been a study conducted of this type and scope in 
at least the past decade and a half, according to my review of the literature.  This study 
can inform cybersecurity leaders, officials in the targeted and surrounding areas, and 
legislators about the cybersecurity policy and program environment, specifically with 
regard to constraints, challenges, resource issues, and gaps in understanding.  Leaders can 
then re-examine policies and procedures at multiple levels of government, look for gaps 
and vulnerabilities, and determine best practices or common ground to resolve identified 
issues and improve the overall security posture.   
Primary concerns by the participants included a dearth of best practices from 
higher governments; resource constraints; challenges with education for users, leaders, 
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and legislators; questions about technical expertise of potential employees, vendors, and 
those in charge of cyber programs; the ability to identify needed skills; the ability (or lack 
thereof) to retain qualified employees; and the need for improved communication and 
better relationships between different levels of government.  Participants also noted that 
current events and cyberattacks in the news can drive some decisions and behaviors.  
Participants clarified, however, that their agencies and organizations have plans and 
procedures in place to protect against a variety of threats and mitigate risks posed by 
these threats.  The news stories do add uncertainty to their dealings with the public, 
particularly when agency operations or procedures are not publicly available or 
transparent.  Data breaches that expose personal data are the primary topics of concern 
for the public, but ransomware attacks that can disrupt operations and impact daily life is, 
as well. 
The findings of the study also confirmed that the ACF framework is well suited to 
evaluate the cybersecurity policy environment.  Areas of focus for the ACF include 
coalition and coalition opportunities, constraints and resources, external events, 
governmental decisions, policy beliefs, inputs, and outputs, and stable system parameters 
(Sabatier, 1988).  During the interviews, each participant referenced each of these areas 
to some extent and discussed the change in cyber policies over a period of years.  
Researchers typically use the ACF to evaluate the impact of these elements on a given 
policy environment over time spans of a decade or more (Sabatier, 1988).  With 
respondents averaging 20 years of experience in their fields, they were well positioned to 
understand how policy changed over the years and provide insight into those forces that 
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drive, or fail to influence, cyber policy within their organizations and in more general 
terms. 
Limitations of the Study 
The most significant limitation of this study was the lack of participation by 
members of the target pool, with 5% of the targeted individuals eventually participating.  
I submitted a change to the IRB to add additional locations, but participation remained 
very minimal across the participant pool.  The participants in the study represented state 
and local level governments, along with very diverse socioeconomic populations.  The 
participants responded to the interview protocol in a similar enough manner that 
saturation occurred.  The information collected achieved the goals of this study.  
However, increased participation could shed light on topics or themes not included in this 
study.   
With the goal of maximum participation, I constructed the study with redundant 
communications and multiple avenues for participation, including face-to-face, 
telephone, and online survey options.  The protocol included an initial e-mail, subsequent 
reminder, and a final attempt, each sent 2 weeks apart.  During the design and preparation 
phases of the study, I felt no community partners were needed.  In many studies, 
community partners can serve as advocates for the researcher, providing access to 
additional populations or assisting with communication.  As cybersecurity such a 
prominent issue across multiple levels of government, in the news, and in both the public 
and private sectors, I concluded a partner would only add complexity and potentially 
influence the outcome of the research.  After reaching out to 100 different potential 
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volunteers and speaking with almost a third in one form or another, I found a lack of 
partners (advocacy groups or other organizations) in place that would have been able to 
help with the targeted population.  The research revealed a variety of stakeholders and 
interested parties in the selected geographic area, but each lacked access, resources, 
and/or adequate relationships with other stakeholders to coordinate large-scale efforts or 
collaboration. 
 One other limitation of this study was the limited geographic area targeted.  When 
selecting a target population, I opted for locations with wide socioeconomic and 
demographic variety.  The targeted counties included disparate political environments, 
governments among the richest and poorest in the state, and some of the smallest and 
largest population centers.  While four counties are represented in the data collected, 
participant responses during the study brought out other counties across the state that 
either have other programs, partnerships, or could otherwise add to the study.  There have 
been several cyberattacks across the state in recent months and years, encompassing both 
public utilities, the private sector, and governments at multiple levels.  All participants 
noted in their responses that cyberattacks are on the increase, and directly referenced the 
impact those had on localities, organizations, and agencies they work with, and on the 
public at large. 
Recommendations 
 There are a number of ways future research could expand or build upon this 
study.  At the local level, future research could expand to cover a wider number of 
counties, regions within the state, or attempt to touch all counties in the state at once.  
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With 95 counties in Tennessee, the most feasible next step would be to conduct a study 
using the Grand Divisions of Tennessee (East, Middle, and West).  This study included 
counties in the middle of the state, so broadening the study to include all counties in the 
Middle Division would be logical.  The inclusion of more counties could expand upon 
the results of this study and determine if there are trends, issues, or coalitions that are 
involved in the larger area.  An additional option for expansion at this level is to reach out 
to other entities in the geographic region that are also impacted by cybersecurity policies 
of the government agencies.  These include, but are not limited to, critical infrastructure 
sectors, third party cybersecurity vendors, and private sector organizations that touch 
government systems and resources.  The inclusion of these partners would widen the 
participant pool, provide more diverse responses and shed light on issues and concerns of 
those dealing with lower level governments and their cybersecurity programs.  Gathering 
responses and data from only the government agencies only provides one part of the 
picture of the nature of the cybersecurity environment at this level.  On a larger scale, a 
future study could also examine the cybersecurity environment across multiple states or 
in a regional area. This study can also be replicated, in original or expanded form, in any 
geographic area across the United States.  The results and data can shed light on 
cybersecurity policies and programs in alternate locations, with the results compared to 
findings for this study.  If the study is conducted in other states or across state lines there 
will be some differences in state policies, procedures, and resources that will require 
additional consideration and documentation. 
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 Another recommendation for future studies, and one I believe to be of most 
critical importance, is to obtain a community partner.  The community partner can 
advocate for participation among the targeted population and help connect researchers to 
key individuals within those populations.  This research project connected with 35% of 
the participants, but 30 out 35 of those participants eventually elected to not participate.  
For most of these, a range of explanations were given for declinations to complete the 
interviews after initial conversations, while the others stopped communicating entirely 
during the process.  Community partners can provide initial introductions, opportunities 
to present the research project and request participants, and advocate for the importance 
of the study and participation.  As I found no partners that reach across all branches of the 
state, there is an opening to create an advocacy group to fill this void. 
Implications 
 This study could generate positive social change on multiple fronts.  Beginning 
with the local level, the research shed light on some of the challenges and barriers 
government agencies below the state level face with regard to cybersecurity policies and 
operations.  Participants at this level are not as clear on how their organizations fit into 
the cybersecurity environment, something that further research, collaboration, and 
communication could help improve.  There is also a lack of understanding as to what 
resources and assistance is available for lower level entities.  Organizations employing 
individuals with a cybersecurity background or training are better positioned in this area, 
but those reliant on vendors or individuals in roles without training and expertise can be 
overwhelmed by the scope of the issues and options for securing systems.  Expanded 
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studies incorporating wider participation and geographic range can also bring additional 
perspectives and expertise into the findings. 
 At the state level, additional research can lead to enhanced understanding of the 
policy environment, how state agencies create policies and seek to incorporate or support 
policies by lower level governments and agencies.  The participants working at the state 
level provided information on a range of programs either in the planning stages or that 
they are working to expand.  Additional research could help identify ways to support 
state efforts, procure funding, and enhance communication and collaboration among 
agencies, legislators, and practitioners across the state.  The information developed by 
this study can also be utilized to enhance communication and collaboration between 
states and help develop regional working groups or policies to protect agencies and 
groups working across state lines.  Looking above the state level towards the regional and 
federal levels, the information and findings of this study can help improve collaboration 
and crafting of policies and procedures to translate more effectively to a wider group of 
users.  Some of the challenges and resource considerations identified can also be used to 
pursue grants and programs to help states better secure their systems and close potential 
vulnerabilities as they utilize federal and regional systems. 
 The research also proved the ACF framework as an effective method to examine 
cybersecurity policies and trends over time.  Three of the codes for ACF were among the 
highest utilized in the coding process and represented three of the top six codes across the 
study.  The lowest frequency code under ACF in the analysis still was more common 
across the responses than 25 of the recurring codes found.  Each of the participants 
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touched upon each of the ACF codes and commented on the nature and evolution of 
cybersecurity policy over the longer term.  The applicability of ACF was particularly 
relevant regarding constraints and resources, governmental decisions, and policy beliefs.  
Further use of ACF in the study of cybersecurity could further illuminate how 
government decisions and policy change over time, how resources allocations shift, and 
what inputs and environmental considerations lead to changes over the longer term. 
Conclusion 
 While cybersecurity is currently frequently in the news and much of the public are 
only recently beginning to understand the potential vulnerabilities and impacts on their 
lives, this field has roots going back decades.  The data collected in this research 
demonstrate a variety of challenges and obstacles at the state and local level to a 
comprehensive, cohesive, and effective cybersecurity environment.  Communication, 
education, technical expertise, collaboration, resource constraints, and conflicting 
priorities are all areas that complicate the cyber policy environment.  Results from this 
study indicate a desire for best practices and procedures from the federal and state level 
to push down to lower-level governments to help them shore up vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses in their policies and programs.  Cybersecurity is a shared responsibility, and 
the only way to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance the overall system is to create a more 
collaborative environment where leaders at all levels understand threats, vulnerabilities, 
and how to work with agencies at multiple levels of government and the public and 





Abbate, J. (1999). Getting small: A short history of the personal computer. Proceedings 
of the IEEE, 87(9), 1695-1698. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1109/5.784256  
Adams, C. (2016). March 3, 1991: Rodney King beating caught on video. CBS News. 
Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/march-3rd-1991-rodney-king-
lapd-beating-caught-on-video/ 
André, P. (2016). A phenomenological study of frontline hiring professionals that recruit 
in a cybersecurity world (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations & Theses Global database. (Accession No. 10250990) 
Atlas.ti. (n.d.) What is Atlas.ti. Atlasti.com 
Retrieved from: https://atlasti.com/product/what-is-atlas-ti/ 
Barnard-Wills, D., & Ashenden, D. (2012). Securing virtual space: Cyber war, cyber 
terror, and risk. Space and Culture, 15(2), 110-123. 
doi:10.1177/1206331211430016 
Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B. (1991). Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems. Journal 
of Politics, 53(4), 1044-1074. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/2131866  
Berkowitz, B., & Hahn, R. (2003). Cybersecurity: Who’s watching the store? Issues in 
Science and Technology, 19(3), 55-62. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43312327 
Blinder, A., & Perloth, N. (2018). A cyberattack hobbles Atlanta and security experts’ 




Carr, D. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An 
introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Northwestern University Press 
Carr, D. (1987). Husserl’s world and ours. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 25(1), 
151-167. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1987.0011 
Caudle, D. (2010). Decision-making uncertainty and the use of force in cyberspace: A 
phenomenological study of military officers (Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Phoenix). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a534888.pdf 
Ciluffo, F., & Cardash, S. (2013). Cyber domain conflict in the 21st century. Seton Hall 
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 14(1), 41-47. Retrieved from 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/87977324/cyber-domain-conflict-21st-
century. Accession No. 87977324 
Clarke, J. (2004). The United States, Europe, and Homeland Security: Seeing soft 
security concerns through a counterterrorist lens. European Security, 13(1-2), 
117-138. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830490484836 
Committee on National Security Systems. (2010). National information assurance (IA) 
glossary (CNSS Instruction No. 4009). Retrieved from 
http://www.ncsc.gov/publications/policy/docs/CNSSI_4009.pdf 
Connelly, F., & Clandinin, D. (1990). Stories of experience and narrative inquiry. 
Educational Researcher, 19(5), 2-14. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189x019005002  




Creswell, J. (2013). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (n.d.). Resources for State, Local, 
Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) Governments. Retrieved from: https://www.us-
cert.gov/resources/sltt 
Cyber Security & Information Systems Information Analysis Center. (2017). The DoD 
cybersecurity policy chart. Retrieved from https://www.csiac.org/resources/the-
dod-cybersecurity-policy-chart/ 
Da Cruz, F. (2013). Programming the ENIAC. Retrieved from 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/eniac.html 
Deere, S. (2018). Confidential report: Atlanta’s cyber-attack could cost taxpayers $17 
million. Retrieved from https://www.ajc.com/news/confidential-report-atlanta-
cyber-attack-could-hit-million/GAljmndAF3EQdVWlMcXS0K/ 
Department of Defense. (2011). Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace. Retrieved from: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents 
/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf 
Department of Defense. (2015). Cyber Strategy. Retrieved from: 
http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/ 





Department of Homeland Security. (2009). Office for State and Local Law Enforcement. 
Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
plcy_directive_252-11_office_for_state_and_local_law_enforcement.pdf 
Department of Homeland Security. (2016). Department of Homeland Security Law 
Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/Law%20Enforcement%20Cyber%20Incident%20Reporting.pdf 
Department of Homeland Security. (2018). About CISA. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/about-cisa 
Department of Homeland Security. (2018(2)). SLTT Governance Guide. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/blog/2018/04/04/2018-sltt-governance-guide 
Department of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Cyber Incident Reporting Guide. 
(2016). A Unified Message for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law 
Enforcement. Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications 
/Law%20Enforcement%20Cyber%20Incident%20Reporting.pdf 
Department of Homeland Security Directive 252-11. (2016). Department of Homeland 
Security Law. Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/Law%20Enforcement%20Cyber%20Incident%20Reporting.pdf 
Dillane, M. (2018). West Haven officials pay ransom after cyber-attack disables 23 
serves at city hall.  Retrieved from: https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-hospital-
pays-55000-to-ransomware-operators/ 
Dobran, B. (2019). 27 Terrifying Ransomware Statistics & Facts You Need to Read. 
Retrieved from: https://phoenixnap.com/blog/ransomware-statistics-facts 
179 
 
Eeten, M. and Bauer, J. (2009). Emerging threats to Internet security: incentives, 
externalities, and policy implications. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management 17(4), 221-232.  Retrieved from:  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
5973.2009.00592.x\ 
Electronic Privacy Information Center. (n.d.). USA Patriot Act. Retrieved from: 
https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/ 
Ervin, S. (2017). City of Spring Hill computer system hit by ransomware. Retrieved from: 
https://www.wsmv.com/news/city-of-spring-hill-computer-system-hit-by-
ransomware/article_b4ef98c5-2617-566d-9846-ab3132c95e5c.html 
European Commission. (2018). A new era for data protection in the EU. Retrieved from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/data-protection-
factsheet-changes_en.pdf 
Executive Order 12333. (1981). United States intelligence activities. Retrieved from: 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-
order/12333.html 
Executive Order 12829. (1993). National Industrial Security Program. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=457290 





Executive Order 13011. (1996). Federal Information Technology. Retrieved from: 
https://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/07/1996-07-16-executive-order-13011-on-federal-
information-technology.html 
Executive Order 13231. (2001).  Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information 
Age. Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=620 
Executive Order 13354. (2004).  National Counterterrorism Center. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=449324 
Executive Order 13355. (2004). Strengthened Management of the Intelligence 
Community.  Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=449323 
Executive Order 13470. (2008). Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States 
Intelligence Activities. Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=487886 
Executive Order 13549. (2010). Classified National Security Information Program for 
State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=19427 
Executive Order 13587. (2011). Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified 
Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified 
Information. Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=689795 
Executive Order 13636. (2013). Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. 
Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731040 
Executive Order 13691. (2015). Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing.  Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=762390 
181 
 
Executive Order 13702. (2015). Creating a National Strategic Computing Initiative. 
Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=768436 
Executive Order 13718. (2016). Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. 
Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790114 
Fusch, P. and Ness, L. (2015). Are we there yet? Data saturation in qualitative research. 
The Qualitative Report, 20(9), 1408-1416. Retrieved from:  
tent/uploads/2015/09/fusch1.pdf 
Galeotti, M. (2012). The cyber menace. The World Today 68(7) 32-35 Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962876 
Garfinkel, S. (2012). Inside Risks: The Cybersecurity Risk. Communications of the ACM 
55(6).29-32. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1145/2184319.2184330 
t3FaYPkf6UWz_YWIA&bvm=bv.146094739,d.cGw 
Garland, M. (2015). A brief history of IT acquisition reform. Journal of Contract 
Management. Retrieved from: https://www.ncmahq.org/docs/default-
source/default-document-library/articles/jcm15---article-05 
Gjelten, T. (2013). First strike: U.S. cyber warriors seize the offensive. Current, (522), 3. 
Retrieved from:  https://www.jstor.org/stable/43554737 
Glaser, G. and Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory.  Aldine 
Transaction. Piscataway, New Jersey. 




Graciela, M. (2018). Ransomware Attacks hits City of Spring Hill. Retrieved from: 
https://www.thepluglosangeles.com/ransomware-spring-hill/ 
Greengard, S. (2016). Cybersecurity gets smart. Communications of the ACM 59(5). 
Retrieved from: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/5/201590-cybersecurity-
gets-smart/abstract 
Hartnett, R. and Stever, J. (2011). The New Policy world of Cybersecurity. Public 
Administration Review 71(3), 455-460. doi: 10.111/j.1540-6210.2011.02366.x 
Healy, J. and Jordan, K. (2016). Setting Priorities on Cybersecurity. Democracy: A 
Journal of Ideas Vol. 40. Retrieved from: 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/40/setting-priorities-on-cybersecurity/ 
Heclo, H. (1974). Social Policy in Britain and Sweden. New Haven, CT. Yale University 
Press. 
Heidenreich, B., & Gray, D. H. (2014). Cyber-Security: The Threat of the Internet.  
Global Security Studies, 5(1), 17-26. 
Homeland Security Council. (2007).  National Strategy for Homeland Security. Retrieved 
from: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. (2003). Management of Domestic Incidents. 
Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf 
Hopkins, S., Wilson, A., Silva, A., and Forsythe, C. (2015). Factors Contributing to 
Performance for Cyber Security Forensic Analysis. In: Tryfonas, T., Askoxylakis 
183 
 
I. (eds). Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust, HAS 2015. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9190. Springer, Cham 
Hudson, B, Hunter, D., and Peckham, S. (2019). Policy failure and the policy-
implementation gap: can policy support programs help? Policy Design and 
Practice 2(1). 1-14. Retrieved from: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2018.1540378 
International Strategy for Cyberspace. (2011). International Strategy for Cyberspace: 
Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_
for_cyberspace.pdf 
Kaiser, R. (2015). The birth of cyberwar. Political Geography (46), 11-20. Retrieved 
from: https://doi.org 10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.10.001 /  
Kallberg, J. & Thuraisingham, B. (2013).  From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert 
Cyber Operations. Strategic Intelligence Management. (229-233). Retrieved from: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407191-9.00019-3 
Kennedy, M. (2017). Volkswagen to plead guilty, pay $4.3 billion in emissions scheme 
settlement. Nashville Public Radio. Retrieved from: 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/11/509318791/volkswagen-to-
plead-guilty-pay-4-3-billion-in-emissions-scheme-settlement 
Koski, C. (2015). Does a partnership need partners?  Assessing partnerships for critical 
infrastructure protection. American Review of Public Administration, 45(3). 
Retrieved from:  https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0275074013494754 
184 
 
Leeuw, F. and Leeuw, B. (2012). Cyber society and digital policies: Challenges to 
evaluation? Evaluation, 18(1), 111-127, doi: 10.1177/1356389011431777 
Leiner, B., Cerf, V., Clark, D., Kahn, R., Kleinrock, L., Lynch, D., Postel, J., Roberts, L, 
and Wolff, S. (2009). A Brief History of the Internet. ACM SIGCOMM Computer 
Communication Review 39(5). Retrieved from: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1629607.1629613 
Lin, H. (2016). Attribution of malicious cyber incidents: from soup to nuts. Journal of 
International Affairs 70(1). Retrieved from: 
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/attribution-malicious-cyber-incidents 
Lobato, L. and Kenkel, K. (2015). Discourses of cyberspace securitization in Brazil and 
in the United States. Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional 58(2) 23-43. 
Retrieved from: https://doi.org/ 10.1590/0034-7329201500202 
Malafronte, K. (2019). Malware Attack Shuts Down Columbia State for 2 Days. 
Retrieved from: https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/university /malware-
attack-columbia-state/ 
Malone, E. and Malone, M. (2013). The “wicked problem” of cybersecurity policy: 
analysis of United States and Canadian policy response. Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal. 19(2), 158-177, doi: 10.1080/11926422.2013.805152 
Maxwell, J. (2002). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (3d edition). 
Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, California. 
McLean, I. (1991).  Rational Choice and Politics. Political Studies (39, 496-512). 
Retrieved from:  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1991.tb01625.x 
185 
 
McCollum, T. (2015). The cybersecurity imperative. Internal Auditor. Retrieved from: 
https://iaonline.theiia.org/2015/the-cybersecurity-imperative 
McCracken, G. (1988). Qualitative Research Methods: The long interview. SAGE.      
doi: 10.4135/9781412986229 
McLeod, S. (2008). Case study method. Retrieved from: Retrieved from: 
https://www.simplypsychology.org/case-study.html 
Morris, T., Vandriel, M., Dries, W., Perdew, J., Schulz, R. and Jacobsen, K. (2015). 
Securing Operational Access. The National Interest (136).  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44028370 
National Archives. (2016). Presidential Libraries. Retrieved from: 
https://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries. 
National Conference of State Legislatures. (2019). Cybersecurity Legislation 2018. 
Retrieved from: http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2018.aspx 
National Cyber Strategy. (2018). National Cyber Strategy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-
Strategy.pdf 
National White-Collar Crime Center & the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2002). 
IFCC 2002 Internet Fraud Report, January 1, 2002 – December 31, 2002. 
Retrieved from: https://pdf.ic3.gov/2002_IFCCReport.pdf 
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies. (n.d.). Explore terms: a 
glossary of common cybersecurity terminology. https://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary 
186 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2017). The Cybersecurity Framework:  
Implementation Guidance for Federal Agencies (NISTIR 8170).  Retrieved from: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-8170/nistir8170-draft.pdf 
National Security Decision Directive 97. (1983). National Security Telecommunications  
Policy. https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/reference/Scanned 
%20NSDDS/NSDD97.pdf 
National Security Decision Directive 113. (1983). Security of Communications Systems 
Used by Key Government Officials. https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives 
/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD113.pdf 
National Security Decision Directive 145. (1984). National Policy on  
Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security. 
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD
145.pdf 
National Security Directive 42. (1990). National Policy for the Security of National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems. 
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd42.pdf 
National Security Presidential Directive 54. (2008). Cybersecurity Policy. 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-54.pdf 
O’Hara, J., Murphy, J., Vreeburg, J., Giaier, S., Maurer, D., Geffroy, M., and Lowe, T. 
(2015). Turf Wars: How a jurisdictional quagmire in Congress compromises 




Office of Homeland Security. (2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-
2002.pdf 
Osborne, C. (2018).  U.S. Hospital pays $55,000 to hackers after ransomware attack. 
Retrieved from: https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-hospital-pays-55000-to-
ransomware-operators/ 
Padgett, L. (2019). Jackson County paid online criminals $400,000 to stop cyber-attack 
officials say. Retrieved from: https://www.11alive.com/article/news/crime/ 
jackson-county-paid -online-criminals-400000-to-stop-cyber-attack-officials-
say/85-bcb02d83-b607-4128-aae4-750b4a91fc50 
Paris Call. (2018) Cybersecurity: Paris Call of 12 November 2018 for Trust and Security 
in Cyberspace.  Retrieved from: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-
foreign-policy/digital-diplomacy/france-and-cyber-security/article/cybersecurity -
paris-call-of-12-november-2018-for-trust-and-security-in 
Passeri, P. (2019). 2018: A year of cyberattacks. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2019/01/15/2018-a-year-of-cyberattacks/ 
Passeri, P. (2019). 1-15 January 2019 Cyberattacks Timeline. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2019/02/04/1-15-january-2019-cyberattacks-
timeline/ 





Passeri, P. (2019). 1-15 February 2019 Cyberattacks Timeline. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2019/03/12/1-15-february-2019-cyberattacks-
timeline/ 
Passeri, P. (2019). 16-28 February 2019 Cyberattacks Timeline. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2019/03/20/16-28-february-2019-cyberattacks-
timeline/ 
Passeri, P. (2019). 1-15 March 2019 Cyberattacks Timeline. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2019/04/09/1-15-march-2019-cyberattacks-
timeline/ 
Passeri, P. (2019). 16-31 March 2019 Cyberattacks Timeline. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hackmageddon.com/2019/04/15/16-31-march-2019-cyberattacks-
timeline/ 
Patton, M. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods (third edition). Sage. 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Pedersen, C. (2014). Much Ado about Cyberspace. Pepperdine Public Policy Review, 71-
21. Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol7/iss1/3/ 
Pellerin, C. (2016). DoD Cyber Strategy Defines How Officials Discern Cyber Incidents 
from Armed Attacks. Defense Media Activity. Retrieved from: 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/841043/dod-cyber-strategy-
defines-how-officials-discern-cyber-incidents-from-armed-att 




President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee. (2005). Cyber Security:  
A Crisis of Prioritization. Retrieved from: 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a449192.pdf 
Presidential Decision Directive 5. (1993). Public Encryption Management. Retrieved 
from: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12737 
Presidential Decision Directive 63. (1998). Critical Infrastructure Protection. Retrieved 
from: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12762 
Presidential Directive 24. (1977). Telecommunications Protection Policy. Retrieved 
from: https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd24.pdf 
Presidential Directive 53. (1979). National Security Telecommunications Policy. 
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd53.pdf 
Presidential Policy Directive 21. (2013). Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731087 
Presidential Policy Directive 41. (2016). Directive on United States Cyber Incident 
Coordination. Retrieved from: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=797544z 
Public Law 89-306. (1965). Automatic Data Processing Act of 1965. Retrieved from: 
http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/89/306.pdf 
Public Law 100-235. (1987). Computer Security Act of 1987. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg1724.pdf 





Public Law 104-191. (1996) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ191/pdf/PLAW-
104publ191.pdf 
Public Law 106-102. (1999). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ102/pdf/PLAW-106publ102.pdf 
Public Law 107-56. (2001). Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot 
Act) Act of 2001. https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-
107publ56.pdf 
Public Law 107-296. (2002). An Act to establish the Department of Homeland Security, 
and for other purposes. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf 
Public Law 107-305. (2002). Cyber Security Research and Development Act. Retrieved 
from: https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ305/PLAW-107publ305.pdf 
Public Law 107-347. (2002). E-Government Act of 2002. Retrieved from: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/2458/ 
Public Law 113-274. (2014). Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014. Retrieved from: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-
bill/1353?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22cybersecurity%22%5D%7D&r=6 









Pugh, E. and Aspray, W. (1996). Creating the Computer Industry. IEEE Annals of the 
History of Computing. 18(2).  Retrieved from:  
https://doi.org/10.1109/MAHC.1996.490112 
Rutkowski, A. (2011). Public international law of the international telecommunication 
instruments: cyber security treaty provisions since 1850. Digital Policy, 
Regulation and Governance 13(1) 13-31.  Retrieved from:  
https://doi.org/10.1108/14636691111101856 
Sabatier, P. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of 
policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences 21: 129-168. 
Saldaña, J. (2016). Theories of the policy process (Second edition). Boulder, Colorado. 
Westview Press. 
Shackelford, S. and Bohm, Z. (2016). Securing North American Critical Infrastructure: a 
comparative case study in cybersecurity regulation. Canada-United States Law 
Journal Vol. 40. 
Simon, H. (1964). On the concept of organizational goal. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 9(1).  
Slayton, R. (2016). Framing computer security and privacy: the 1960s and 1970s. 




State of Tennessee Executive Order 8. (2003). An order Constituting the Tennessee 
Office of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Council, and the Tennessee 
Governor’s Citizen Corps Advisory Committee. Retrieved from: 
http://share.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-bred8.pdf 
State of Tennessee Executive Order 16. (2012). An order dissolving the Tennessee 
Governor’s Citizen Corps Advisory Committee as constituted by Governor Phi 
Bredesen’s Executive Order No. 8, dated April 3, 2003. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/safety/attachments/exec-orders-haslam16.pdf 
State of Tennessee Executive Order 23. (2005). An order establishing the National 
Incident Management System as the basis for all incident management in the 
State. Retrieved from: http://share.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-
bred23.pdf 
State of Tennessee Executive Order 36. (2002). An order constituting the Tennessee 
Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council and establishing 
the Tennessee Governor’s Citizen Corps Advisory Committee. Retrieved from: 
http://share.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/sundquist%20executive%20order%20no.%
2036.pdf 
State of Tennessee Executive Order 48. (2007). An order transferring the Tennessee 
Office of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Council, and the Tennessee 
Governor’s Citizen Corps Advisory Committee from the Governor’s Office to the 




Symantec. (2019). Internet Security Threat Report. Retrieved from: 
https://img03.en25.com/Web/Symantec/%7B1a7cfc98-319b-4b97-88a7-
1306a3539445%7D_ISTR_24_2019_en.pdf 
Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to case study. The Qualitative Report 3(4).  Retrieved 
from: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol3/iss2/4/ 
Tennessee Anti-Phishing Act. (2006). Anti-Phishing Act of 2006. Retrieved from: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/tncode/ 
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Home 
Retrieved from: https://www.tn.gov/content/tn/tbi.html 
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. (n.d.). About us. Retrieved 
from: http://www.tn.gov/safety/article/about_us 
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security 2. (n.d.). Directory. Retrieved 
from: http://www.tn.gov/safety/article/directory 
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security 3. (n.d.). Homeland Security. 
Retrieved from: http://www.tn.gov/safety/section/homelandsecurity 
Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security 4. (n.d.). Cyber Awareness. 
Retrieved from: http://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/safety 
/attachments/A_Safer_Tennessee.pdf 
Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act of 2003. (2003). Tennessee Personal 




Tennessee State Government. (2016). A Safer Tennessee: Highlights of the Governor’s 
initial public safety action plan, 2016-2018 with key performance indicators. 
Retrieved from: http://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/safety/ 
attachments/A_Safer_Tennessee.pdf 
Trautman, L. (2015). Cybersecurity: what about U.S. policy? University of Illinois 
Journal of Law, Technology & Policy. Retrieved from:  
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2548561 
Tripathi, S. (2015) Cyber: Also a Domain of War and Terror, Strategic Analysis, 39:1, 1-
8, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2014.980549 
United States Code. (2009). Title 44, Public Printing and Documents Section 3502. 
Retrieved from: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-
title44/pdf/USCODE-2009-title44-chap35-subchapI-sec3502.pdf 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Brentwood city, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ brentwoodcitytennessee 
/PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Columbia city, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ columbiacitytennessee 
/PST045218 
United States Census Bureau (2017). Quick facts: Davidson County, Tennessee. 




United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Fairview city, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ fairviewcitytennessee 
/PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Franklin city, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ franklincitytennessee 
/PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Giles County, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ gilescountytennessee 
/PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Maury County, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ maurycountytennessee/ 
PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Nashville-Davidson (balance), 
Tennessee. Retrieved from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table 
/nashvilledavidson balancetennessee /PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Pulaski city, Tennessee. Retrieved 
from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ 
pulaskicitytennessee/PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Spring Hill city, Tennessee. Retrieved 




United States Census Bureau. (2017). Quick facts: Williamson County, Tennessee. 
Retrieved from: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ 
williamsoncountytennessee /PST045218 
United States Census Bureau. (2018). Quick facts: Tennessee.  Retrieved from: 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/tn/PST045218 
United States Cyber Command. (2015).  Beyond the build: delivering outcomes through 
cyberspace. The commander’s vision and guidance for US Cyber Command. 
Retrieved from: https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/docs/US-Cyber-Command-Commanders-Vision.pdf 
United States Office of Homeland Security. (2002). National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-
strat-hls-2002.pdf  
United States Strategic Command. (2016). U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 
Retrieved from: http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-
View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/ 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. (2001). Pub. L. No. 107-56. 
Vermuelen, H. (1995).  Origins and Institutionalization of Ethnography and Ethnology in 
Europe and the USA, 1771-1845. Fieldwork and Footnotes: Studies in the History 
of European Anthropology, 39-59. 
197 
 
Walden University Center for Research Quality. (n.d.). Research Ethics & Compliance: 
Welcome from the IRB. 
https://academicguides.waldenu.edu/researchcenter/orec 
Warner, M. (2012). Cybersecurity: A Pre-history. Intelligence & National Security, 
27(5), 781-799. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708530 
Warner, M. (2015). Notes on the Evolution of Computer Security Policy in the United 
States, 1965-2003. IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 37(2). Retrieved 
from: https://doi.org/10.1109/MAHC.2015.25 
Weible, C., Sabatier, P., and McQueen, K. (2009). These and variations: taking stock of 
the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Studies 37(1). 
Whetstone, T. (2018).  Knox County election night cyberattack was smokescreen for 
another attack. Retrieved from: https://www.knoxnews.com/story 
/news/local/2018/05/17/knox-county-election-cyberattack-smokescreen-another-
attack/620921002/ 
Wingfield, T. and Sharp, R. (2014). Tanks in cyberspace. International Policy Digest 
1(4). Retrieved from: https://intpolicydigest.org/2014/04/14/tanks-cyberspace/ 
Wipersoft. (2019). The biggest data breaches of 2018. Retrieved from: 
https://www.wipersoft.com/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-2018/ 
Wolfe, M., Jones, B., and Baumgartner, F. (2013). A Failure to Communicate: Agenda 
Setting in Media and Policy Studies. Political Communication 30(2). 
Yin, R. (2014).  Case study research; design and methods (fifth edition).  Thousand 
Oaks, California. SAGE  
198 
 
Zaveri, M. (2018).  Harris County tightens cybersecurity after almost losing $900K in 










From “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning Therein,” by P. Sabatier, 1988, Policy Sciences, 21, p. 132. Copyright 
1988 by Springer.  
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Appendix B: Advocacy Coalition Framework Outline From 2009 
 
From “Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” by 
C. Weible, P. Sabatier, & K. McQueen, 2009, Policy Sciences, 37, p. 123. Copyright 




Appendix C: The Department of Defense Cybersecurity Policy Chart 
 
 
Reprinted from “The DoD Cybersecurity Policy Chart (Formerly the IA Policy Chart,” 
by Cyber Security and Information Systems Information Analysis Center, 2017  




Appendix D: Agencies and Offices Targeted for Interviews in the Study 
               
    
  
Office Government Level Potential Interviews
U.S. Senate Federal 2
U.S. House Federal 9
TN Senate State 19
TN House State 25
TN Governors Office State 3
Safety and Homeland Security State 2
TBI State 2
TEMA State 2
Davidson County County 3
Giles County County 3
Maury County County 3





Mount Pleasant City 3
Nashville City 3
Pulaski City 3
Spring Hill City 3
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Interview Candidate: ________________________________ 
 
Opening Comments: 
Thank you again for agreeing to meet with me today.  Our discussion should last 
approximately 90 minutes.  Our discussion topic is cybersecurity policy and 
management, particularly how federal policy influences state policies and procedures, if 
adequate resources exist, and where this issue ranks among other priorities on the 
legislative and operational priority matrix.  For those with working knowledge of agency 
operations in the state, we will also discuss how well programs and policies are 
implemented in the field and whether they meet the expressed vision and goal of 
published policies. 
I will begin the interview with some background questions regarding your personal and 
professional background, responsibilities, and level of engagement with cybersecurity in 
your current role.  The second set of questions will focus on the current policy 
environment around cybersecurity.  In the final section, questions will explore the 
relationship between established policies in the state and their implementation in the 
field. 
As a reminder, you do not have to answer any questions you choose and we can skip over 
a question and return to it later in the interview to address, if desired.  All responses 
provided are anonymous and no identifying information will be provided to anyone or 
included in publication.  I will conduct the collection and analysis myself, so there is no 
risk for data exposure.  
I will be digitally recording the audio portion of the interview to assist with transcription 
and data capture.  Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
I would like to begin with some general questions to establish your background and 
experience, along with your engagement level with cybersecurity in your current role. 
 
Opening Questions: 
• What is your professional and educational background? 
• How long have you been in your current position? 
• What are the primary responsibilities of your current role? 
• What issues do your constituents (if applicable) communicate with you most 
about? 
• What special interest areas or policy subjects do you feel are most important to 
the business, social, or political environment of your home territory? 
• What are the most pressing legislative/policy items at your peer level? 
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• What is your comfort level with the field of cybersecurity from both technical and 
policy perspectives? 
• Are there any unique considerations or emergent issues I need to take into 
consideration for the interview today? 
 
Research Question 1: 
Does U.S. cybersecurity policy at the federal level provide sufficient guidance and 
resources for state and local agencies to enact and implement cybersecurity policy at their 
levels? 
 
Interview Questions 1: 
1. What are the main drivers of the most important legislative issues on your agenda 
year to year? 
2. Can you provide some examples of emergent (unplanned) issues that elevated 
beyond their assumed importance during a given session over the last decade? 
3. In your opinion, what are the responsibilities of the various levels of government 
with regard to cybersecurity? 
4. Which federal cybersecurity policies and programs are the most relevant and 
applicable to the current policy environment in Middle Tennessee? 
5. Based on your experience, is cybersecurity viewed consistently (as a need, as an 
issue for the federal government, or mixed) by your peers or is support divided?  
If divided, are the coalitions divided along party lines or other groups? 
a. Are there special interest groups or other outside parties expressing 
interest in cybersecurity policy within the State of Tennessee (either for or 
against) and contributing to advocacy or coalitions on either side of the 
discussion?  If so, can you provide groups or other major stakeholders 
involved, along with their belief structure and resources? 
b. How effective are these coalitions at influencing legislative opinions on 
topics up for discussion and the eventual direction and decisions made by 
the governor? 
c. What methods are used by these coalitions to further their agenda 
(resource allocation, appointments, rules and regulations)? 
6. What are your main influences when considering cybersecurity policies and 
procedures (do news stories or reports of hacking and other activity raise the issue 
to an actionable level if it was not previously there)? 
7. How (if at all) have cybersecurity considerations impacted emergency 
preparedness and planning at your level? 
8. Over the course of the last decade, how have the following policy areas changes 
around cybersecurity: 
a. Attributes of the problem 
b. Fundamental social values and structure 
c. Basic constitutional structure and laws 
d. Socioeconomic reform 
e. Systemic governing coalition 
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f. Degree of consensus needed for policy change 
g. Overlapping societal cleavages 
h. General direction and focus of policy 
 
Research Question 2: 
Regarding cybersecurity programs, how well aligned is the current implementation with 
established policies and the initial vision of the legislation that created them? 
 
Interview Questions 2: 
1. Please provide an overview of how cybersecurity is accounted for in the planning 
and policy of your locality (higher government responsibility, emergency 
manager in charge, CIO, et cetera). 
2. What are the major constraints and/or limitations on emergency planning and 
operations regarding cybersecurity? 
3. What provisions, authority, or resources are provided by higher government 
entities to you around cybersecurity? 
4. How clear are your organization’s mission, focus, and goals around 
cybersecurity? 
a. Can you provide a brief overview of each? 
b. How are these measured in your organization? 
5. With your current level of resources, oversight, and authority, are you able to 
fully accomplish all the missions and objectives set out for you by policy, charter, 
and directive? 
a. If not, what resources are needed to bridge the gap between your current 
state and fulfillment? 
6. How do your operations and field agencies compare on the ground to their vision 
on paper and in the charter for your organization (compare the implementation 
and continued finding and operation of ED and CS to the original concepts, 
budgets, and strength and mission on paper)? 
7. In your opinion, what is the most effective method to address concerns of a 
disconnect in implementation, mission creep, conflicting directives, or lack of 
resources to perform critical tasks? 
 
Closing Comments: 
This concludes our interview today.  Thank you once again for your participation in and 
contribution to this research project.  Within the next seven days I will provide you with a 
written transcription of the interview question and responses from this session via e-mail 
for your review.  Please review the transcription and let me know if there is anything that 




Appendix F: Invitation E-mail for Participants 
Good Afternoon: 
My name is Daniel Scherr and I am a doctoral candidate at Walden University.  I am 
conducting a research study focused on public officials and cybersecurity in Tennessee.  
This study will occur in the form of interviews that I will facilitate.  Each participant’s 
confidentiality will be protected during the collection of data and the reporting of results. 
This e-mail is meant to serve as a request for participants for this voluntary study related 
to cybersecurity.   If you are interested in participating in the study, please e-mail me 
directly at [redacted] and I will provide the necessary paperwork for informed consent for 
your review and completion.    
If you need any additional information prior to deciding as to whether to participate, 
please feel free to contact me at the e-mail address noted below. 
As a reminder, participation is voluntary and confidential.     




Daniel Scherr, MBA, CFE 




Appendix G: Reminder E-mail for Participants 
Good Afternoon: 
This e-mail is meant to serve as a reminder that there are two weeks remaining to 
communicate interest in participating in the voluntary study related to cybersecurity.     
If additional information is needed prior to making a decision as to whether or not to 
participate, please feel free to contact me at the e-mail address noted below. 
As a reminder, participation is voluntary and confidential.     





Daniel Scherr, MBA, CFE 




Appendix H: Final E-mail for Participants 
Good Afternoon: 
This e-mail is meant to serve as a reminder that there is one week remaining to 
communicate interest in participating in the voluntary study related to cybersecurity.    
If additional information is needed prior to deciding as to whether to participate, please 
feel free to contact me at the e-mail address noted below. 
In the event in which I do not receive a response within the next week, it will be 
understood that you are not interested in participating.  This e-mail will be the last 
communication that is sent to individuals who do not respond.     
As a reminder, participation is voluntary and confidential.     





Daniel Scherr, MBA, CFE 




Appendix I: Preliminary Coding 
  
Primary Coding - Topic
Topic Codes Possible Interview Questions
Cyber Security CS All
Domestic and Emergency Planning DEP 1-2, 7, 9, 10, 13-15
Secondary Coding - Theoretical Framework:
Topic Codes Possible Interview Questions
Advocacy Coalition Framework ACF 5-6, 8, 10
Coalition ACFC 5-6, 8, 10
Policy Beliefs ACFPB 1-8
External Events ACFEE 1,3-5, 8
Stable System Parameters ACFSS 1,3-5, 8, 11, 13
Coalition Opportunity ACFCO 5-6, 8, 10
Policy Outputs ACFPO 2, 4-5, 9, 11-14
Policy Inputs ACFPI 1-3, 5-8
Constraints and Resources ACFCR 10-11, 13
Governmental Decisions ACFGD 1-4, 6-15
Tertiary Coding - Recurrent Themes
Topics Codes Possible Interview Questions
Challenges CHA 2,5a, 5b, 7-13, 15
Considerations CON All
Decisions DEC 1, 3, 6-10, 11, 13, 15
Documentations DOC 2-4, 7, 9, 11-12
Funding FUN 1, 4, 6-7, 10, 13
Hacking HAC 2, 6, 8, 9
Homeland Security HSC All
Impact IMP All
Infrastructure INF 13-14
Manpower MPW 3, 7, 9-10, 13-15
Objectives OBJ 7, 9, 12
Obstacles OBS All
Public-Private Partnership PPP 5, 7-9, 13
Relationships REL All
Resources RES 1, 3-4, 7-8, 10-11, 13
Technical Expertise TCH 6-7, 9-10, 12-13
Threats THR All
Unfunded Mandate UFM 3-4, 7, 9-11, 13
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Appendix J: Final Codes and Frequency of Usage 
               
Primary Coding - Topic
Topic Codes Code Frequency
Cyber Security CS 166
Domestic and Emergency Planning DEP 45
Secondary Coding - Theoretical Framework:
Topic Codes Code Frequency
Advocacy Coalition Framework ACF 381
Coalition ACFC 82
Coalition Opportunity ACFCO 94
Constraints and Resources ACFCR 167
External Events ACFEE 63
Governmental Decisions ACFGD 129
Policy Beliefs ACFPB 130
Policy Inputs ACFPI 70
Policy Outputs ACFPO 81
Stable System Parameters ACFSS 59
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Tertiary Coding - Recurrent Themes 414
Topics Codes Code Frequency
Best Practice BPR 114













Homeland Security HSC 28
How do we keep up HOW 19
Impact IMP 112
Infrastructure INF 84













Shared Responsibility SHA 38
State vs Federal SVF 31
Strategic STR 41
Tactical TAC 44




Unfunded Mandate UFM 41
Vendor VEN 70
Vendors focused on bottom line VBL 14
Weakness WEK 54
You are not alone YNA 26
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Appendix K: Demographic Profile for Selected Counties and Localities 
 
Data collected from Census data at census.gov/data 
 
Location Population Median Income Median Home Value
State of Tennessee 6,770,010 $48,708 $151,700
Davidson County 691,243 $53,419 $194,800
Giles County 29,401 $43,925 $120,400
Maury County 92,163 $52,080 $156,000
Williamson County 226,257 $103,543 $388,400
Brentwood 42,667 $151,722 $582,800
Columbia 38,266 $41,673 $126,000
Fairview 8,763 $63,125 $191,000
Franklin 78,321 $92,589 $362,300
Nashville 667,560 $52,858 $191,400
Pulaski 7,676 $34,241 $96,200
Spring Hill 39,602 $86,538 $237,700
